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THE KLAMATHS’ PATH AFTER TERMINATION 
 
Chairperson:  Dr. Len Broberg 
 
  During the 1950s, termination policy dominated federal Indian policy.  Termination 
policy was an effort by the federal government to complete the assimilation process by 
ending the federal trust relationship it held with Native American tribes.  US federal 
officials chose to terminate the trust relationship with tribes that they considered 
assimilated and wealthy.  As many other historians have argued, termination history did 
not end in a positive way for tribes.  Many tribes witnessed the social and economic 
collapse of their communities, as well as the loss of their tribal identity.   
  Although the Klamaths suffered from their termination experience, they faced a new 
path before them after termination.  This new path resulted from conservation-based 
amendments to the tribes’ termination act.  The conservation-based amendments 
encouraged the federal purchase of most of the Klamaths’ forested land.  In 1970, the US 
denounced termination and in 1975 enacted self-determination policy, legislation that 
would allow tribes to assert their sovereignty without severing their federal trust 
relationship.  The federal, rather than private, ownership of the Klamaths’ former land 
offered the Klamaths a land-base on which they could practice their treaty rights and 
assert their sovereignty in the management of that land during the self-determination era.  
This study delves into the Klamaths’ interests in their forested land prior to termination.  
Then, it illuminates the development of the conservation-based amendments.  Last, the 
research follows the Klamaths down their new path to show how the tribes empowered 
themselves by taking advantage of self-determination policy, environmental law, and 
federal administrative procedures. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We flipped our lines into the Williamson River near its headwaters where the river 
emerges as a spring from the volcanic soil.  My dad and Grandpa Jackie took me out to 
fish and to poke around the ponderosa pine forest near our home in southern Oregon 
every summer.  I tightly gripped my pole and lightly held my line with my left pointer 
finger and thumb.  With as much patience as I could muster at ten years old, I waited for 
a bite.  The sweet aroma of ponderosa pines tickled my nostrils.  As I shifted my footing, 
the pumice-flour soil, speckled with dry, orange ponderosa needles, crackled and 
compacted beneath me.  I reeled in the line and cast it again toward the pool along the 
opposite bank.  Grandpa Jackie and my dad each had found their own fishing nooks along 
the riverbank.  They were casting, relaxing, and sharing the sweet summer air in the 
forest. 
The Williamson is one of three main rivers that flow through the Upper Klamath 
River Watershed, a region that included the Klamath Indian Reservation at one time.  
After the Williamson’s waters surface in the north-central end of the reservation, they 
flow south until they hit the basalt dike that dams the river.  The dike forces much of the 
Williamson’s water to spread across the land, creating the Klamath Marsh.  Not all the 
water is dammed, though.  Quite a bit bypasses the dam and continues southwest toward 
Klamath Lake.  Just before reaching Klamath Lake, the Sprague River pours into the 
Williamson, increasing the discharge in the channel.  The Sprague flows east to west, 
bisecting the reservation.  Another river, the Sycann, carries water from the northeast side 
of the Klamath Reservation south to the Sprague River.  This river, like the Williamson 
River, also morphs into a marsh and continues south through the ponderosas that stand 
along the riparian corridor like guardsmen.  Grandpa Jackie knew these rivers well.  He 
taught my dad where the best fishing holes were on each river.  Then, he and my dad 
gave me this knowledge of the watershed. 
Grandpa Jackie was my adopted grandpa.  He had plenty of grandkids, but I was short 
in the way of grandpas.  Jackie Crume, now passed, was a thin, gentle, aloof member of 
the Klamath Tribes.  The Klamath Tribes are a confederated tribe consisting of the 
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Klamath, Modoc, and Yahooskin Band of Paiute Indians in southern Oregon.  Prior to 
creation of their reservation, the ancestors of the Klamath Tribes inhabited more than 20-
million acres of land throughout southern Oregon and northern California.  The Klamath 
proper were composed of six main groups, which anthropologist Theodore Stern refers to 
as tribelets, dispersed throughout their territory.  Some of the Klamath groups lived near 
Klamath Lake, while others lived farther east near the Williamson and Sprague rivers and 
near the marshes on the north end of their territory.  The Klamath’s diet depended mostly 
on fish from these water sources.  The Klamaths lived a more stationary life compared to 
the Modocs.  The fish in the lake and marshes offered the Klamaths stability year-round.  
They supplemented the fish with other foods, such as game, pond lily seeds, berries and 
tubers.1  
The Modocs lived south of the Klamaths, in present-day north-central California.  
The Modocs’ territory consisted of a separate river, marsh, and lake system than the 
Klamath.  The Modocs’ diet included fish from Lower Klamath Lake, Tule Lake, Goose 
Lake and the Lost River.  They, too, ate tubers, berries, and seeds.  However, the 
Modocs’ territory did not offer their people an adequate supply of fish year-round.  They 
ate large amounts of game from the nearby shrub and timberlands.2 
To the north and east of the Klamaths and Modocs lived multiple bands of the 
Northern Paiutes, including the Yahooskin Band.  The environment of the Yahooskin 
resembled that of the Klamaths and Modocs.  They subsisted on fish from rivers and 
lakes in lowland valleys, including the eastern side of Goose Lake, Summer Lake, and 
                                                 
1 The Klamath Tribes use the plural form of their name to represent the three tribes included in their 
confederated tribe.  The three tribes include the Klamath proper, the Modoc, and the Yahooskin Band of 
Paiute. Theodore Stern, “Klamath and Modoc,” Handbook of North American Indians, Plateau, vol. 12, 
vol. ed., Deward E. Walker, Jr., general ed., William C. Sturtevant. (Wash., D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 
1998), 447-453.  The Klamath and the Modoc spoke dialects of the Klamath language group.  
Anthropologists classify the Klamath language in the Plateau Penutian family, Stern, 1998, 446. In a later 
footnote I discuss the controversy anthropologists have over the Yahooskin Band of North Paiutes. As far 
as their language is concerned, one can infer that the Yahooskin, who lived east of the Modoc and north 
and east of the Klamath probably spoke Western Numic, the language that other bands of Paiutes spoke 
within the same geographic region.  The Western Numic language is part of the Uto-Aztecan family, see 
Catherine S. Fowler and Sven Liljeblad. “Northern Paiute,” Handbook of North American Indians, Great 
Basin, vol. 11. vol. ed., Warren D’Azevedo, general ed., William C. Sturtevant (Wash., D.C.: Smithsonian 
Institution, 1986), 435. 
2 Stern, 1998, 447-453.  
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the Harney Valley.  Aside from fish, the Yahooskin subsisted on roots, berries, seeds, and 
game.3 
Tules, or cattails, blanketed the lake edges and marshes throughout the combined 
territory of the three Indian groups.  They all utilized the tule.  The Klamaths and Modocs 
constructed tule mats, baskets, walls for their summer dwellings, clothing, and footwear.  
The Northern Paiutes, and presumably the Yahooskins, used tules for housing, footwear, 
decoys, and clothing.   
In the early 1800s, these tribes encountered non-Indians for the first time.  When 
Peter Skene Ogden of the Hudson’s Bay Company traveled through Klamath territory in 
1826, one Klamath village hosted around 200 Indians who had met for trading.  The 
Klamaths told Ogden that his party would meet larger populations of Indians as they 
traveled west on the Klamath River to the ocean.  Stern argues that the Klamaths did 
most of their trading on the Willamette River and at a large trade center in The Dalles, 
Oregon, on the Columbia River.  According to Stern, in the early-1800s, trappers first 
introduced the Klamaths to the trade center at The Dalles.  This trade center became 
important for the Klamaths and Modocs.  Both raided neighboring tribes and participated 
in a slave trade at The Dalles.4   
By the late-1800s, the Klamath, Modoc, and Yahooskin groups would together agree 
with the federal government to move onto a reservation.  Leaders of the Klamaths, 
Modocs, and Yahooskin Band of Paiute Indians met with Indian Office officials in 
                                                 
3 Fowler and Liljeblad, 439-443. Anthropological sources offer mixed opinions as to whom the Yahooskin 
name refers. Fowler and Liljeblad do not include the Yahooskin in their discussion of the Northern Paiute. 
Instead, they referred to that name in their synonymy section. By applying anthropological sources, they 
postulate that the Yahooskin Band of Paiutes was actually a group of Upland Klamaths or possibly a miss-
named group belonging to another band of Northern Paiutes. They contend that Yahuskin, or Yahooskin, is 
not a Northern Paiute name. Furthermore, they argue that the only records that use that term are Indian 
Office records. None of the military records, prior to the establishment of the Indian Office, use that name. 
See Fowler and Liljeblad, 464-465. One should note, however, that the contemporary Klamath Tribes 
recognize the Yahooskin Band of Paiutes. Their acknowledgement of the Yahooskin is clearly evident on 
their tribal seal and in the name of their casino, Kla-Mo-Ya—Klamath, Modoc, and Yahooskin, 
respectively. Because this group of Indians is not clearly defined in anthropological literature, I based my 
decision to categorize the Yahooskin as Northern Paiutes living in the areas northeast and east of the 
aboriginal Klamath and Modoc on the Klamath Tribes’ and the BIA’s recognition of those people.  
4 Klamath and Modoc, see Stern, 1998, 450-455. Yahooskin Band of Paiute, see Fowler and Liljeblad, 439-
446. The Klamath were also part of a trade network with other tribes of the Klamath River region and 
Columbia River region. See, T. C. Elliot, “The Peter Skene Ogden Journals,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 
11 (June 1910), 211. Elliot provides editorial notes for the journal entries. Miss Agnes C. Laut copied the 
original journals in 1905 from the Hudson’s Bay Company House, London, England. See also, Stern, “The 
Klamath Indians and the Treaty of 1864,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 57 (Sept 1956), 229-273. 
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October of 1864 to sign a treaty.  They gathered near the shallow, yet expansive Klamath 
Lake in southern Oregon.  The 27 tribal headmen, who included La-Lake, Chil-o-que-
nas, Blow, Mo-ghen-kas-git, Che-mult, Jackson, Keint-poos, Sky-te-ock-et, and Schon-
chin, each with two strokes of ink ceded more than 20-million acres of their territory in 
southern Oregon and northern California.  The estimated 1,200 to 2,000 members of the 
three groups of Indians left their vast high desert territories to reside on a two-million 
acre reservation in the heart of the Klamath peoples’ pre-reservation homeland.5    
Grandpa Jackie grew up in southern Oregon on the Klamath Reservation.  My dad 
bought property down the road from Grandpa Jackie’s house in the 1960s.  They met 
after my dad found Grandpa Jackie’s wife, Grandma Dowie, and their daughter Jola in a 
ditch.  They had careened off the road in their car.  My dad drove them home.  Soon after 
this favor, my dad and Grandpa Jackie befriended each other.  Grandpa Jackie shared his 
favorite fishing and hunting spots and places that were sacred to him and his family with 
my dad on the land he knew—the land that was his reservation.   
By the time my dad moved to the Sprague River Valley, however, the Klamath 
Reservation no longer existed.  In the 1950s, the Klamaths had participated in federal 
legislation that terminated their trust relationship with the federal government.  The 
Klamaths had established their trust relationship with the federal government when the 
leaders of their tribes signed a treaty with the United States government.  Through this 
agreement, the Klamaths became wards of the federal government, and the government 
assumed the role of trustee.  As trustee, the federal government provided services for the 
tribes, such as healthcare and management of the tribes’ forest.  Until the 1950s, federal 
Indian policy encouraged the assimilation of Native Americans while they were under 
wardship status.  In the 1950s, termination policy ended the Klamath Tribes’ trust 
relationship with the federal government and, at least in the hopes of US policymakers, 
completed that tribe’s assimilation process.   
The Klamaths’ termination process ended in 1961, only a couple of years before my 
dad bought land on the former reservation.  During the process of this so-called 
                                                 
5 Stern, 1956, 229-273.  Treaty between the United States of America and the Klamath and Moadoc [sic] 
Tribes and Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians, October 14, 1864, Statues at Large 16, 707-712. In this 
paragraph, I am referring to the Klamath proper, not the confederated Klamath Tribes. 
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“termination policy,” the US Forest Service took title to most of the tribal forest.  That 
summer day in 1990 I was fishing in Winema National Forest.  When Grandpa Jackie 
was a kid, that same place was within the boundaries of the one-million-acre Klamath 
Reservation forest.  The Chief Forester of the Indian Office J. P. Kinney described the 
enormous opportunity for timber harvest offered by the Klamaths’ forest. 
On the Klamath Reservation in southern Oregon, there was in 1910 the most 
extensive stand of western yellow pine (Pinus ponderosa) [sic] on any Indian 
reservation and one of the most favorable logging chances in the entire 
western pine region.  This forest contained at that time not less than eight 
thousand million board feet of merchantable timber.6 
 
An average logging truck today carries about 5,000 board feet of timber per load.  
Harvesting the 8,000,000,000 board feet of timber on the Klamath Reservation would 
have required 1,600,000 logging trucks, each loaded with 5,000 board feet, to haul the 
timber from the reservation.  If placed end-to-end, the 1,600,000 logging trucks would 
have covered a distance of 15,000 miles, approximately three-quarters of the distance 
around the earth’s equator.  At the beginning of the Klamaths’ termination process in 
1954, the BIA estimated that the remaining forest held 4,000,000,000 board feet—still an 
enormous amount of timber.7 
Not until I was 26 years old and starting my first semester of graduate school did I 
realize that the Klamath Reservation no longer existed.  My exploration of my family’s 
experiences with Grandpa Jackie and Grandma Dowie in the Sprague River Valley led 
me to this discovery.  I called my dad one night to ask him why the Klamath Reservation 
was not included in my Oregon atlas.  He took a moment, chuckled, and told me he was 
not really sure.  My dad participated in rodeos, fished the rivers, and hunted with 
Grandpa Jackie from the ‘60s through the ‘90s on land he swore was part of the 
reservation.  My dad may have been partially right.  About 135,000 acres of the former 
Klamath Reservation forest remained under the ownership of a minority of Klamath tribal 
members until the early ‘70s.  I found this out in my searches on the internet and 
                                                 
6 Kinney, J. P. “Forest Management on the Klamath Reservation, 1910-1933,” In Indian Forest and Range: 
A History of the Administrative and Conservation of the Redman’s Heritage, (Wash., D.C.: Forestry 
Enterprises, 1950), 183. J. P. Kinney held his position as chief forester for the Indian Office from 1914-
1933. He completed this volume in 1938, but did not publish it until 1950. 
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secondary sources that later led me to archival and government document research.  My 
new understanding of the history where I grew up astounded me.  I had not learned about 
the Klamaths’ termination experience in the public school system. 
When I was about four years old, my parents had moved from Sprague River, 
Oregon, in the boundaries of the former reservation, to Klamath Falls, a rural town about 
25 miles southwest of the former Klamath Reservation boundary.  Klamath Falls was a 
timber town.  As this town developed in the early 1900s, so did its timber industry, which 
was dependent on Klamath Reservation timber.  During the decade of the Klamaths’ 
termination, the tribes’ timber accounted for 25 percent of the available saw timber in 
Klamath County, a county in which 40 percent of the economy relied on timber and 
timber harvesting.  Despite the significance of the reservation timber and termination 
policy to our region’s history, I did not learn about either topic in the public schools.  
Perhaps, the story was too controversial for young ears.  As I researched termination, I 
found that the policy resulted in hardship for the Klamath Tribes, and other tribes 
throughout the United States.  Tribes that underwent termination experienced a collapse 
of social cohesion in their communities.  The Klamaths experienced increased incidents 
of alcoholism and increased death rates.  Grandpa Jackie and Grandma Dowie never 
talked about termination with my family.  That makes sense.  Termination had probably 
imposed emotional and social stress on them.  Talking about it might have raised 
nostalgic feelings about their former reservation.8  
That termination is laden with negative connotations is also reflected in the 
historiography of that subject.  The literature on termination focuses mostly on the 
horrific social and economic outcomes tribes experienced during and after their 
termination processes.  Law Professor Charles Wilkinson uses the Klamath Tribes’ 
termination history to show how and why termination was a terrible policy for tribes in 
his book, Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations (2005).  Historian Donald 
Fixico focuses his early research on the roles of the pro-termination congressmen and 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 I estimated this from info that Professor Jim Burchfield, Department of Forestry at the University of 
Montana-Missoula, in the forestry department gave me. I am looking for a citable source for the average 
length of a logging truck and the average board feet it would contain. 
8 I do not know if the Jackie or Dowie Crume supported termination policy. Furthermore, members who 
supported termination may not have expected the horrible social and economic outcomes of termination. 
Some of them may look back at their decision with regret.  
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government officials.  He later argues that capitalistic pressures led to the termination of 
the Klamath Tribes in his volume, The Invasion of Indian Country in the Twentieth 
Century: American Capitalism and Tribal Natural Resources (1998).9 
Patrick Haynal, an anthropologist, has dedicated most of his academic writing to the 
Klamaths’ termination.  In his master’s thesis, “The Impact of Termination on the 
Klamath Sociocultural System,” at San Diego State University, 1986, Haynal compares 
the Klamaths’ and Menominee’s abilities to regain restoration status after termination.  
He argues that the Klamath Tribes took 11 years longer to regain their federal status 
because federal laws had impacted the Klamaths in different and more detrimental ways.  
Haynal continued his study of the Klamath Tribes with a more positive perspective in his 
doctoral dissertation, “From Termination through Restoration and Beyond: Modern 
Klamath Cultural Identity,” at the University of Oregon—Eugene, 1994.  In this work, 
Haynal contends that during the post-termination decades the Klamaths started using 
transcultural techniques.  The term, transcultural technique, refers to the way in which the 
Klamaths began using the dominant culture’s legal system to their benefit.  The Klamaths 
began lobbying politicians, filing suit, and taking advantage of the mass media.  These 
actions allowed the Klamaths to reaffirm their subsistence treaty rights and their federal 
status as an Indian tribe.  By regaining federal status, they could benefit from federal 
programs for tribes again. 
Haynal's most recent publication, an essay titled “Termination and Tribal Survival: 
The Klamath Tribes of Oregon,” explores the Klamaths’ roles in termination and their 
rebuilding of the Klamath tribal community.  Haynal chronicles events without an 
overarching argument.  His focus on tribal records and informants, however, offers 
insight into the Klamaths’ termination and self-determination experiences.10   
                                                 
9 For a thorough bibliographic essay on termination research pre-1984 see Donald Fixico, “Twentieth Century 
Federal Indian Policy,” Scholars and the Indian Experience, ed. W.R. Swagerty, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1984. See Charles Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations (New 
York: Norton, 2005). For the roles of congressmen and government officials see Fixico, 1984, 136, Fixico, 
“Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy in the 1950s” (Ph.D. diss., University of Oklahoma, 1980), 
and Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal Indian Policy, 1945-1960, (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1986); and for his work on termination and capitalism, see Fixico, “Termination of the Klamath 
and Timberlands in the Pacific Northwest,” in The Invasion of Indian Country in the Twentieth Century: 
American Capitalism and Tribal Natural Resources, (Boulder: University of Colorado Press, 1998), 79-102. 
10 Patrick Haynal, “The Impact of Termination on the Klamath Sociocultural System” (master’s thesis, 
Anthropology, San Diego State University, 1986), 280pp.; Haynal, “From Termination through Restoration and 
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Haynal’s mentor, anthropologist Theodore Stern, centered his academic research on 
the Klamath Tribes.  In his volume, The Klamath Tribe: A People and Their Reservation 
(1966), Stern covers the early period on the Klamath Reservation through the Klamaths’ 
termination in the early-1960s.  He concludes that both the reservation system and 
termination policy did not prepare the Klamaths for individual self-sufficiency.  Instead, 
the BIA’s program of directed change on the reservation led to cultural confusion among 
the Klamaths.  After termination, the Klamaths were no longer regarded as Indian by the 
dominant society, nor did that society accept them as equals.11 
Other scholars, however, have looked for an uplifting side to such a despised policy.  
By taking a revisionist approach, Peter Iverson opened a new chapter in the termination 
historiography.  In his essay, “Building toward Self-Determination: Plains and 
Southwestern Indians in the 1940s and 1950s,” Iverson investigates how the termination 
era and the Plains and Southwestern Indian tribes’ goals for economic self-sufficiency 
empowered those tribes.  Iverson’s revisionist approach to a period that many historians 
have categorized as deconstructive gives a fresh perspective to termination policy.12 
Without discrediting the distressing social and economic outcomes termination posed 
for Klamath tribal members, we view of the Klamaths’ termination history with a 
nuanced perspective.  My research of their termination period suggests that conservation 
played an integral role in the Klamaths’ termination process.  Conservation refers to the 
definition linked with “wise use” of natural resources for economic and ecological 
reasons.  Congress passed amendments to the Klamath Termination Act of 1954 that 
were predicated in conservation ideology.  Therefore, I have chosen to refer to them 
specifically as conservation-based amendments.  These amendments resulted in a new 
future, which the original act did not offer, for the Klamath’s forest and for the Klamaths, 
themselves.  The conservation-based amendments encouraged the federal purchase of 
most of the Klamaths’ reservation forest, subsequently protecting the forest from private 
                                                                                                                                                 
Beyond: Modern Klamath Cultural Identity” (Ph. D. diss., Anthropology, University of Oregon, 1994), 
xiii+413pp.; Haynal, “Termination and Tribal Survival: The Klamath Tribes of Oregon,” Oregon Historical 
Quarterly 101 (2000), 270-301.   
11 Theodore Stern, The Klamath Tribes: a People and Their Reservation, (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 1966), xv-xvi, 260, and the term “cultural confusion,” 227. 
12 Peter Iverson, “Building toward Self-Determination: Plains and Southwestern Indians in the 1940s and 
1950s,” Western Historical Quarterly 16 (April 1985), 163-173. 
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purchase, fragmentation, and degradation in the future.  In this way, the conservation-
based amendments, which Congress passed in order to protect largely non-Indian 
conservation interests, actually established a land base on which the Klamaths would 
later assert their treaty rights and sovereignty.   
The tribal forest is consistently at the forefront of the tension the Klamaths experience 
with the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Department of the Interior, other federal 
agencies, Congress, and the intertribal conflicts that emerge.  In the early 1900s, the 
tribes’ forest became a source of wealth for the tribes and a staple of the timber industry 
that developed in the southern Oregon region.  Through the 1950s, the forest maintained 
its importance to the economy of that region.  More than that, many southern Oregon and 
northern California non-Indians depended on the forest for its ability to stabilize the 
watershed and provide habitat for game.  Over the course of the 20th century, the forest 
had supported the Klamaths’ subsistence and spiritual needs.   
The Klamaths’ story can best be understood in the context of the changing federal 
Indian policy throughout the 20th century.  Historians have compared federal Indian 
policy with a pendulum that swings from assimilation on one side to cultural pluralism on 
the other.  Although the Klamaths did not always agree with the current federal policy, 
they found their lives influenced by the prevailing policy of a given era.  Likewise, the 
Klamaths retained an influential role in the development of federal Indian policy 
throughout most of the 20th century, as will become evident in this narrative.  Therefore, 
each of the following chapters corresponds to a specific federal Indian policy period.13    
Fifty years before my dad met Grandpa Jackie and Grandma Dowie, the prevailing 
federal Indian policy was that of allotting reservations.  From the 1887 to 1934 the 
federal government followed allotment policy.  The story of the Klamaths’ 90-year 
struggle to earn management rights to their reservation forest began during this period.  
During this time, the Indian Office atomized many tribal reservation lands in an attempt 
to further assimilate Indians under allotment policy.  Pro-allotment policymakers 
believed that communal property only hindered the assimilation process.  However, the 
Indian Office set aside large amounts of forested land on many reservations in an effort to 
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conserve the forests and to provide a supplemental income for tribes whose land did not 
support farming and ranching, the two economic goals of allotment policy.  The Klamath 
Indian Reservation was one such reservation.  The Klamath Indian Reservation’s high 
desert climate supported one of the most valuable stands of merchantable timber in the 
nation—about 1,000,000 acres of primarily ponderosa pine trees.  As trustee for Indian 
tribes, the US government maintained the responsibility of safeguarding tribal resources.  
And as a federal agency they also had the responsibility to conserve national resources, 
such as forests.  In the early 1910s, the Indian Office developed its own forestry division, 
which would manage the Klamaths’ forest until 1961.14 
Chapter two begins with the BIA’s decision to set aside nearly one-million acres of 
forest for timber harvest as a communal benefit for the Klamath Tribes during the 
allotment period.  From 1913-1933, the BIA managed the Klamaths’ forest for timber 
production.  This chapter explores the tribes’ growing interest in their forest wealth and 
the simultaneous development of their frustration with the BIA’s management of the 
forest and the reservation at large.  During this policy era, the Klamath Tribes developed 
a keen interest in benefiting directly from their forest asset.  Their interests manifested in 
the form of two factions by the end of the allotment period.  One group argued for the 
continued communal benefit of the forest.  On the contrary, the other faction contended 
that the Klamaths should allot their communal forest on a pro rata basis and end the 
Klamath Tribes’ federal supervision.   
Allotment policy did not prevail during the next decade.  Like President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s New Deal for America in the 1930s, the newly-appointed Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, John Collier, developed what historians would refer to as the Indian New 
                                                                                                                                                 
13Laurence Kelly, “United States Indian Polices, 1900-1980,” Handbook of Native American Indians, 
History of Indian-White Relations, volume ed. Wilcomb Washburn, general ed. William Sturdivant, vol. 4, 
(Wash., D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1988), 66-80. 
14 Alan S. Newell, Richmond Clow, and Richard N. Ellis, A Forest in Trust: Three-quarters of a Century of 
Indian Forestry, 1910-1986, Prepared for the U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
Division of Forestry, Wash., D.C. by Historical Research Associates, Missoula, MT, 1986, conservation 
and Indian forestry, see ch. 1, pp. 1-14, establishment of BIA forestry division, see ch. 2, p. 16; communal 
forests, ch.3 pp.1-2. Francis Paul Prucha suggests that the development of allotment policy was largely an 
outcome of citizens, motivated by their Protestant backgrounds, acting benevolently for the sake of the 
Indians. Allotment policy mirrored the ethics of Protestantism, individualism and hard work. Many of these 
evangelical-based groups met at a yearly conference in Lake Mohonk, New York, and referred to 
themselves with the title, “Friends of the Indian,” see Prucha, “Federal Indian Policy in United States 
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Deal, or Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.  Collier envisioned assimilating tribes as 
communities, rather than individually as allotment had.  However, this era of Indian 
policy, from 1933 to 1953, did not turn out as Collier expected.  Many tribes, including 
the Klamaths, rejected the Indian Reorganization Act.   
During the Indian New Deal Era, the Klamaths developed intense factional conflicts, 
as did many tribes.  Within tribes there often existed a portion of tribal members who 
embraced the tenets of allotment.  However, those same tribes also included members 
who believed the IRA would offer their tribe a chance to protect their heritage and tribal 
culture.  According to historian Graham Taylor, Collier’s major flaw was his inability to 
recognize that tribes were not homogenous communities.  They were, instead, diverse 
groups of people with different views.15  
Chapter three is a study of the hearings that tribal faction leaders’ participated in 
during the Indian New Deal era.  Their testimonies and the bills they suggested in the 
years leading into and during this period are reflected in the Klamath Termination Act of 
1954.  The very requests the faction leaders made and their compromises to which they 
agreed would mirror the very sections of the act that Congress later amended for 
conservation purposes.   
Because Grandpa Jackie and Grandma Dowie did not discuss termination with my 
parents or me, I do not know if they supported or opposed it.  During the beginning of the 
termination era, the Klamaths’ two factions remained in opposition.  One faction strongly 
supported the termination bill that Congress passed, while the other supported 
terminating the federal trust relationship, but not as the Klamath Termination Act of 1954 
required.  What is clear from the historical evidence is that conservation became an 
integral factor in the Klamaths’ termination process.   
In chapter four, I explain how and why Congress added conservation-based 
amendments to the Klamath Termination Act of 1954.  These conservation-based 
amendments offered a new future for the Klamaths’ faction that promoted keeping the 
                                                                                                                                                 
History,” In Indian Policy in the United States: Historical Essays, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1981, 26-35. 
15 John Collier expected that the Klamaths would support the IRA. He had been working closely with one 
of the Klamath leaders since the late-1920s. See Graham Taylor, The New Deal and American Indian 
Tribalism: The Administration of the Indian Reorganization Act, 1934-1945, (Lincoln: University of 
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tribal forest under Klamath ownership and management.  However, decades would pass 
and other political and legal pieces of their history would need to develop first. 
Termination would seem like the end of their tribe to many Klamaths in 1961.  But 
leaders like Seldon E. Kirk maintained hope.  Kirk wrote in a “Letter to the Klamath 
People”:  
We have no power over what has been but we have it in our power to shape 
our future and the future of our children.  Out of the discouragement, the 
bitterness of the past, and out of Termination, perhaps something good can be 
created.  It is important that you and I work harder than ever so that we can 
continue to lift up our heads with pride, and if they were living today, our 
ancestors too, could be proud of us.16 
 
During the decades that followed termination, the Klamaths realized Kirk’s vision.  
Self-determination became the antithesis of termination policy in the mid-1970s.  Charles 
Wilkinson describes the nascence of the American Indian movement and the Self-
Determination Movement that resulted in the shift in federal Indian policy in Blood 
Struggle: 
Although an exact historical moment could never be determined for such a 
thing, the modern Indian movement had crystallized by the mid-1970s.  The 
termination election at the Colville Reservation, the Menominee Restoration 
Act, congressional passage of self-determination legislation, and the Boldt 
decision in the Northwest fishing cases were both symbolic and deeply 
substantive—not isolated triumphs on individual issues but systemic advances 
that benefited tribes broadly.  Together they represented new winds in Indian 
country and reached all three branches of the federal government.  Together 
they announced that at last Indian tribes could shape their own futures.17   
 
Unlike termination, which directly affected about 100 of the more than 500 federally-
recognized tribes and bands of Indians, self-determination would be accepted by 
practically all tribal nations.  The tribes that underwent termination would be able to 
restore their trust relationship and federal status through restoration policy.  Grandma 
Dowie was in charge of organizing the Klamaths’ Restoration Powwow, which the tribes 
held every spring.  As Wilkinson observed, self-determination was not only federal law, 
it was an internalized social movement fueled by American Indians, themselves.  The 
                                                                                                                                                 
Nebraska Press, 1980), 32-33. For Taylor’s argument on factionalism within tribes during the Indian New 
Deal era, see 39-62. 
16 Quote taken from Stern, 1966, 258. 
17 Wilkinson, 2005, 177-178.  
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process of rebuilding tribal communities has been long, though, and often the means have 
required some creativity.18  
In the 1960s and 1970s, mainstream America witnessed the beginning of the 
environmental movement.  During these decades, Congress passed multiple 
environmental laws.  The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the Forest 
Service administrative appeals process in combination with self-determination policy 
became important political tools for the Klamath Tribes.  They would use these policies 
to garner a management position for their former forest resources in the 1990s. 
Chapter five will focus on how and why the Klamaths used their treaty rights, NEPA, 
the Forest Service administrative appeals process, and litigation to reaffirm a 
government-to-government consultation process with the USFS over the tribes’ former 
reservation land.  This period of the Klamath Tribes’ history suggests that a nexus exists 
between environmental law and self-determination, which has empowered tribal nations. 
Grandpa Jackie and Grandma Dowie fade into the background of this narrative.  
Although they influenced my life and my interest in the Klamaths’ termination history, 
the story will focus on the political leaders of the tribes, which my friends were not.  
However, Grandpa Jackie and Grandma Dowie lived this history, as did many of the 
tribal members who are not mentioned in the following chapters.  Keep in mind that the 
tribes are not merely the leaders that this history includes.   
The Klamaths’ history is developing in a positive direction.  During the last few 
decades, the remaining members of the faction that believed in perpetuating the 
Klamaths’ heritage have begun to realize their vision.  Most historians have viewed the 
Klamaths’ termination in a negative light.  Without denying that these historians are 
correct, I seek to expand the historiography of termination policy and the greater 
historiography of federal Indian policy by analyzing the Klamaths’ termination in the 
context of the conservation-based amendments to their termination act.  The 
conservation-based amendments became a key feature of the Klamaths’ history.  This is 
not to say that the conservation-based amendments were the sole reason for the 
Klamaths’ later success in rebuilding their tribes’ heritage.  Instead, the conservation-
                                                 
18 David Getches et al. report that “more than 100” tribes underwent termination, Getches et al., Case 
Materials on Federal Indian Law, 4th ed. American Book Series (St. Paul, MN: West Group, 1998), 11. 
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based amendments should be understood as an outcome that offered the tribes’ a new 
path.  The Klamaths, with two paths before them, had the choice to influence their own 
future.  When the powerful winds of self-determination, described by Wilkinson, reached 
the former Klamath Reservation in the mid-1960s, the Klamaths joined other Indian 
nations.  They walked that new path that the conservation-based amendments offered.  
They fully embraced their rights to participate in environmental policy processes 
concerning land that the conservation-based amendments kept in federal ownership.  
Through their willingness to leave termination behind and lift their heads in the era of 
self-determination, the Klamaths have gained political ground. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE HALLS OF CONGRESS 
 
The young couple strolled up the steps of the congressional building.  Spring dew hung 
on tree leaves.  The smell of the bustling East Coast city was probably much different than 
their sweet sage- and ponderosa pine-scented home in southern Oregon.  This was their not 
their first trip to Washington, D.C.  Later that day, Wade Crawford explained during a 
congressional hearing how he had “wandered the Halls of Congress” for about three years in 
an effort to change the way the Interior Department handled the Klamath Indian 
Reservation.19  Wade Crawford and his wife Ida Crawford were tribal delegates of the 
Klamath Tribes.  The Klamaths had sent delegates to Congress for decades prior to this day 
in April of 1930.  During the latter half of the allotment period, from 1916 to 1932, the 
Klamaths participated in more than 15 congressional hearings. 
In an effort to illuminate tribal agency and tribal voices, this narrative incorporates 
congressional hearings that the Klamaths participated in from1916 through the end of the 
allotment period in 1932.  Through their testimonies we can learn how the Klamaths tried to 
earn their independence from the federal government through economic means.  They 
repeatedly argued for strategies to Congress that would, in one way or another, allow the 
tribes to use the forest as capital for their economic independence as a tribe and as 
individuals.   
Two interconnected themes emerge from these hearings.  First, the Klamaths increasingly 
recognized the forest as a source of wealth—one that could help them achieve their goals of 
economic modernization and independence.  Second, the tribes continuously struggled with 
the BIA over the management of this valuable asset.  In this context, the Klamaths developed 
internal disagreements over how to pursue ending their BIA oversight and how to handle 
their jointly-held assets.  This chapter is the story of their struggle with the BIA and their 
intratribal disagreements that surfaced at the end of the allotment period. 
 
                                                 
19 Wade Crawford’s quote taken from Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Incorporation of the Klamath 
Indian Corporation, 25 and 29 April 1930, 8. Hereinafter referred to as “Incorporation of the Klamath 
Indian Corporation, 1930.” The title of the chapter is a paraphrased version of his comment during the 
hearing.   
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When Congress passed the General Allotment in Severalty Act of 1887, allotment 
became the national policy for assimilating American Indians into the mainstream.20  This 
policy enabled the federal government to break up the communal land holdings of tribes by 
giving individual Indians parcels of reservation land.  The privatization of Indian reservations 
simultaneously promised American Indians US citizenship and promoted the complete 
assimilation of Indians into a homogenous society.  Additionally, the policy opened tribal 
land to non-Indians.  Guiding this Indian reform program were the benevolent intentions of 
Protestant citizens.  These citizens believed that the individualist ideas and work ethic of 
Protestantism were the answer to Indian assimilation.  The policy rested on the assumption 
that each Indian could farm his land to support himself and his family.21   
Allotment policy, however, did not offer a framework for tribes that lived on heavily-
forested reservations with little arable farmland, like the Klamaths.  A vast ponderosa pine 
forest covered almost half of their reservation their nearly two-million-acre reservation.   
In the context of a developing national conservation ethic the Indian Office found that 
balancing their trust responsibility for the tribes and the pressure of conserving the national 
forests was not always a simple task.22  In 1909 the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) 
established its own forestry division.  The leading policy of this division was to manage 
Indian forests as communal assets for the tribes, instead of offering the surplus lands to non-
Indians.  Communal tribal lands opposed the tenets of atomizing tribal property and 
community.  The BIA, however, justified its decision by arguing that the forest revenues 
would support tribal farming and ranching industries.  Although the BIA instituted the 
policies for the benefit of tribes, the policies often resulted in hardship and frustration among 
tribal members.23  
Former Chief Forester of the Forestry Branch of the Indian Service J. P. Kinney included 
a detailed history of timber sales on the Klamath Reservation during the second half of the 
allotment period in his volume Indian Forest and Range: A History of the Administration and 
Conservation of the Redman’s Heritage (1950).  In his chapter titled “Forest Management on 
the Klamath Reservation, 1910-1933” he contends that his decisions regarding the sale of 
                                                 
 
21 Prucha, 1981, 26-35. 
22 Newell et al., see ch. 1, pp. 1-14. 
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timber on the Klamath Reservation were “too conservative.”  Insects destroyed an 
“enormous” amount of the tribes’ forest and they lost revenue when stumpage prices 
decreased due to the recession during this period.  For these reasons, Kinney argues that the 
large amount of cutting on the Klamath Reservation between 1917 and 1933 should be 
viewed as beneficial decisions for the Klamaths.24 
Kinney’s essay also reveals the extent to which the non-Indian timber industry 
developed in response to the availability of Klamath timber.  From 1920 to 1930, the 
Klamath Reservation timber was in such high demand that the prices rose abnormally 
higher in that region than in the rest of the Pacific Northwest.  Kinney explains that this 
phenomenon resulted from two factors.  First, “the lumber manufacturing facilities had 
been overbuilt in the Klamath Basin.”  Second, he credits the forestry policies employed 
by the BIA’s forestry division.  According to Kinney, they managed timber sales in such 
a way that benefited both the tribes and non-Indian timber contractors and that 
maintained the “principles of sound silvicultural practice.”25   
Anthropologist Theodore Stern’s ethnohistorical volume, The Klamath Tribe: A 
People and Their Reservation (1966), begins with the pre-reservation state of the 
Klamaths and ends with the dissolution of the Klamath Tribes in the early-1960s.  He 
contends that money and the market economy altered the economic dynamics on the 
reservation during the allotment period.  The Klamaths began receiving per capita 
payments from the sale of timber and revenue from leasing and selling their allotment 
properties.  Stern argues that these funds resulted in the increased economic 
independence and the decreased responsibility of Klamaths.  Depending on per capita 
payments and revenue from selling land did not constitute competency among tribal 
members.  For this reason, Stern says, the BIA maintained their tight regulation of the 
reservation and tribal activity.  Stern offers mostly the perspective of federal officials, 
                                                                                                                                                 
23 Ibid, establishment of BIA forestry division, see ch. 2, p. 16; communal forests, ch.3 pp.1-2.  See also, 
Kinney, 1950, 183, 218-252. 
24 Kinney, iv.  Impacts of insects and Great Depression on Klamath Reservation timber sales, see Kinney, 
202-203, 206-208, 213-214, 280-281. 
25 Ibid, 203. 
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and he has not consulted the congressional hearings as evidence for the Klamaths’ side of 
the story during these decades.26 
Stern also argues that tribal factions existed throughout the allotment period.  He 
explains that factions formed around a reservation boundary dispute at the turn of the 
century and again around the leasing of the tribal rangeland in the late-1910s and early-
1920s.  He scarcely covers the second half of the Klamaths’ allotment period and briefly 
discusses factional disagreements during these years.  He categorizes the Klamaths’ 
factions as a rift between traditional and progressive ideology.  In his analysis, he 
associates the progressives—mostly mixed bloods—with the “Lower End” of the 
reservation centered in the town of Chiloquin, Oregon.  He contends that the 
traditionalists—mostly full bloods—lived in the “Upper End” of the reservation, near 
Sprague River, Oregon, a more rural location.27  Stern argues throughout his volume that 
although the Klamaths comprised three distinct tribes prior to the reservation, the 
intermarriage of the groups and various political changes that took place during the early 
reservation years helped form a common identity among the tribal members.  Therefore, 
factions likely did not develop around intertribal conflicts within the confederated 
tribes.28  
Stern’s analysis parallels that of many scholars of the allotment period, including that of 
historian D. S. Otis, who wrote The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands (1973).  
Otis contends that factional parties were common throughout Indian Country during the 
allotment period.  Factions, Otis explains, represent “the fundamental fact that the allotment 
controversy was a struggle between two cultures.  With the irresistible penetration of the 
white civilization, the conflict within the tribes crystallized into two factions, the half-breeds 
and the full-bloods, the young and the old, the ‘progressives’ and the ‘conservatives’….”29 
                                                 
26 Stern, 1966, 150-154, 159. In 1952, Hiroto Zakoji completed a master’s thesis titled, “Klamath Culture 
Change,” in which he focuses primarily on the pre-1900s on the reservation, not the years during which the 
tribal timber became a valuable commodity. See Hiroto Zakoji, “Klamath Culture Change,” (master’s 
thesis, University of Oregon, 1953). Patrick Haynal’s 1994 doctoral dissertation focuses on the post-
termination effects on the Klamaths’ tribal community and identity. Therefore, his research on the 
allotment period is mostly background information and is largely a synthesis of Zakoji’s and Theodore 
Stern’s research.  
27 Stern, 1966, 242. 
28 Ibid, 94-96. 
29 Stern, 1966, 242.  D.S. Otis, The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands. Francis Paul Prucha, ed. 
and introduction. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973, 95. Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., also 
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Perhaps this description of factionalism that Stern and others employ is too simplistic for 
depicting the Klamaths’ factions.  By looking at the Klamaths’ factions more closely, one can 
discern that the Klamaths’ factional leaders took views that were the opposite of what one 
would expect when attempting to categorize the tribes’ factions under a traditionalist-versus-
progressive notion.  For instance, Crawford, a mixed blood, supported incorporation, which 
would keep tribal assets communal and perpetuate the tribal community—a traditionalist 
perspective.  His opponent Walker and Walker’s fellow full-blooded supporters advocated 
the final settlement plan.  This plan would privatize all the tribally-held assets and end the 
reservation—a progressive notion.  Furthermore, some tribal members may not have 
supported Crawford or Walker.  The existence of such a group may constitute another tribal 
faction.  Therefore, unlike Stern, I argue that the traditional historical view of factions does 
not adequately depict the Klamaths more complicated factions during the latter years of the 
allotment era or the early years of the next policy era.  The factions are less of a focus in this 
chapter than they are in the next chapter, which covers the decades prior to the Klamaths’ 
termination act.30   
The hearings provide minimal evidence of Klamath factions forming around the grazing 
and rangeland leasing issues as Stern described.  However, they do offer evidence of the 
tribal members’ growing economic interest in the tribal forest.  The Klamaths’ economic 
interest in the forest seems to have been revived by the tribes’ general intent to pursue 
economic and cultural modernization.  The hearings also suggest that tribal members 
disagreed over how to manage their forest resource under allotment policy.  During the latter 
half of the allotment period, some tribal members argued that the Indian Office should allot 
                                                                                                                                                 
speaks to the importance of factions in tribal politics. See Berkhofer, “The Political Context of a New 
Indian History,” The Pacific Historical Review 40 (August 1971): 357-382. 
30 An increasing amount of literature provides evidence that the traditional historical argument for 
factionalism, which identifies only two factions within tribes, for instance the progressives and 
conservatives, is far too simplistic for analyzing tribal politics. See David Rich Lewis, “Reservation 
Leadership and the Progressive-Traditional Dichotomy: William Wash and the Northern Utes, 1865-1928,” 
in Ethnohistory 38 (Spring 1991), 124-125. Lewis borrowed the term “middlemen” from Loretta Fowler, 
who studied the tribal politics of the Gros Ventres and the Arapahoe.  See Fowler, “Political Middlemen 
and the Headman Tradition among the Twentieth-Century Gros Ventres of Fort Belknap Reservation,” 
Journal of the West 23 (July 1984), 54-63. Lewis’s argument is further influenced by Robert F. Berkhofer, 
Jr.  See Berkhofer, “The Political Context of a New Indian History,” Pacific Historical Review 40 (August 
1971), 357-382; and Berkhofer, “Native Americans,” in Ethnic Leadership in America, ed. John Higham 
(Baltimore, MD, 1978), 119-148. Also see Brian C. Hosmer, American Indians in the Marketplace: 
Persistence and Innovation among the Menominees and Metlakatlans, 1870-1920, (Lawrence: University 
Press of Kansas, 1999), 40. 
 20 
the communal forest.  Others maintained that the communal forest should remain as a jointly-
held tribal asset.31   
The hearings contain mostly the voices of tribal delegates, a small amount of general 
council resolutions and meeting minutes, and some letters from tribal members.  Because 
it is mostly the tribal delegates speaking for the tribes, we should think about who the 
delegates were.  Each district on the Klamath Reservation voted for a representative to 
convey their interests in the tribal council, a separate group than the general council.  
These 12 to 14 elected tribal council members chose the delegates that represented the 
tribes in Washington, D.C.  They chose both full bloods and mixed bloods, men, and a 
woman.  Most of the delegates spoke very articulately.  The delegates probably 
represented some of the most acculturated members of the Klamaths and economic 
leaders in the tribes.  In the early hearings, the delegates included ranchers, farmers, and a 
real estate and insurance broker.  From the mid-1920s to the early-1930s, the delegates 
were mostly owners of forested allotments.  Furthermore, the delegates were probably 
individuals motivated by their own economic interests, and who shared similar interests 
with other tribal members, even though other tribal members may not have been as 
highly acculturated.32 
The latter half of the allotment period constitutes the nascence of the Klamath Tribes’ 
40-year quest for ending their federal supervision.  During this period, the tribes’ realized 
the high value of their forest assets.  Yet, the BIA’s supervision restricted the Klamaths 
from managing their forest themselves.  Conservation-based amendments to the 
Klamaths’ termination act in the 1950s would lay the ground work for the tribes to later 
realize their goal of forest management of their reservation forest lands.  But it would 
take 90 years from the beginning of their timber industry for this to happen. 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Stern briefly discusses the Klamaths’ disagreements over the allotment of the tribal forest. See Stern, 
1966, 155-159. I expand this discussion with evidence from congressional hearings in which the Klamaths 
participated. 
32 Tribal council, see House Subcommittee of the Committee on Indian Affairs, Klamath Indians of 
Oregon, 68th Cong., 1st sess., 11 April 1924, 8-9. Hereinafter referred to as “Klamath Indians of Oregon.”  
See, also, Stern, 1966, 237. 
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The Early Allotment Period 
The Klamath Tribes, which had previously subsisted through fishing, hunting, and 
gathering, as well as raiding and trading, began the process of assimilation upon moving 
to the reservation.33  Under assimilation policy the Klamaths began farming.  However, 
the reservation did not offer a sufficient amount of agricultural land as required by 
assimilation policy.  The Klamaths attempted farming on the limited arable land, but the 
high elevation, long winters, and drought conditions of southern Oregon proved difficult 
conditions to overcome.  The land did support cattle ranching, though.  Many Klamaths 
avidly ranched, and a few increased their herds to more than 300 head.   
After the agency and tribes finished construction of the treaty-promised timber mill in 
1870, some Klamaths began trading with and selling logs to non-Indians.  Within only a 
few years, the BIA ended the Indians’ venture because of an earlier Supreme Court 
decision, known as the Cook Decision (1873).  The Cook Decision reinforced the legal 
argument that the resources on Indian land belonged to the United States.  Therefore, this 
decision banned Indians from selling timber from their trust lands without permission 
from Congress.  Policymakers believed that logging was not going to civilize the Indians.  
The yeoman farmer ideology permeated non-Indians’ conceptions of Indian 
assimilation.34 
Following the passage of the General Allotment Act in 1887, the Indian agent on the 
Klamath Reservation began allotting land in 1895.  Soon after he began allotment, a 
reservation boundary dispute postponed allotment until after Congress ratified the 
settlement in 1906.  Klamaths selected allotments on lands ranging from those adequate 
                                                 
33 Stern, 1956, “The Klamath Indians and the Treaty of 1864,” Oregon Historical Quarterly 57 (Sept 1956), 
229-273. 
34 The Indian agents reported the construction of the saw mill on the Klamath Reservation in passive voice.  
So, we can presume that both Indians and non-Indians working for the agency built it. See, O.C. Knapp, 
Captain U.S. Army, Indian Agent, Klamath Agency, Oregon, Report No. 20, 5 September 1870, in Annual 
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30. The Cook Decision affected other tribes such as the Menominees in Wisconsin. See David R. M. Beck, 
The Struggle for Self-Determination: History of the Menominee Indians since 1854, (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2005), 46; and Brian C. Hosmer, American Indians in the Marketplace: Persistence and 
Innovation among the Menominees and Metlakatlans, 1870-1920, (Lawrence, Kansas: University of 
Kansas Press, 1999), 31. 
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for farming and ranching to marshlands and forested lands.  In her study of the Nez 
Perces and Jicarilla Apaches during the allotment period, historian Emily Greenwald 
found that tribal members often chose allotments that did not conform to the 
government’s plan for assimilation.  She explains, “Indians chose allotments that made 
sense within their own environment, political, and cultural systems,” rather than choosing 
those parcels best suited for farming.35  On the Klamath Reservation, where farming and 
ranching lands were limited, early agents may have allowed allotments in the marshes 
and forests because it made their own jobs easier by reducing conflicts over the small 
amount of arable land.  The agents’ decisions to allot forested land led to tribal conflicts 
after the tribes recognized the market value of their forest resources.  In 1910, the BIA 
closed the allotment roll to only those Klamaths born on or before 15 April 1910.  Almost 
all of the non-timber allotments were spoken for, and the BIA had a plan for the surplus 
forested lands.36  
One year earlier, in 1909, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company had laid lines to the 
northern end of the reservation.  Rail lines offered the southern Oregon community, 
including the tribes, a means by which they could transport their goods to larger, regional 
market.  Even if the Klamaths wanted to sell their timber at this point, the 1873 Cook 
Decision restricted them.37 
In 1910, the same year the BIA closed the tribal roll, they set aside the nearly 
1,000,000 surplus acres of forested lands to manage as a communal source of capital for 
the benefit of the Klamaths.  With a benevolent venture in mind, the federal government 
planned to use the timber money as a supplemental income to cushion the increasingly 
unstable ranching economy on the reservation.  The BIA used the revenue to fund their 
reservation administration and programs such as education and healthcare.  The BIA cut 
and sold the Klamaths’ timber as early as 1913.38  
                                                 
35 Emily Greenwald, Reconfiguring the Reservation: The Nez Perces, Jicarilla Apaches, and the Dawes 
Act, (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 2002), 9. 
36  For closing of allotment rolls, see House Committee on Indian Affairs, Allotments to Certain Klamath 
Indians, 67th Cong., 4th sess., 15 December 1922, 6-7.  Hereinafter referred to as “Allotments to Certain 
Klamath Indians.” See also, Stern, 1966, 139. Stern (1966) briefly mentions that some Klamaths chose 
allotments in the Klamath Marsh because they still relied on the marsh for subsistence needs, 133. 
37 Railroad to Southern Oregon and Klamath Reservation, see Stern, 1966, 125; Kinney, 183-184; Senate 
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Tribal Voices in the Halls of Congress 
The relationship between the federal government and tribes has been a peculiar one.  
Treaties established two somewhat-contradictory relationships between the United States 
and American Indian tribes.  On one hand, the US government recognized tribes as 
nations with their own sovereignty.  On the other hand, the US government limited that 
sovereignty while establishing a trust relationship between the United States and tribes.  
In this way the federal government found itself responsible for the safety and well-being 
of tribes, where tribes were “wards” of the federal government.  The duty of the BIA in 
the early-1900s was to complete the assimilation process of these wards and at the same 
time protect the wards’ assets.  The government developed a very hesitant mindset 
toward allowing tribes to manage their own property.  For tribes with very valuable 
assets, such as the Klamaths, the BIA made very conservative decisions.  They not only 
managed the tribal forest for the Klamaths, they actively had to encourage assimilation 
policy and protect the forest for the benefit of the country.  The hearings reveal this 
contradictory relationship between guardian and ward, which directly related to the 
Klamaths’ forest assets.39 
The Klamaths’ hearing testimonies began in 1916 when the Klamaths’ tribal 
delegates testified that the tribes were very dissatisfied with the BIA’s management of 
their reservation.  Moreover, the tribes had not received any per capita payments from the 
timber sales, which the BIA had promised them.  The Klamaths should have received 
them as early as 1913, when the federal government began harvesting and selling the 
tribal timber.  Stern reports that the Klamaths began receiving per capita payments in 
1913, but he does not cite evidence.40   
The per capita payments were important for many reasons, including support for the 
elderly members.  In 1916, tribal member S. Fred Hendricks explained to the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs that the BIA’s restrictions on the timber money were 
hurting the “incompetents” or “old people.”  Hendricks argued, “They need to be 
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supported.”  The tribal members could not help them because neither they nor the elders 
could “touch the money.”41  Hendricks was a successful rancher who lived near the 
Agency at the north end of Klamath Lake.  He had traveled to Washington, D.C. to 
request that Congress make an appropriation from the tribal treasury fund.  The Klamaths 
planned to use the money primarily to help the tribal elders, whom the rest of the tribe 
could not support in a “traditional” or a “modern” fashion under BIA policies.  The tribes 
also argued that the per capita payments from their forest revenues would afford the 
Klamaths money for needed improvements of their property and for investments. 
Not only did the Klamaths struggle to support their elders, the Klamaths had a hard 
time securing jobs within the tribal timber industry.  The chief forester for the BIA, 
according to Hendricks, encouraged some tribal members to believe that they could have 
logging jobs if he opened up a certain tract for cutting.  But when the tribal members 
brought their logging teams to the site, they worked for a short time before the person in 
charge of the logging laid them off and replaced them with non-Indians.  When 
Hendricks inspected this particular work site with the reservation’s chief forester, they 
found that of 27 workers, only two were Klamaths.  Hendricks said that he later realized 
how corrupt the agency was when he read in the local paper that the chief forester 
reported that the Klamath Indians were providing the labor for logging.42  
If the BIA was not going to allow the tribal members to share directly in the timber 
revenue, to manage the forest lands, or to work in the timber industry, the tribes wanted 
the federal government simply to buy the timber from the tribe outright.  The delegates 
explained to the congressional committee in 1916 that the Klamaths did not want to sell 
their land, only the “dead and down and merchantable” timber that measured “down to 16 
inches.”43  The bill they presented to Congress, however, requested that the government 
sell “all of the tribal timber and timberlands.”44  This discrepancy in the bill and the 
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testimonies of the delegates may suggest that differences of opinion about their land and 
how it should be handled may have existed. 
What is really important at this point is that the Klamaths viewed their forest as a 
solution to their economic hardship they experienced under reservation life.  They were 
devising their own plan to support their tribal members in the future.  The Klamaths 
believed that the BIA’s management of the reservation was not doing this.  The tribes had 
given up many of their traditional economic means of survival as policymakers had 
hoped the tribes would do under assimilation policy.  The Klamaths still hunted, fished, 
and gathered, but not to the same extent they had before.  The tribal members understood 
that their economic freedom lay with their ability to reap the benefits of their forest 
resources.  They wanted to show they could be self-supporting.  But they could not do 
that under the present management of the BIA—especially if they were not receiving any 
of the timber revenue.  As drastic as it may have sounded for the tribes to sell all of their 
valuable timber and forest land, it may have been the best answer they could come up 
with that would relieve them of their conditions under the supervision of the BIA.   
The congressional testimonies of tribal delegates in 1918 reveal that the frustration of 
the Klamath people had grown.  The BIA continued to manage the Klamaths’ forest 
without granting the tribes any authority in the matter.  The BIA had started 
administering per capita payments from timber sales, but if the Klamaths were to 
continue developing their cattle ranching industry, they needed more monetary support 
from the BIA.  Hendricks and another tribal delegate, Harrison Brown, traveled back to 
Washington, D.C. and waited about 30 days to testify before Congress in 1918.  This 
time the men requested that Congress appropriate $200,000 dollars from the Klamaths’ 
own treasury fund in the form of a loan.  The delegates promised that the Klamaths 
would pay back the loan through the sale of their timber.  The BIA expected that the 
timber on the reservation would bring the tribes an estimated $75,000 dollars per year for 
the next fifteen years.  Additionally, they estimated the reservation timber was worth 
about $23,000,000 dollars in 1918.45  These testimonies demonstrate that the Klamaths 
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were sure of the value of their forest assets and that they were willing to use their 
expected timber revenues as leverage for loans.   
Each year, the tribal treasury fund accrued money from the sale of timber.  In 1918, 
the Klamaths’ treasury fund totaled $95,000 dollars.  What benefit was the money if the 
Klamaths could not use it?  In describing the tribes’ desire for the loan, Hendricks stated 
that the Klamaths wanted to use the money “for the purpose of aiding us in building 
homes, improving our allotments, purchasing stock, cattle, and for all other purposes 
necessary to enable us to become established in self-supporting industry on our 
allotments.”46  At this time many of the tribal members, especially the older ones, lived in 
traditional housing called wikiups.  The term wikiup resembles the Klamath name for 
their summer home, wu’kee’ploks.  Ethnographer Leslie Spier explained that the elderly 
members of the tribes slept in the summer houses year-round because they could not 
climb into the winter subterranean lodges.  Some Klamath families lived in one-room 
cabins, often with eight family members.  The revenue from timber sales could provide 
the Klamaths with the means of modernization.  However, the tribes could not access the 
money without permission from the BIA and Congress.  And when they did ask for loans, 
they were asking for loans from their own tribal account.47 
Congress designed allotment policy to encourage farming and cattle ranching, not 
logging, among Indian tribes.  The Klamaths situation was confusing because the agents 
in charge of allotting land on the Klamath Reservation had broken this policy and 
allowed some Klamaths to claim timbered lands and other non-agricultural lands.  The 
current administrators found themselves in a bind. 
 
As the BIA continued to manage the communal forest, tribal members devised ways 
they could reap benefits from the trees.  When the tribes began to recognize the value of 
their forest, some allotees requested to exchange their original allotments for forested 
allotments.  The department granted some of these early requests.  Clayton Kirk, the 
secretary of the tribal council in 1922, explained this in a letter to Oregon Republican 
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Representative N. J. Sinnott.  Six Klamaths, he wrote, upon “realizing the value of 
timbered lands, relinquished [their allotments] and secured lands that had nearly 
3,000,000 feet of timber per quarter section.  These the Indian Office did not hesitate to 
approve.”48  But, the agency denied several tribal members’ requests for timbered 
allotments in the late-1910s and early-1920s, and they continued to approve others’ as 
late as 1921.  However, some tribal members contested the continued allotment of their 
communal forest to other tribal members.49   
In the 1922 hearing, the agency explained why they would not allow the current 
allotment requests.  They explained that Congress never intended the BIA to allot 
forested lands to Indians—that had been an accident.  Additionally, the agency set aside 
the communal timber lands so that the tribal members benefited in common from the 
timber revenue.  If the agency allotted the timber lands requested, they would set 
precedent and would be under pressure to continue allotting forested lands.  Not only 
that, the agency forester had already sold the trees on that land, and the agency would not 
break the timber contracts.  The BIA knew that they had allotted all of the range and farm 
lands on the reservation.  But, by cutting the forest, they were going to clear land for 
farming and ranching.  Then, the new allotees would have parcels of land within the same 
value range as other allotees, aside from those tribal members who already held title to 
forested allotments.  The current BIA believed they were abiding by the by federal 
policy.50   
On the other hand, some of the Klamaths demanded that the BIA was “unfairly 
discriminating” against the allotees by denying their requests for forested allotments.  
Five tribal members questioned the agency’s actions in a letter to Representative Sinnott.  
“There is not reason or excuse whatever for the denial of these claims as they are all in 
the middle of the 19 timbered claims allowed.”  They continued, “Why or by what sort of 
reason should one bunch of people get their timber claims allowed and another set of the 
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same people be denied claims and allotments in the same identical place in the forest?”51  
The timber holdings of the 19 Klamaths mentioned ranged from 1,000,000 to 4,000,000 
board feet each—sizable amounts of timber.52  
In response to the proposal of accepting stump lands for allotments, the tribal 
members argued that the stump lands were “worthless.”  A group of five Klamaths wrote 
in a letter to Representative Sinnott explaining that Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Charles Burke “does not understand the climatic and soil conditions on this 
reserve…you’ve lived in Oregon a long time; you know this reserve; you know that this 
land is worthless after the timber is off for any purposes, except reforestation; that it’s 
unfit for agriculture, and no grass whatever [sic].”53  These tribal members wanted the 
forested allotments for investment purposes, because they were not suitable for ranching 
and farming.  In a letter to Representative Sinnott, Klamath tribal member Chas. S. Hood 
explained the allotees’ plans for the forested allotments: “The object in the allotees filing 
on such timbered lands for allotments are for the purpose of getting the purchase price of 
the timber and to purchase them some suitable land here on the reservation for a home.”54  
Kinney’s report on the stumpage prices received for Klamath allotment timber supports 
the Klamaths’ reasoning behind acquiring forested allotments.55 
At this time, the Bureau had allotted land to 571 tribal members, and 600 tribal 
members, mostly minors, had not yet received allotments.  Furthermore, some tribal 
members did not agree that the BIA should allot the communal forest lands.  Five of them 
stated in a letter to their reservation agent that “the approval of such allotments would be 
a grave injustice to other Indians living on the reservation.”56  The chairman of the tribal 
council, Seldon Kirk, and other council members sent a letter dated 5 May 1922 
requesting Congress to allow only some of the forested allotments.  He and other 
signatories of this letter believed that five of the total requests for allotments were valid 
because the allotees made them “at a time when timber values were not considered of 
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much value.”57  Now that their forest held a high monetary value, the tribal members 
were trying to increase their direct benefit from the asset. 
This hearing provides evidence that Klamath tribal members’ had developed 
economic motivation associated with their forest assets.  Some of them tried to attain 
private ownership of the communal property.  Owning forested allotments meant wealth 
and independence.  On the other hand, some members opposed the continued allotment 
of the communal forests.  A small number of tribal members succeeded in garnering 
forested lands and in benefiting from the sale of that timber, while others were not so 
lucky.  The disagreements over allotting the communal forest foreshadowed the distinct 
Klamath factions that developed at the end of the period.  As guardian of the tribal trust 
lands and resources, the BIA faced a balancing act—the tribal needs and wants on one 
side and conservation of the nation’s forests on the other.  The BIA had the responsibility 
of helping all the tribal members on the reservation, not just a small percentage.  They 
could not change errors that previous officials had made.  And, they had the 
responsibility of safeguarding the forest resource.  If they allotted more forested land, 
they ran the risk of having the allotees exploit the resource at a rate that might degrade 
the watershed.58     
The Klamaths increasingly lost faith in their trust relationship with the federal 
government.  The tribes believed that they should benefit directly from the sale of their 
timber.  According to tribal delegate Hood, the tribes were not benefiting to the extent 
they should have been.  He explained, “The department has expended money from the 
timber sales year after year, or as fast as the money would accrue from the sales of the 
timber, without giving our people very much assistance.”59  Hood was an off-reservation 
tribal member who moved back to the reservation during the allotment period.  He 
worked as a local real estate broker and as a local representative for both the 
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and the 
Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland.  He was one of the 300 members of the 
Klamath Tribes that the BIA had named competent, or capable of managing his own 
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assets.  Stern describes Hood as one of the “persons who had already made extensive 
adjustment to the larger society.”60  
The Klamaths did not understand why even those tribal members that the BIA 
recognized as competent did not receive some of the benefits of management and did not 
receive direct benefit from the revenue.  Competency was supposed to speak to the 
Indians’ abilities to manage their own money and assets and to their high level of 
modernization.  Furthermore, Hood believed that 300 more Klamaths could be declared 
competent, but “for various reasons” they had chosen not to pursue that status.  One of 
the main reasons was that even if declared competent, “they [would] be denied even the 
right to handle their own personal assets due them from this reservation.”61  Why bother 
with the recognition of competency when it does not allow you or your tribe any further 
authority over your most valuable asset?  If Hood’s estimate was correct, then almost all 
of the adult Klamaths were competent, just not formally declared so.   
Many Klamaths had dedicated themselves to adopting aspects of Western culture.  
They found that, although they had made progress on the Western cultural scale, the 
Department did not recognize their progress as adequate for gaining the authority the 
Klamaths sought over their communal forest.  The BIA’s policies, they argued, needed a 
facelift.  Speaking before members of the House Committee on Indian Affairs in 1924, 
Levi Walker, a Klamath tribal delegate, stated the position of the tribes in response to the 
current policy.  “We have outgrown what you might call ‘an Indian custom’ to a great 
extent.”  Walker continued, “The laws which governed 40 or 50 years ago should not 
apply to the Klamath Indians.”62  If the point had not been made to the committee, the 
other tribal delegate, Hood, further clarified the tribal position:  
                                                 
60 Ibid, 18.  Chas. Hood was a descendant of a group of Modoc Indians, whom the US military moved to 
the Quapaw Reservation in Oklahoma in the late-1800s. The military transferred them east after they 
resisted living on the Klamath Reservation by fighting the US in the Modoc War near the Oregon-
California Stateline. Stern gives the background on Hood’s connection to the Modocs, see Stern, 1966, 
138-139. The federal government passed the ‘Competency Act’ of 1906, which established a competency 
commission. This commission visited reservations and judged the ability of tribal members to manage their 
own assets. In a sense, the commission was judging how assimilated tribal members were. A vote of 
competency for a tribal member meant that the federal government would take his/her allotment out of trust 
status. Therefore, tribal members who held competency status also could hold title to their allotment and 
could sell them to anyone. See Robert W. Young, “Historical Background for Modern Law and Order,” 
(Wash., D.C.: Bureau of Indian Affairs, Division of Law Enforcement Services, 1969), 15. 
61 Ibid, 19. 
62 Ibid, 17. 
 31 
We believe the management extended to our people is absolutely wrong at the 
present time.  It may have been a well arranged affair a number of years ago, 
to restrict the red man from exercising a share in the management of his 
personal estate—in the assets due him from the reservation—simply because 
he was considered incompetent; but at the present time we have some very 
intelligent people on this reservation….63 
 
The time had come, the Klamaths argued, when the BIA needed to relax its paternal 
control and allow the tribes to begin taking on the “responsibility of citizenship.”64  
Citizenship should let the Klamaths manage their own forest. 
Into the Twenties the Klamaths continued to disagree with the BIA’s management of 
their reservation.  By 1924 the BIA reported that the Klamaths had received multiple 
small per capita payments from their timber revenues, which totaled $355 dollars.  What 
is not clear from this hearing is what year the payments began.  If the payments were 
stretched over a period of 10 years, as the Department official claimed, the each Klamath 
would have received an average of $35.50 a year.  The Department did not disperse the 
money yearly.  Instead, Walker stated, they “received $150 per capita at one time, $80 
another time, $50 at one time, and $75 at another time.”  These payments, the Klamaths 
argued, were not enough to support their industrial efforts.  Their further concerns about 
their grazing lands draw a clearer picture of their situation.65   
The Department granted lease contracts to non-Indian stockmen for the Klamaths’ 
communal grazing lands.  According to the tribes’ General Council, by over-leasing the 
tribal rangeland to non-Indian sheepherders, the Department had “practically and in effect 
driven the [Klamaths] out of the stock business.”66  Furthermore, the BIA had argued that 
timber money doled to the tribal members would support and encourage investments in 
the ranching industry on the reservation.  Without this money for cattle investments and 
without a range for cattle, the young tribal members interested in pursuing ranching could 
not achieve their goals.   
The federal Indian policy that was written to help them make progress was, instead, 
hindering their advancement toward independence as a tribe and individuals.  Moreover, 
the BIA had justified the communal timber operation on the reservation as means by 
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which the Klamaths as a whole could benefit, but this benefit had yet to be fully 
recognized by them.  According to the Klamaths, the BIA had not allocated the timber 
money in a way that was helping their ranching industry, and the BIA’s leasing practices 
were only making it that much harder for the tribal members to succeed.  
The late-1920s and early-1930s represent the maturation of the tribes’ goal to manage 
their own assets and to end what they understood as the BIA’s restrictive and listless 
administration of their reservation.  With their new tribal constitution and newly-
established Business Committee, the Klamaths formalized their goals to manage their 
tribal assets.  During these years, distinct factions developed among tribal members.67   
 
Factions Emerge 
Klamath tribal member Wade Crawford emerged as a leader in the late-1920s, and he 
accepted the position as president of the Business Committee.  He had acquired one of 
the limited forested allotments and was no stranger to the timber industry.  His family 
owned multiple adjoining forested allotments.  His father, William Crawford, was a 
mixed blood and a leading progressive who kept close connections with off-reservation 
tribal members.  His father was also one of the first tribal delegates to visit Washington, 
D.C. in the late-1800s.68  According to Stern, Wade Crawford, and his wife Ida, “drew 
their principal [political] strength from the Lower End and the absentee membership.”69  
Wade Crawford’s interest in the tribal forest assets surfaced in the late-1920s hearings.  
Wade Crawford’s vested interest in the timber resources is apparent in his dedication as a 
witness in hearings for more than thirty years. 
From 1930 to 1932, evidence of the tribal factions appeared as the Klamaths proposed 
two different plans for their tribes.  The factions reflect the tribes’ earlier disagreements 
over allotting the tribal forest versus keeping it a communal asset.  The first plan, the 
final enrollment bill, was going to close enrollment for the Klamath Tribes, divide the 
tribally-held assets, and put the tribal members and their assets under state jurisdiction.  
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Final enrollment basically meant privatizing all tribal assets and the end of the tribes as a 
political entity.  A few months later the Klamaths introduced a tribal incorporation bill.  
This bill offered the tribes the ability to maintain their communal ownership of their 
jointly-held assets as a corporation.  Wade Crawford supported both; maybe he wanted to 
be safe, since he may have believed that either option would be better than staying under 
the BIA’s supervision.  Another Klamath, Levi Walker, who appeared in earlier hearings, 
supported the final enrollment bill and argued against Wade Crawford’s incorporation 
plan.70  
The Klamaths’ wealth created many issues concerning enrollment.  The timber 
money had drawn applicants for enrollment in the Klamath Tribes who otherwise would 
not have been interested.  According to the Crawfords, some members who belonged on 
the rolls were not listed, while names appeared on the rolls that should not be on them.  
At a hearing on 26 February 1930, Wade and Ida Crawford and Luke Chester presented 
Congress with the final enrollment bill.  The BIA, however, did not agree that the 
Klamaths were ready for such an endeavor. 
The Interior had closed the rolls of about 84 tribes that it believed were prepared for 
that step.  But tribes with extensive assets, like the Klamaths, required more planning.  
“There is no more reason for closing the roll to-day [sic] than there would have been 10 
years ago,” argued Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs J. Henry Scattergood.  The 
Bureau simply did not know how to handle such large estates.  “It is a great, big question 
as to what final disposition shall be made finally of these tribal assets, like the Klamath 
forest and the Menominee forest,” explained Scattergood.   The Bureau wanted to study 
these particular situations and decide them on the “merits of each case.”71  The BIA had 
considered that tribes could transition from federal trusteeship into a corporation, joint-
stock venture with incorporation, or even another type of trusteeship, but had not yet 
made a decision for the Klamaths’ situation.72   
Only a few months later at a hearing Wade Crawford and his wife Ida Crawford 
testified for the tribe.  They stated that the Klamaths had deliberated and had developed a 
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new plan for their future.  They wanted to incorporate.  “[A]s Secretary Wilbur says, we 
need to give the Indians the advantages of modern organization and modern business,” 
argued Wade Crawford.73  The incorporation bill, Wade Crawford contended, would 
allow the Klamaths to take the next step toward full citizenship—the management of 
their jointly-held tribal assets.   
The Crawfords were not alone in lobbying for the incorporation bill.  A highly 
enthusiastic member of the American Indian Defense Association, John Collier, 
supported their efforts.  Collier believed in the rights of American Indians to gain 
authority over their assets.  He wanted to help liberate them.  In only a few years this man 
would become the commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.  Despite the Crawfords’ 
support from some congressmen and Collier, Congress did not accept their plan for 
incorporation.  The Crawfords found themselves testifying two years later for an identical 
bill.74   
Wade Crawford’s zealous leadership and the intentions of the Business Committee, 
which he headed, were put into question by Walker during a federal hearing in 1932.  The 
BIA suggested that Congress pass a bill to allow the Department to renegotiate timber 
contracts with non-Indian contractors on the Klamath Reservation.  Wade Crawford 
argued that the BIA was not acting in the interest of the Indians.  Instead of renegotiating 
the contracts, he thought the BIA should freeze the contract prices and penalize those 
contractors who did not fulfill their agreements.  The Depression caused a hardship for 
many people.  He did not see any reason for changing the timber contracts, when the 
change would reduce the tribes’ revenue.  Walker disagreed.75    
Stern explains that by siding with the Upper End, Walker affiliated himself with a 
group of tribal members that was composed mostly of full bloods and traditionalists.  
Tribal delegate Walker was a rancher, but like Wade Crawford, he owned forested land.  
Walker suggested to the congressmen that Wade Crawford and the Business Committee’s 
actions were not “in harmony” with the tribes in general.  He argued that the timber 
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contracts should be changed in favor of the non-Indian contractors.  Later in the hearing, 
Walker admitted that he was involved in a timber contract on his privately-owned land 
and had been speaking personally about the subject.  If the timber contracts were 
changed, he would have probably been able to make a quick profit or at least keep his 
working relationship with non-Indian contractors.  Whether or not Walker or Wade 
Crawford was telling the truth did not matter.  What was unfolding before Congress was 
evidence of discord among tribal members.76 
Disagreements among Klamath tribal members surfaced again in the Klamaths’ 
second hearing for the incorporation of their tribal assets in 1932.  This time, Walker, and 
both Crawfords testified.  At this hearing, Walker explained that Wade Crawford had 
pursued the incorporation bill against the general interests of the tribes.  “For several 
years, since 1929 or 1928, Mr. Crawford and his committee has [sic] been urging the 
passage of this bill.  On the other hand, the people at large are not in sympathy with the 
plan.”77  Not only that, Walker described how Wade Crawford did not accommodate the 
concerns of people who opposed his views.  “Because of different questions raised from 
the other side of the [h]ouse, Mr. Crawford got mad and he went out.  Three times I know 
of he packed his papers and told his people he was not going to represent them.”78  
Walker was determined to weaken Wade Crawford’s vision for incorporation.  He did not 
believe the Klamaths were ready for that kind of plan, but added that they welcomed 
“some change” in the current administration of their reservation.  He explained, however, 
“I am not able to say that they want to make a radical change.”79  Stern, however, argues 
that Walker was one of the strongest supporters of the final enrollment bill.80  Walker 
may have viewed the final enrollment and privatization of all tribal property as a safer 
end rather than allowing a tribal corporation to manage his share of the tribal assets.   
Wade Crawford was frustrated with Walker’s attack.  He attempted to discredit 
Walker by relying on the Business Committee’s resolution.  “Mr. Walker has not carried 
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out the resolution that he was instructed to as delegate after he was elected.”81  Wade 
Crawford later stated simply, “I am down here representing the tribe.  I am not down here 
representing my own personal opinion about anything.  I am merely submitting the 
resolutions that have been given me to express their wishes to the members of Congress 
and to the Interior Department.”82   
Historians Vine Deloria, Jr., and Clifford Lytle discuss the Klamaths’ incorporation 
bill and their final enrollment bill in their volume, The Nations within: The Past and 
Future of American Indian Sovereignty (1984).  They describe how the opposing tribal 
members confused Congress.  “Naturally the people in Congress were baffled at the 
sudden appearance of two groups of Indians each claiming to represent the true feelings 
of the tribe.”  Furthermore, Deloria and Lytle explain, “Both proposals seemed radical in 
the context in which Congress understood Indians.  People could not believe that Indians 
wanted to liquidate their lands or that they wanted to manage the lands themselves—and 
had devised a plan to do so.”83  Deloria and Lytle probably were not informed about the 
Klamaths’ early attempt to sell all of their timber and forested land in 1916 or about the 
tribes’ earlier requests to manage it themselves throughout the 1920s.  Still, their 
evaluation of the situation in which Congressmen found themselves is accurate.  
Congress was not about to enact a plan for tribes that had such opposing views.  The 
BIA’s indecisive response to the Klamaths’ future may have only encouraged Congress 
to postpone their decision making.  
 
Conclusion 
Prior to these two hearings, the Klamaths had seemed pretty clear in their arguments 
before Congress.  But their disagreements over how to manage their tribal forest seem to 
have weakened their position for incorporation or any other such plan.  Had Wade 
Crawford taken too much control and lost sight of his responsibility to consider the views 
of all tribal members?  Or did Walker simply state his personal opinion, as he admitted to 
doing during the earlier hearing?  Perhaps both men acted with underlying personal and 
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economic motivations.  Congress was probably unsure, and this only handicapped any 
further progress toward independence that at least some tribal members desired.84    
Most importantly, these hearings give voice and agency to the Klamath tribal 
members.  They document the Klamaths’ persistent attempts to modernize in an effort to 
gain economic independence.  They show that the Klamaths’ forest became the central 
focus of their argument for tribal and individual economic independence.  The Klamaths 
were not disinterested owners of a valuable estate.  Last, the hearings reveal the 
factionalism that later hindered their efforts in the next few decades.    
The BIA struggled, too, with how to reduce the Klamaths’ federal supervision.  After 
the Klamaths’ 1932 incorporation hearing, Congress left the Klamaths’ future undecided.  
Keeping the tribes under the control of the BIA may have been easier for Congress and 
the Interior Department than trying to make a decision for the discordant Klamaths.  For 
17 years, Klamath delegates had argued for independence and tribal authority of their 
forest.  At this hearing, Wade Crawford saw all this work lose importance under the 
weight of his argument with Walker.  And Walker got what he wanted, more time for 
what he considered careful decision making and, perhaps, a chance to liquidate and 
privatize the tribal assets.  Maybe Collier, the ambitious American Indian rights lobbyist, 
would help the Klamaths solve this disagreement the following year, upon accepting his 
appointment as the commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs in 1933.  
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CHAPTER 3 
“PULLING IN THE SAME DIRECTION”85 
 
By the end of the allotment period, the Klamath Tribes had realized a very high 
demand for their forest resources.  The local timber economy had developed largely due 
to the availability of timber from the Klamaths’ extensive ponderosa pine reserve.  The 
Klamaths had also benefited.  Tribal members received their shares of the revenue from 
the reservation timber industry in the form of per capita payments.  However, the 
prevailing Great Depression stunted the Klamaths’ economy as well. 86 
In the coming decades, the tribes faced a shift in federal Indian policy that had been 
foreshadowed by their rising leader, Wade Crawford, and his partnership with the soon-
to-be commissioner of Indian affairs.  Commissioner John Collier’s reform policy, the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) became the Bureau’s guiding policy.  The IRA 
promoted the incorporation of tribes and their resources.  Collier believed tribes would 
assimilate better as a group, rather than individuals, as policymakers had assumed with 
allotment policy.  By incorporating, they would learn to run businesses and could slowly 
end their federal supervision.  Another part of the IRA was the intention of the BIA to 
rebuild their land bases by reacquiring land they lost during the allotment period.  The 
IRA, as many Klamaths later argued, did not help tribes like theirs, who already had a 
solid tribal land base.  Instead, it inhibited their accepted goals of individual assimilation.  
In the early-1930s, Levi Walker and his supporters still advocated their final settlement 
bill that would distribute the tribes’ forest, the nearly 1,000,000 acres of land on the 
reservation, on a per capita basis to each tribal member.  Perhaps the influence of this 
faction remained strong.  The Klamaths voted against implementing the IRA on their 
reservation in the mid-1930s. 
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The Klamath Tribes entered the Indian New Deal era as a tribe split by factional 
disagreements over how to manage their forest in the future.  This theme continued 
through the end of the Indian New Deal era.  However, complex political shifting took 
place, blurring the decisiveness of the tribes before congressional committees.  Crawford 
changed his stance on the future of the tribes and their forest resources many times during 
these two decades.  Crawford’s tribal opponents, led by full-blood Boyd Jackson, 
responded to the bills Crawford put forth in many different ways throughout the Indian 
New Deal era.  And this opposition altered their views just as much as Crawford did. 
Despite the factions’ disagreements, the one thing they did agree on was that they 
wanted to end the federal supervision of their tribes and reservation.  Their main 
disagreement was over how to accomplish this shared goal.  The two decades that span 
the Indian New Deal era were, for the Klamath Tribes, an extensive deliberation over the 
future of their forest resources.  Congressional hearings that the Klamath tribal faction 
leaders attended during the Indian New Deal era reveal the important influence this era 
had on the development of portions of the Klamath Termination Act that would later 
require conservation-based amendments. 
 
The two scholars who have studied the Klamath Tribes during the Indian New Deal 
Era, from 1932-1953, have done so through an ethno-historical lens.  Their arguments 
place the study of cultural change within the historical context of Indian policy and tribal 
life.  Anthropologist Theodore Stern, argues that the Klamaths’ tribal government 
“sensitively reflected the interplay of continued efforts by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to 
mold Indian life and the Indian reaction to those efforts.”87  In his chapter titled, “The 
Tribal Government,” Stern explains that in the 1930s and 1940s Washington had become 
the “seat of decision” for the Klamaths.  Despite the centralized power of the federal 
government, Stern contends, the Klamaths discussed and debated important issues, 
including the end of their federal supervision and the liquidation of their tribal assets.88 
 Haynal, a former student of Stern, uses historical events to explain why cultural and 
identity changes among the Klamaths resulted from the termination process.  Many of the 
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historical events these scholars use to support their arguments also provide evidence for a 
narrative of the Klamaths’ termination history viewed from the perspective of the tribal 
forest and their interest in managing it.  Neither one of these scholars explains the 
significance of the Indian New Deal period on the future of the Klamaths’ forest.  
Furthermore, they do not put this period into the context of the conservation-based 
amendments.89 
 
The Crawford Party and the Jackson Party 
Before delving into the hearings of this era, one should first explore the intratribal 
conflicts among the Klamaths.  This chapter does not focus on the factional disputes.  
However, the congressional testimonies of this period illuminate the tribal factional 
views.  Moreover, the faction leaders’ testimonies and proposed bills played a large role 
in sculpting the Klamaths’ final termination legislation.  An understanding of the leaders’ 
backgrounds and the view-shifting that occurred helps make clear the development of the 
Klamaths’ termination legislation and the later need for conservation-based amendments 
to the act. 
The Klamath factions that surfaced at the end of the allotment period only became 
further exacerbated during the Indian New Deal era.  Historian Graham Taylor argues 
that the fundamental assumptions of Collier’s Indian Reorganization Act did not take the 
differences among tribal members into consideration.  Most tribes did not consist of a 
homogenous, cohesive group.  Inherent within most tribes were differences in the amount 
of assimilation one member had compared to another.  Another important factor that 
influenced intratribal relations was the degree to which a tribal member was full blooded 
versus mixed blooded.  As historian D. S. Otis explained, factionalism often developed 
between full bloods, who can usually be categorized as traditionalists, and mixed bloods, 
who normally adopt political views that historians describe as progressive.90   
As I explained in the last chapter, the progressive-conservative description does not 
adequately describe the Klamaths’ factionalism during the late-1920s and early-1930s.  
Crawford, a mixed blood, advocated for traditionalist outcomes—keeping the tribal assets 
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communal by incorporating the reservation.  On the other hand, his full-blooded 
opponent, Levi Walker, supported a progressive plan—a final settlement bill that would 
privatize the Klamaths’ communal assets and disband the reservation.91   
The Klamaths actually exhibited atypical factions during the early part of the Indian 
New Deal era.  Crawford, a mixed blood, supported incorporation, which would keep 
tribal assets communal and perpetuate the tribal community—a traditionalist perspective.  
His opponent Walker and Walker’s fellow full-blooded supporters advocated the final 
settlement plan.  This plan would privatize all the tribally-held assets and end the 
reservation—a progressive notion.  Midway through the Indian New Deal era, however, 
the leaders of these factions flip-flopped their political positions.  Crawford began 
lobbying Congress for legislation that would divide up and allocate tribal assets on a per 
capita basis, and end the reservation all together.  The other factional leader, who 
surfaced in the 1930s, Boyd Jackson, transitioned from an advocate of final settlement to 
a firm believer in keeping the reservation under tribal ownership.  He came to view the 
heritage of the tribes as one of the most important factors of their future.  To make 
matters even more confusing, the two factional leaders actually compromised with each 
other at the end of the Indian New Deal era, but their cooperation lasted only a short time.   
Jackson had left the Klamath Reservation in 1911 for Arizona and other areas in the 
Southwest.  He returned to the Klamath Reservation in 1925, only after receiving in the 
mail an application for a patent in fee for his allotment.  Jackson probably remained on 
the reservation after returning in the mid-1920s.  He began his political career on the 
reservation around the same time the Crawfords vigorously developed their plans for 
incorporating the tribe and reservation.  Jackson had supported Levi Walker, and other 
full-blooded Klamaths, in his campaign for “final settlement” in the early-1930s.  Not 
until Collier appointed Crawford as superintendent in 1933, though, did Jackson emerge 
as a vocal leader of the Klamaths.92 
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Jackson, too, came from a family of leaders, albeit, less directly than Wade Crawford.  
Boyd’s father, Ike Jackson, lived a minimal political life compared to his half-brother and 
the uncle of Boyd, Henry Jackson.  Henry Jackson rose as a political leader in the late-
1800s.  He and other Klamaths, including Crawford’s father, lobbied Congress as early as 
the 1890s concerning the tribes’ reservation boundary dispute.  Much like his uncle, 
Boyd’s followers resided in what Stern refers to as the “Upper End” of the reservation.  
The Upper End, or eastern part of the reservation including the Beatty and Sprague River 
communities, was home to mostly Modocs, Paiutes, and some Klamaths.  These 
communities consisted of ranching operations that spread through the 11-mile-long 
Sprague River Valley, a valley which the sinuous Sprague River spreads across, erodes, 
and spills its banks over creating fertile terraces of meadow grass for grazing.93 
Unlike Crawford, Jackson seems to have held a more positive working relationship 
with the agency and BIA in general.  Jackson rarely, if ever, ridiculed the Indian Service 
in the congressional hearings.  As a member of the executive council, general council, 
and loan board he may have found it easier to keep his connections with the Bureau 
stable.  Some of Jackson’s positions required him to garner the superintendent’s approval, 
something that would be hard to accomplish without a solid working relationship. 
In general, Jackson spoke with less formality than Crawford and often in a circular 
fashion, which confused congressmen on many occasions.  Jackson’s conversation with a 
congressman in 1947 explains Jackson’s interest in a political career rather than stock-
raising.  Jackson stated, “I am not in the stock business….I rather like this kind of work 
where they [opposing tribal faction leaders] can kick me around…I like to hear them razz 
me once in while, so I can come back at them.  See.”94   
Jackson became Crawford’s political rival in the 1930s.  As Stern noted, the two party 
leaders reversed their views for the future management of the tribal assets during the 
Indian New Deal era.  As Stern explained: “From a long-range view, it is noteworthy that 
Crawford had turned from a plan for an enduring tribal cooperative to one directed to the 
piecemeal withdrawal of members who wished to sever tribal connections.”  Of Jackson 
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and his party Stern briefly explains, “In their turn, the former advocates of final 
settlement had become the champions for the preservation of their tribal body.”  This 
political shifting on the part of the faction leaders becomes apparent in the hearings of 
this period.  Tracing the leaders’ views in the hearings only clarifies the development of 
the Klamaths’ termination act and why Congress would amend it for conservation 
reasons.95 
 
The Collier Era 
After Collier accepted his appointment as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, he 
appointed Crawford as the superintendent of the Klamath Reservation in 1933.  
Crawford’s political career seemed to be reaching its zenith.  However, he soon found 
that many tribal members did not support him or Collier’s plan for reforming federal 
Indian policy.     
Collier and Crawford, as a leader of the Klamaths, had lobbied Congress together 
since the late-1920s.  Collier had come to believe that the Klamaths would accept his 
reform graciously.  However, Crawford faced opposition on the reservation.  When the 
time came for the Klamaths to vote on the IRA in 1935, the majority voted against the 
IRA.  Crawford’s tower of hope collapsed.  Collier began to question Crawford’s position 
as superintendent.  The Klamaths that opposed Crawford’s leadership on the reservation 
submitted a petition to Collier that requested Crawford’s removal from office.  In 1937, 
Collier dismissed Crawford.  The Interior released a statement that explained the basis of 
Collier’s decision.  Collier did not dismiss Crawford for being dishonest.  Rather, he 
based his decision largely on the tribes’ “inharmonious relations” with Crawford.96  
Despite his dismissal, Crawford remained active in Klamath political affairs in the 
ensuing years.  His efforts for incorporation faded.97 
Collier lasted only eight years after he dismissed Crawford.  In 1945, the 
commissioner resigned.  Collier’s departure from office marked the beginning of the end 
of the IRA.  A new reform campaign advocated for a nuanced federal Indian policy, one 
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that would end the federal trust relationship between the federal government and tribes in 
order to complete the assimilation process.  From the national perspective, World War II 
had come to a close, and this only heightened xenophobia.  Only two years later a BIA 
report deemed the Klamaths, and many other tribes, ready to end their federal trust 
relationship.   
Congress, too, prepared for their abbreviated role in Indian affairs.  In 1947, they 
downsized their role in Indian affairs from a full committee to a subcommittee of the 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.  Wyoming Democratic Senator Joseph C. 
O’Mahoney stated that this change came about because Congress expected that the 
handling of Indian affairs would become an “acute” responsibility.  Congress expected 
that the time was near when tribes would be ready to end their trust relationship with the 
federal government.   
After his fallout with Collier and his dismissal from his position as superintendent of 
the Klamath Reservation, Crawford gave up on the Klamath Tribes’ ability to 
successfully incorporate the reservation.  With Collier out of office, and the IRA losing 
recognition as the prevailing federal Indian policy, Crawford began submitting 
termination-like legislation to Congress again with intensified zeal.  He found support 
from senators like Republican Senator Watkins of Utah and Senator Wayne Morse of 
Oregon, then a republican.  The multiple bills Crawford introduced at the end of the 
Indian New Deal era become mirrored in the final Klamath Termination Act of 1954.98   
 
The Eve of Termination Policy 
From 1946-1953 Crawford proposed three bills and discussed plans for other 
solutions for the Klamaths’ federal supervision with the BIA and Congress.  His plans, 
however, did not play-out smoothly.  Crawford faced strong opposition from Jackson and 
his party.  These two men had spent the previous decade in opposition with each other.  
They ironically had very similar goals—to end the federal supervision of their tribes.  
Their visions for how to do that were quite different, though.  Their testimonies in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
97 Klamaths vote against IRA, see Taylor, 32-33; Deloria and Lytle, 172. 
98 Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Klamath Indians, Removal of Restrictions, Part 1, 79th Cong., 2nd 
sess., 1 August 1946, 14. Hereinafter referred to as “Klamath Indians, Removal of Restrictions.” 
 
 45 
hearings over Crawford’s proposed bills elucidate the differences in each faction’s 
interests.  At the same time, their testimonies helped influence Congress’s development 
of the Klamaths’ termination legislation.  What develops is a group of tribal members 
under Crawford who wanted to liquidate the reservation completely.  They basically want 
to sell all of their land and timber on the market.  The other faction led by Jackson argues 
that the tribes should retain their forest under tribal management when they end federal 
supervision.  The future of the forest was, again, teetering. 
Crawford had scrutinized the BIA’s management of the tribal forest since the late-
1920s.  Bark beetles had killed many trees in the Klamaths’ forest.  Instead of cutting 
trees before they, too, became infested, the Indian Office left them and caused more 
damage to the remaining forest.  In Crawford’s eyes, the forest was simply capital.  If he 
had the final decision, he would have cut the whole forest, sold it on the market, and split 
the money among the members or put it in the bank where it could accrue interest.99 
In 1946, Crawford proposed his bill, S. 1313, which would resemble the very section 
of the Klamaths’ termination act that required conservation-based amendments.  This bill 
called for the liquidation of the reservation assets.  S. 1313 suggested that the federal 
government or private investor purchase the tribes land at the appraised value.  Crawford 
did not see federal purchase as mandatory.  He explained, “It is immaterial to us whether 
we sell our timber to the Government or to private concerns.  Our timber is principally 
ponderosa pine.  There is a wonderful market for it.”  He continued, “We could sell it all 
in 30 days.  There would be no burden to the government at all.”100  After liquidation, the 
tribe would allocate the revenue collected on a per capita basis.  The reservation would 
no longer exist.  The Klamaths would no longer be under the net of federal supervision.  
They would not have their forest anymore, either.  During a hearing on this bill Crawford 
clarified his perception of the forest as strictly an economic good for the market, “I would 
sell the entire forest on the reservation, which are tangible assets.  There are hundreds of 
lumber companies that are looking for that timber.  There is demand for it.”101  Jackson 
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and his party were determined to avoid this outcome.  Moreover, the Klamaths’ general 
council voted down this liquidation bill.102   
The BIA did not support Crawford’s plan for liquidation, either.  The Interior 
opposed the plan for liquidation because it would leave nothing for the future Klamath 
tribal members.  More importantly, the BIA contended that a better decision would be to 
continue their sustained-yield cutting on the reservation.  The BIA’s suggestion, however, 
did not satisfy Crawford or Jackson.  Despite his ability to gain support from the General 
Council and the BIA, Crawford attempted another approach. 
In March of 1947, Crawford reverted to a plan similar to that which his opposition 
had suggested in early-1930s.  The bill he suggested, S. 1222, offered a plan for “final 
settlement.”  Final settlement also resembled S. 1313, a bill for liquidating tribal assets.  
He, then, suggested an amendment that would allow individual members to withdraw 
from the tribes.  Rather than force all of the Klamaths to cut their connections with the 
tribes and their forest assets, those who wanted to could.  Likewise, those tribal members 
who wanted to remain could remain.103   
Jackson gave his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs at this 
hearing in March of 1947.  He did not discuss the possibility of withdrawal.  Instead, he 
discussed his general view of emancipation for the Klamath Tribes.  Contrary to 
Crawford, Jackson stressed the need for a slow and well-planned process for ending the 
Klamaths’ federal supervision.  As a leader of the Klamath Tribes, he explained that he 
would support the majority’s decision.  He knew that he could easily benefit monetarily 
by liquidating the tribal assets.  “It is true that I, too, could clamor for an immediate 
emancipation…with the holdings that I have before me, I could realize a considerable 
sum of money.  But that is not what I am standing for.”104  
Jesse Lee Kirk, the chairman of the business council, supported keeping the tribal 
land base and forest.  He made his first appearance before Congress during this hearing.  
Kirk explained why he disagreed with the proposal to liquidate the reservation.  “…I had 
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one grandfather who was a signer of the treaty between the United States Government 
and the Klamath Indians, and three great uncles, and when I was a small boy I was told to 
‘fight for and keep, if you possibly can, this vast estate that we are leaving to you.’”105 
This faction would later benefit from the conservation-based amendments to their 
termination act in the 1950s. 
Jackson and Crawford next met with the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs to 
discuss the issues surrounding the emancipation of Indians only a month after meeting 
with the Senate Subcommittee.  Jackson’s discussion with the congressmen focused on 
the concept of withdrawal as a form of emancipation.  Jackson’s view at this point was 
that those members who wanted to withdraw should have been able to do so.  As he 
understood it, the members who chose to withdraw from the tribe would take their share 
of the assets in cash and not be connected with the Klamaths any longer.  Jackson, 
himself, was not interested in withdrawing.  Rather, he seems to have understood the 
withdrawal option as a compromise—a way for the majority of the tribe to keep their 
estate and function as a tribe, and allow the minority of members who were interested in 
leaving the tribes, to do so.  Crawford and Jackson had both shown support for individual 
withdrawal.  After further disagreements among the faction leaders, Congress would add 
this concept to the final termination bill at the very end of the second session of the 83rd 
Congress.  The later outcome of the withdrawal election would encourage Congress to 
reevaluate their termination act.  The final outcome would be the conservation-based 
amendments to the termination act in the mid-1950s.106 
At this hearing, Crawford made a comment that foreshadowed the uniqueness of the 
Klamath’s termination act.  Crawford stated, “I believe there should be special legislation 
for each individual tribe.  I believe that would be satisfactory to the Indians and to the 
county and the community that they live in, to the State and to the Federal Government.”  
Furthermore, he argued, “I believe that legislation could be worked out with every tribe, 
and I believe it should be done, and done now, in this Congress.”107  The Klamaths’ 
termination act provides for specific procedures that no other tribes’ termination acts 
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include.  In the act is the express interest of Congress to complete a hasty termination 
process.  Congress ultimately amended the hurried nature of the Klamath Termination 
Act due to the need for more planning and conservation concerns. 
The last two hearings probably provided Congress with hope that the two factional 
leaders were coming to a compromise.  However, Congress received mixed signals from 
Assistant Commissioner William Zimmerman, Jr.  Earlier in 1947, Zimmerman released 
his report that ranked each tribe’s readiness for ending federal supervision.  The 
Zimmerman Report listed the Klamaths in the group of tribes most ready for termination.  
His testimony about the Klamaths’ readiness for termination in congressional hearings, 
however, was not so supportive.  In a congressional hearing titled “Welfare of the 
Klamath Indians” Zimmerman explained, “I am not prepared to say that as to a majority 
of that tribe that all limitations or control should be removed.  But I would heartily 
approve legislation which would give [the Klamaths] more control and more 
authority.”108  The BIA had reverted to incorporation, similar to the IRA’s plan for tribes, 
which Crawford and Collier had advocated in the early 1930s.  Under incorporation, the 
tribes would have less federal supervision, and gain more autonomy, but not completely 
end federal supervision, as Crawford had recently proposed. 
Rather than continue discussion at this time on incorporation, the Senate 
Subcommittee on Indian Affairs traveled to Oregon in August of 1947 and continued 
hearings in Klamath Falls, Oregon, on Crawford’s earlier bill, S. 1222.  This bill provided 
the means for liquidating the reservation and distributing the assets among the current 
members of the tribe, as did an analogous bill, S. 1313.  These bills both put the tribal 
land at stake for liquidation.  They also would have forced all tribal members to end the 
Klamath Tribes and end their relationship with their tribally-held land. 
The congressmen of the Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs listened to multiple 
tribal members discuss their views concerning S. 1222.  The senators faced wide-ranging 
opinions.  Representatives of the men and women, young and old, full bloods and mixed 
bloods in the tribes spoke in favor of liquidating the tribes’ assets and ending federal 
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supervision.  At the same time, different members of these same demographic groups 
disagreed with liquidating the reservation and argued that the Klamaths should keep their 
forest, or at least take more time to plan and complete a proper appraisal of the estate 
before making any permanent decisions.  Despite their disagreements about the way the 
federal trust relationship should end, tribal members generally agreed that the Klamath 
Tribes would benefit by ending the trust relationship.109 
In the context of the federal hearings and their interest in ending the trust relationship, 
both faction leaders viewed the forest resources as an economic good for the tribal 
members.  Jackson discussed the option of establishing the Klamaths’ forest as a national 
forest with a senator at the hearing.  Jackson strongly opposed this alternative.  “My 
feeling, in connection with our forests, has been that it should remain an asset belonging 
to the Klamath Tribes.”  He continued, “…I understand that our forest holding now—the 
cut-over timber we hold now, today—is second to none in the United States of 
America.”110  He imagined a time in the future when the tribes would manage their forest 
as a tribe.111   
Crawford’s initiative had once been for the incorporation of the tribes.  However, he 
had changed his mind and, at this time, was still advocating the liquidation of the tribal 
assets and dissolution of the tribes.  Crawford defended his reasoning behind his bill for 
liquidation, S. 1222: “The reason why we wrote the bill as it is, giving the Indians their 
individual rights—it would give them rights they wanted to live under, that they had 
always lived under until such Government control had been placed on them….”112  This 
statement by Crawford represents the fundamental difference between Crawford and 
Jackson at this point in their political careers.  Jackson still held on to the base argument 
of the IRA—that tribes can assimilate through community strengthening and self-
government.  Crawford was fighting for individual rights and saw the forest as the asset 
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that the tribes could exploit in order to reach full citizenship.  Crawford had latched onto 
the surge of reform that rejected the tenets of the IRA and reintroduced the idea of 
assimilating individuals.   
At the closing of this hearing, Senator Watkins addressed both factions of the 
Klamath Tribes.  “I would like to make a plea tonight,” he said.  “Evidence had been 
heard from witnesses for and against the legislation.  I’m absolutely convinced that you 
have the same objective that we have.  We are agreed on that.”  He continued assuredly.  
“And, I know you will never make progress, as a group, and as members, individually, 
unless you become united and work together; and that you forget jealousies and 
overcome these natural weaknesses that all flesh is heir to.”  He concluded, “You can 
work together.  You have great destiny.”113  Congress attempted to appease both belief 
systems when they formulated the Klamaths’ termination act.  This became apparent in 
the actual wording of the legislation.  The very section of the legislation that is influenced 
by the need to address both factions’ interests also led to the need for conservation-based 
amendments to the termination act. 
Senator Watkins may have instigated cooperation between the two leaders when he 
made that “plea” for the Klamath Tribal members to combine forces.  The very next 
hearing held 30 July 1953 over the Klamath Tribes’ federal supervision, the two leaders 
displayed atypical behavior toward each other and an uncharacteristic interest in working 
together.  Crawford and Jackson both came to the hearing with the intention of discussing 
Crawford’s and Jackson’s final settlement bill, H.R. 3402.  This bill encouraged 
voluntary individual withdrawal as a way of distributing individual shares of the tribal 
estate.  The two tribal faction leaders had worked on this bill all winter after discussing it 
with the representatives of the BIA.  At this hearing, however, the BIA officials had, 
again, reverted to their previous plan for the incorporation of the tribes and their assets.114 
Although Crawford and Jackson were both surprised by the Interior’s last minute 
change, both leaders accepted the proposal.  Crawford explained, “…I can not see too 
much objection to the idea of incorporating the Klamath Indians under the laws of 
Oregon.  I know that as a corporation we will be successful in that State….”  Even more 
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important to Crawford was that the BIA, Congress, and the Klamaths were all working on 
the same plan.  Crawford argued, “We don’t feel like we should work on an individual 
withdrawal and later come back here and talk about incorporating…[W]e don’t want to 
waste any time and we do not feel that we should be put off for 2 1/2 years to 
incorporate…”115  Jackson showed a similar approval of the BIA’s change of plans.  He 
stated, “I do not have much to say, other than that I feel rather good that the Department 
has finally come out with something that expresses their position as to what we were 
driving at.”  He then referred to the factions among the tribal members and their joint 
efforts at cooperating: “…[W]e have had some difference of opinion but we have finally 
decided that unless we got together and put our shoulders to the wheel as a unit, then only 
would we make progress.”116 
By this time, the BIA had deliberated over how to handle ending federal supervision 
for a tribe that had such a valuable asset for four decades.  Even though the BIA 
representative approached the hearing with incorporation of the Klamaths’ as their goal, 
the BIA representative showed interest in the withdrawal plan on which the tribal 
members had been working.   
For the Klamaths, this hearing in July of 1953 marked the eve of termination policy.  
Only two weeks later, Congress passed House Concurrent Resolution 108, the legislation 
that enabled Congress to pass bills that would terminate tribes’ federal trust relationships.  
Resolution 108 explicitly listed the Klamath Tribes.  Moreover, an urgent tone permeated 
the resolution.  The document stated that the listed tribes should undergo termination 
policy “at the earliest possible time.”117 
 
Developing the Klamath Termination Act of 1954 
Almost a year later to the day that Congress passed Resolution 108, the House and 
Senate agreed on and passed the Klamath Termination Act of 1954.  The Klamaths’ 
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faction leaders had come to an agreement on both incorporation and final settlement with 
withdrawal only a month before Congress passed Resolution 108.  But the tribes had a 
history of incongruous politics.  Likewise, they had dealt with an indecisive BIA for 
decades.  Now, both Crawford and Jackson felt pressure from Congress to formulate 
termination legislation in a hurry.  This was the first time that Indian policy seemed to 
align with all the interested parties concerning the Klamaths’ end of federal supervision.  
What becomes clearer in this single year is how the testimonies of the faction leaders and 
the bills they proposed for terminating their federal trust relationship coalesced into the 
Klamath Termination Act.  From the perspective of the later conservation-based 
amendments, one can discern how this period was significant in determining the need for 
those amendments that became so important for the tribes during the era of self-
determination. 
After the July of 1953 congressional hearing, Jackson and Crawford went back to the 
reservation and studied the BIA’s incorporation plan, S. 2745.  However, together 
Jackson and Crawford came to the conclusion that incorporation would not benefit the 
Klamath Tribes as favorably as a cooperative would.  By forming a cooperative, the 
tribes could avoid paying certain state and federal taxes required by a corporation.  
Crawford wrote the articles of association and bylaws for the cooperative organization.  
In mid-December, he and Jackson proposed the cooperative plan to the Executive 
Council.  The next day at a meeting with the General Council, Jackson reversed his 
opinion.  He and the majority of council members voted down the plan for a cooperative.  
Stern explains that most tribal members were surprised with the sudden collaboration 
between Jackson and Crawford.  Furthermore, according to Haynal, Jackson rejected the 
cooperative plan in order to show his “general opposition to termination.”  Jackson, 
however, explained in a hearing in February 1954 that he was not opposed to terminating 
the tribes’ federal supervision.  Rather, he supported a more careful and slower process of 
termination than any plan had offered.  In response to Jackson’s decision, Crawford 
changed his attitude toward termination, again.  Crawford no longer supported 
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incorporation or a cooperative.  He now wanted to simply withdraw and take his assets in 
cash.118   
Congress, again, faced the leaders in a state of polar opposition.  Jackson advocated 
keeping the tribal land and resources under tribal ownership, while Crawford strongly 
promoted liquidation.  Jackson stated at the February 1954 hearing on the Interior’s 
termination bill, S. 2745, “[I]t is nothing new for this committee to know that I have 
stood for conservation and holding our homelands together over the years, and my ticket 
was to do everything I could to conserve the heritage of the Klamath Tribe.”119  Jackson 
and his party chose to support the Interior’s bill, S. 2745, under the condition of 
amendments that would lengthen the amount of time allowed for the Klamaths’ 
termination process.120 
Crawford saw no reason why the Klamaths, who did not get along, should try to 
manage the reservation together.  “I don’t believe the [Klamath] Indians will ever get 
together in running their affairs as a tribe.  I had hoped that they would,” stated Crawford.  
He continued, “[T]he only solution is for Congress to pass a bill, S. 1222, which will put 
the Indians out on their own individually.  And there is nothing wrong with that.” 121  The 
bill Crawford referred to was his liquidation bill, which he had proposed in 1947.  This 
bill suggested that the federal government purchase the reservation from the Klamaths as 
a means for terminating the Klamaths’ trust relationship and dividing up tribal assets.  
The kicker was that Crawford was well aware that the Klamaths’ reservation forest was 
of vital importance to the region, both economically and ecologically.  He argued that 
federal ownership of the Klamaths’ reservation land would be “a good deal for the 
Indians and for our county and for everybody concerned [because] we have the 
watersheds of the two rivers which supply the water in southern Oregon and northern 
California.”  Crawford also advocated selective cutting practices for the forest, rather 
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than clear cutting, as a means of protecting the watershed.  Moreover, he argued that if 
the Klamaths’ forest became part of the national forest system, timber companies would 
still have access to the resource.  Crawford, the very man who pursued liquidating the 
tribal assets, discussed the conservation issues and the benefit of federal purchase during 
this hearing.  On the contrary, non-tribal testimonies showed little to no interest in 
conservation of the watershed and forest resources.122 
The Klamath Falls Chamber of Commerce, who would later advocate the 
conservation-based amendments to the Klamaths’ termination act in the mid-1950s, 
submitted a written statement for this hearing record.  Their statement did not discuss the 
conservation issues associated with the termination of the Klamaths and the possible 
liquidation of the tribes’ reservation.  The Chamber of Commerce’s statement included a 
section-by-section report on the Interior’s bill, S. 2745.  Their report provided evidence 
that they were aware that if the Klamaths could not come to a decision about the future 
management of their reservation within three years from passing the act, the Interior 
would proceed with liquidating the tribes’ assets, including their forest.  Perhaps their 
attention to such details was slighted by the short amount of time they had to review the 
bill before commenting in the February hearing.  The Chamber of Commerce explained 
that after receiving the bill, they had very little time to “give the bill as much 
investigation and study as it would ordinarily desire.”123  Yet, they still supported the 
measure, describing S. 2745 as a “fair bill and as well designed as possible to meet the 
complex problems involved in termination of Federal control.”124  Their attitude would 
change sharply soon after Congress passed the final version of S. 2745. 
Both the House and Senate Subcommittees on Indian Affairs held a second hearing at 
the Klamath Agency, just west of the reservation in southern Oregon on 19 April 1954.  
The Joint Subcommittees wanted to hear tribal members’ and the non-Indian locals’ 
views on S. 2745.  Both Crawford and Jackson attended this hearing, as did many other 
Klamath tribal members.  Crawford, still advocating his earlier liquidation bill, S. 1222, 
argued that liquidation would allow the Klamaths to gain their citizenship in Oregon as 
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they wanted.  Furthermore, he argued that the tribal land should be managed by the 
federal government and opened for public use.  Crawford believed that the Joint 
Committees should urge the local newspaper to have an election for the local non-
Indians, so that they could give their preference for federal, state, or private ownership of 
the reservation land in the future.  Crawford further argued that the tribal members should 
be given a secret ballot vote on the same subject.  He was sure that the majority of both 
referendums would support federal management.125   
Jackson did not discuss the future management of the reservation.  Instead, he 
discussed the factionalism and how withdrawal would appease both tribal parties.  
Jackson explained that the factionalism was misleading.  The two parties really wanted 
the same end—termination of the tribes’ federal supervision.  “[W]hen all is said and 
done, two factions point to one goal in particular; and because of that, why should there 
be factions?” 126  The greatest difference between the two factions was their desired 
outcome after termination.  Jackson had embraced the idea of individual withdrawal 
because both his party and Crawford’s would benefit.  
After this hearing the stakeholders held informal meetings with federal officials.  
Those who attended the meetings were Jackson and the other tribal delegate, Crawford as 
the leader of the opposing party, both factions’ attorneys, representatives of the Secretary 
of Interior, the commissioner of Indian Affairs, and members of the Senate and House 
subcommittees.  The local business officials, like the members of the Chamber of 
Commerce, were not present at the informal meetings.  According to the House Report on 
S. 2745, the Klamaths’ 40-year interest in termination, the bills the tribes had presented 
in the past, and these meetings led to the Senate’s amended version of S. 2745.127 
The Senate Subcommittee’s alterations to S. 2745 extended the planning process for 
the Klamaths’ termination.  Instead of allowing 18 months for studies, the new version 
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gave the Klamaths two years.  Rather than having two years to decide on a management 
plan and present it to the Secretary of the Interior, the new bill allocated three years for 
the tribes to decide.  This bill, then, gave the Secretary one year after receiving the tribes’ 
decision, which was to be decided by majority vote, to complete the termination 
procedures.  As the original bill stated, the Secretary of the Interior would transfer the 
management of the tribes’ assets to the tribes to handle them in the form of a “corporation 
or other legal entity organized by the tribe.”  Under the Senate version of S. 2745, the 
tribes reserved the rights to choose their own consultants for special studies and to 
decide, according to a majority vote, the final plan for their assets after termination.  Last, 
the bill allowed for more planning and gave them an extra year to complete the process.  
This year extension was not exactly what Jackson had advocated in the previous hearings, 
but it reflects his requests for more planning time.128 
Similar meetings continued after the Senate passed the amended bill to the House.  
After the last of such informal meetings, the House, then, further amended the Senate 
version.  The House amendments implemented the most drastic changes to the 
legislation.  The first change to the Senate’s version of S. 2745 was to section five of the 
act, the section that extended the planning time for termination and gave the tribes’ 
authority in the outcome of their termination process.  The House struck out all of section 
five in the Senate’s bill.  They replaced it with a directed plan for the Klamaths’ 
termination process.  Under the House version of S. 2745, the Klamaths no longer 
retained authority in planning their future for their assets.  Instead, the Interior would hire 
non-tribal specialists to manage the tribes’ termination process and, above all, to make 
decisions about the future management of the tribes’ assets.  Another important addition 
to this section was that of individual withdrawal, which both Crawford and Jackson 
advocated in earlier hearings.  The tribal members could individually withdraw from the 
tribe and take with them their share of the tribal assets in cash.  The tribes would pay off 
withdrawing members with cash garnered from liquidating the appropriate amount of 
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their assets.  Those who remained would be subject to the plan suggested by the 
management specialists.129   
Aside from procedural changes to the termination process in the act, the new 
language had a rushed tone.  The whole process was to take four years to complete.  
However, this bill read more like Resolution 108.  Instead of giving the tribes three years 
to decide on their future management plan, the bill gave the management specialists one 
year to complete an appraisal of the tribal assets.  “Immediately after the appraisal of the 
tribal property” the management specialists were to hold an election for the tribal 
members to choose their future after termination—to withdraw or to remain.  After the 
completely new section five, the House added another new section, section six.  The 
wording of this section also suggested the hurried nature of the House version: “It is the 
intention of Congress that all of the actions required by section 5 and 6 of this Act shall 
be completed at the earliest practicable time and in no event later than four years from the 
date of this Act.”130  Not only did this wording carry the hasty essence of Resolution 108, 
it also paralleled Crawford’s current view toward the termination process.  
The House proceeded to pass the bill and send it back to the Senate.  The Senate 
concurred, and President Dwight Eisenhower signed S. 2745 into law on 13 August 1954.   
 
Conclusion 
The Klamath Termination Act of 1954, referred to as Public Law 587, mirrored many 
of the bills that the faction leaders presented in earlier hearings.  The act also reflected 
many of the Jackson’s and Crawford’s comments during their testimonies, especially 
their factional conflicts.  The Klamath Termination Act would lead to an intense uproar 
over conservation concerns in southern Oregon and northern California.  Those 
conservation concerns, as we will see in the next chapter, would mold a new path for the 
tribal forest and the tribes’ future management of the forest. 131 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONSERVATION TWIST IN THE KLAMATHS’ TERMINATION 
 
The Klamaths’ reservation existed as a deeply-rooted economic and ecological 
component of southern Oregon and northern California.  After 40 years of harvesting, 
more than four-billion board feet of timber remained in the Klamaths’ tribal forest in the 
mid-1950s.132  The reservation timber provided 26 percent of the saw timber in Klamath 
County.  The towering stand of ponderosas accounted for one quarter of the commercial 
forest area in the county, where 40 percent of the area’s economy relied on timber harvest 
and production.133  More than simply a wealth of timber, the Klamath Tribes’ forest 
offered many other benefits to the non-Indians throughout southern Oregon and northern 
California.   
Farmers in the southern end of the Klamath Basin depended on the Klamaths’ land 
and resources for different reasons.  The tribes’ ponderosa pines stabilized the soil of a 
large portion of the Upper Klamath River Watershed.  Many farmers that lived south of 
the reservation in southern Oregon and northern California had come to depend on the 
water storage capabilities of the massive forest and marshlands.  Without continued 
conservation management of the forest, their irrigation water might dry up or their 
irrigation dams might fill with silt from the erosive forces of water over heavily cut 
timber lands.   
Three rivers carved through the basalt bedrock and pumice soil within the reservation.  
On the north end of the reservation, two marshes supported millions of birds every year 
as they traveled the Pacific Flyway.  The tribal marshes were two of many that spread 
across southern Oregon and northern California.  For non-Indian hunters and sportsmen 
of Klamath County, the tribal marshland and forestland provided integral habitat for 
game in that region.  When Congress passed the Klamath Termination Act of 1954, they 
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failed to recognize the web of ecological and economic connections among the 
reservation, the rest of southern Oregon, and northern California.  Perhaps that was 
because parties interested in the termination process had not given conservation concerns 
much attention during the congressional hearings that led to the development of the 
Klamath Termination Act.  The Klamath County Chamber of Commerce did not send a 
representative to the Klamaths’ pre-termination hearings.  Instead, they submitted written 
statements that supported the Senate version of S. 2745.       
The first year and a half after Congress passed the act, non-Indian locals began 
questioning the possible impacts of the Klamath Termination Act on their economy and 
the ecology of the region.  On the other hand, Klamath tribal members questioned their 
future economic positions.  Some were concerned that termination might weaken the 
regional economy that they were about to enter as private citizens.  They would no longer 
have the support of their tribal per capita payments.  Other tribal members worried that 
the conservation concerns might ruin their chance for termination and reduce the value of 
their portion of the assets. 
Congress and the BIA faced a dilemma.  They needed to get the tribes a fair price for 
their reservation, and, at the time, they had to protect the future economic and ecological 
integrity of reservation and the surrounding region.  Congress held amendment hearings a 
few years after passing the act.  Although conservation was not a concern of the original 
Klamath Termination Act, conservation played an integral role in the outcome of the 
Klamaths’ experimental termination process. 
 
Most of the published material on the termination of the Klamath Tribes covers the 
basic legislative history and social effects on the tribes.  None of the research explains the 
significance of the conservation-based amendments to the act.  Many historians 
emphasized the misconduct and devious incidents that still haunt the Klamath Tribes’ 
termination history.  Patrick Haynal explained the Klamath Tribes’ roles in termination.  
Donald Fixico focused his research on the roles of the pro-termination congressmen and 
government officials.  He later argued that capitalistic pressures encouraged the Klamath 
Tribes and other tribes to manage their tribes and tribal assets in the form of a 
corporation.  Theodore Stern reported the immediate effects of termination of those 
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members who had lived on the reservation.  He explained that both the reservation 
system and termination policy did not prepare the Klamaths for individual self-
sufficiency.  Both Haynal and Charles Wilkinson examined the post-termination effects 
on the Klamath Tribes.  They have emphasized the tribes’ abilities to unite toward the 
common goals of restoration and tribal self-sufficiency.134 
 
“The ‘Experiment’ that Failed” 
In the 1940s and early-1950s, federal Indian policy experienced a progressive shift 
from the IRA to a policy that supported the end of federal supervision as means for 
completing assimilation.  This shift prompted BIA officials to develop a plan for tribes 
like the Klamaths.  Congress developed termination policy as a result. 
The goal of Congress was to begin the termination process with the most assimilated 
tribes, which the BIA believed were ready to enter mainstream American culture.  Many 
of the tribes chosen for termination, like the Klamaths, owned large land bases or natural 
resource capital.135  Termination ironically removed these tribes from the very source of 
their wealth—their land.  But, as the Klamaths’ termination history exemplifies, some 
tribal members did not worry about that outcome and sought to live as individuals after 
termination. 
Throughout the course of the Klamaths’ termination, differences among the factions 
reformed and surfaced in the congressional hearings and in various discussions the 
Klamath faction leaders had with BIA officials.  Both parties continually supported the 
general idea of termination, but each had a different view of how the legislation should 
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work.  Jackson’s party argued for slowing down and carefully studying the termination 
process.  Conversely, Crawford and his party basically wanted out of the tribe.  During 
the termination process he continued to promote the rapid sale of the reservation forest 
resources.  His view was concentrated on a snappy sale, a quick payoff, and a hasty end 
to the federal supervision.136 
The Klamaths’ termination process probably did not satisfy either leader of the tribes.  
Congress deliberated over amendments to the Klamath Termination Act through the latter 
half of the 1950s.  The whole process took Congress and the BIA seven years to 
complete.  This may seem short, but it is a much longer timeframe than the required four-
year process in the original Klamath Termination Act.   
Termination policy did not last much more than decade and a half.  Congress 
terminated about 100 tribes and bands of Indians before President Richard Nixon revoked 
termination policy in 1970.137  This short-lived policy, however, negatively altered the 
lives of thousands of tribal members.  Termination became known as the US 
government’s “‘experiment’ that failed.”138 
 
Klamath Termination Act and the “Meat of the Coconut” 
The original six-page Klamath Termination Act of 1954 included 26 sections.  
However, the most important section became section five.  This was the section that the 
House completely rewrote prior to passing the bill in the final month of the 83rd 
Congress.  Section five outlined the process by which the Klamath Tribes were to transfer 
out of federal supervision.  Democratic Oregon Senator Richard Neuberger later referred 
to section five as the “meat of the coconut in the operation of termination.”139  
Congress held hearings on the early version of S. 2754 in Klamath County, prior to 
the Senate and House changes.  The Klamath Falls Chamber of Commerce agreed with 
this bill.  However, in the 1956 amendment hearings the Klamath Falls Chamber of 
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Commerce stated that Congress had not consulted them before making last-minute 
changes to section five and passing it in August of 1954.  Senator Neuberger found 
himself “perplexed” by this information; he was new to the Subcommittee on Indian 
Affairs and could not believe that Congress had failed to notify the leaders of Klamath 
Falls about the changes to the termination legislation.  The House claimed that their 
representatives had met with the Klamath faction leaders and their attorneys, the BIA, 
and Senate representatives in informal meetings after the April 1954 hearing in Klamath 
County.  Moreover, the House report stated that these informal discussions led to the 
changes they made to section five and other sections of S. 2745.  The House reported that 
“participants” of these informal meetings came before the House Subcommittee on 
Indian Affairs and agreed to the House’s changes to S. 2745.  Therefore, the Chamber of 
Commerce was probably not aware of the House version.140         
Section five of the original bill, S. 2745, afforded time for planning and studies for 
the termination process.  However, as the Klamath Falls Chamber of Commerce 
described in an amendment hearing, the House version of section five that became part of 
the Klamath Termination Act “eliminated the period of further study and planning and 
substituted a crash program for the sale of tribal assets.”141  This was the section that 
refocused the Klamaths’ termination process on conservation issues.  
Section five of the termination act passed by Congress first required the Secretary of 
the Interior to appoint three management specialists.  This section outlined the 
management specialists’ many specific duties.  Their general responsibilities included 
assisting the Klamath Tribes’ and managing the tribal assets during the termination 
process.  A review of their duties provides an outline of this “crash program.”   
Within a year of their appointments, the management specialists were to have an 
appraisal completed of the Klamath Tribes’ jointly-held assets, including their 800,000-
acre forest.  Immediately after the completion of the appraisal, section five of the act 
required the management specialists to hold a withdrawal election among the tribal 
members.  During this election, the tribal members were to choose whether they would 
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remain in the tribe or withdraw and take their portion of the jointly-held assets in cash.  
The management specialists third set of duties required them to choose what portion of 
land the tribes should sell that would adequately pay off those members who chose to 
withdraw.  Next, they were to sell this property and distribute the funds to the 
withdrawing members.  This stipulation meant that the more tribal members who 
withdrew, the more land they would need to sell and transfer out of communal tribal 
ownership.  The fourth provision in the act under section five allowed the management 
specialists to request studies and reports that the Klamath Tribes or Secretary of the 
Interior believed should be undertaken during the termination process.  Rather than 
suggest that studies for the future sustained-yield management of the forest as the original 
termination bill had in section five, the House version of section five made no mention of 
conservation-based forestry practices.  The last duty of the management specialists listed 
in section five required them to devise a management plan for the remaining members’ 
assets.  Therefore, the tribal members who chose to remain would not know the future 
management plan of their assets until after the withdrawal election.142 
On 9 May 1955, Thomas B. Watters, Eugene Favell, and William L. Phillips accepted 
their appointments as the management specialists of the Klamath Tribes’ termination 
process.  Watters, who had lived in Klamath Falls for about 30 years, chaired the 
committee.  He was a former mayor of Klamath Falls and had experience in banking and 
estate management.  Favell lived in Lakeview, Oregon, a rural community about 60 miles 
east of the Klamath Reservation.  For more than 40 years, Favell worked in the land-
appraisal and lumber-brokerage business.  Watters and Favell were prime candidates for 
the management specialist positions.  The third member, Phillips resided in Salem, 
Oregon.  He had decades of experience in car sales and had recently worked in the real 
estate business.  Less than a year in the position, Phillips resigned from the management 
specialists’ team to take a position on Former Secretary McKay’s political campaign.  
The BIA chose not to hire anyone to fill the empty position.  Watters and Favell became 
the sole members of the management specialist team.143   
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Soon after accepting their appointments, the management specialists contracted the 
Stanford Research Institute to conduct a social and economic study on the Klamath 
Tribes and the region surrounding the Klamath Reservation.  The study, which the 
Stanford Research Institute completed in April 1956, was supposed to provide the 
management specialists with data that would guide them through their duties during the 
termination process.  When the management specialists opened the report for the first 
time, they faced a statement that would foreshadow the conservation-based amendments 
Congress later added to the Klamath Termination Act.  On page one, they read: “The 
desirability of changes is particularly evident in the sale or disposition of timber 
resources and in the establishment and operation of a legal entity for the management of 
tribal property.”144  The report offered very few specific suggestions for how the 
management specialists should try to change or amend the law. 
The most alarming aspect of the Stanford Research Institute’s report was a 
preliminary survey of the amount of tribal members who planned to withdraw from the 
tribe during termination.  According to section five of the termination act, the Klamaths 
would have to liquidate 70% or roughly one-half million acres of tribal land within two 
years from the termination act’s instatement in order to pay off the withdrawing 
members.  When Jackson agreed to the Klamath Termination Act of 1954, his faction did 
not expect the majority of the tribal members to withdraw.  The survey revealed that 
about 70% of the tribal members planned to withdraw.145 
Soon after the Stanford Research Institute released its report, the BIA acknowledged 
the problems within the Klamath Termination Act.  Commissioner of Indian Affairs Glen 
Emmons and four other Bureau representatives met with three members of the Jackson 
party 17-18 September 1956 to discuss the termination process and what that party 
believed was the best future plan for the tribal forest.  Jackson did most of the talking for 
his party at this meeting.  He argued that the tribal members did not really understand the 
termination act and that they really needed more time to prepare for termination.  But, 
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Jackson and his party were not against termination in general.  Jackson clearly remarked 
that he and his followers believed that Congress should not repeal the termination act.  
Jackson stated, “We are not saying that we want the law repealed, because I don’t know 
just how we would function.  Just what course of administration could we possibly adopt 
other than going back to where we started from.”146  Similar to the Crawfords, Jackson’s 
party desired to change the administration of their reservation.  They were not willing to 
continue federal guardianship.  At this meeting, his party advocated that the federal 
government buy the tribal forest.  Last, Jackson wanted to know what plan would govern 
the remaining members.   
Commissioner Emmons responded to Jackson with rhetorical questions.  He did not 
understand how a plan for the remaining members could be made before the tribal 
members made their decisions to withdraw or remain.  His words demonstrate his 
determination to follow the procedures outlined in the Klamath Termination Act.  
Commissioner Emmons explained:  
Until that appraisal is made, you can’t have a referendum [withdrawal 
election].  Until the referendum is made, how in the world can any plan be 
worked out.  If indication is that 20 per cent only are going to remain and 80 
per cent want to go out, then that is going to require a different type of 
amendatory legislation even necessary possibly if only 20 per cent go out.147 
 
Commissioner Emmons was taking into account the very different outcomes that the 
withdrawal election might have.  If most of the Klamaths elected to remain, then the BIA 
would be comfortable allowing the tribes to incorporate or form some other legal entity in 
order to manage their forest assets.  However, if only a minority of Klamaths remained in 
the tribe, the BIA would suggest that a trustee take over the management of the remaining 
tribal members’ assets.  Although Commissioner Emmons’ justification for future 
planning may have made sense from the BIA’s perspective, the Commissioner was not 
taking into account the influence that the unknown plan might have had on tribal 
members’ decisions to remain or to withdraw. 
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Jackson continued to argue for the importance of having a plan for the withdrawing 
members developed after the appraisal.  “…[U]pon the completion of the these appraisals 
there also must be a cut-and-dried plan, organization, of some sort of legal entity and that 
is where this stop-gap amendment come in.  It proposes to create that ‘missing link,’ we 
think, is not in the law now.”148  Jackson’s party supported slowing down the termination 
with a stop-gap bill.  A stop-gap bill would allow the tribes, the Interior, and the public to 
voice their concerns for amendments to the Klamath Termination Act. 
The Stanford Research Institute’s study, combined with others the management 
specialists conducted themselves, influenced their next plan of action.  The management 
specialists suggested that Congress amend the Klamaths’ termination act.  In October of 
1956 the Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs reconvened for a hearing in Klamath 
Falls, Oregon.  At this hearing, Watters explained the management specialists’ view of 
the Klamath Termination Act: “…[T]he information derived from the studies has led us 
to believe that the law, if carried out in its present form, will jeopardize both the long-
term welfare of the Klamath Indians and the interests of the community in which they 
live.”149  The management specialists outlined seven proposals for amendments.  The 
proposals included, state acquisition or federal acquisition of the tribal land, 
postponement of the termination deadlines, a sustained-yield requirement for any future 
owner of the tribal forest, a requirement that the federal government pay the withdrawing 
tribal members the extra value of the reservation above the price acquired for selling the 
forest under the sustained-yield requirement, and variations of these.150 
During this hearing, the management specialists confirmed their suggestion for the 
federal purchase of the entire reservation and for the required sustained-yield 
management of that forest.  “After studying the basic qualities of each of the proposed 
methods we now believe that the most feasible method for terminating this trust 
responsibility is through the federal purchase of the Klamath tribal property by the 
Government,” stated Watters at the hearing.  He continued, “Such a purchase, if made, 
should be on a basis which recognizes our Government’s great moral as well as its legal 
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obligation to the Klamath Indians.”151  Furthermore, they argued that the deadline for the 
Klamaths’ termination process should be extended.152  The management specialists, like 
Jackson, supported the stop-gap measure for the Klamaths’ termination process.  Soon 
the Interior would support it also. 
On 7 January 1957, Secretary of Interior Hatfield Chilson sent identical letters to the 
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House.  In this letter he spoke to the 
importance of the proposed stop-gap bill that Jackson had discussed with Commissioner 
Glen Emmons during their meeting in September of 1956.  “…Inasmuch as it is the 
public interest that is involved, some form of public ownership comes to be the only 
reasonable approach.”  Commissioner Emmons continued, “We therefore recommend 
that the sale of any part of the forest should be stopped for the reasonable time in order 
that Congress may consider further whether public acquisition by the Federal or State 
government will be authorized.”153  The Senate and House passed this amendment bill to 
postpone the sale of the tribal land.  In the extension period, Congress held hearings that 
unearthed the profound conservation concerns the Klamath Termination Act evoked 
among Klamath tribal members and non-Indians in northern California, southern Oregon, 
and throughout the State of Oregon. 
 
Amendment Hearings 
The congressional amendment hearings can be characterized by many themes because 
of the varied perspectives witnesses offered.  First the Klamath tribal members, including 
members of both factions, and other tribal members who did not identify with either 
faction, participated in the hearings.  Second, the BIA representatives argued for their 
role as guardian of the tribes as well as their responsibility to help conserve natural 
resources for the public good.  Third, regional civic leaders, conservationists, local 
farmers, small and large regional timber companies, and timber and forestry associations, 
voiced their opinions.  These are simply generalizations about the more than 150 
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testimonies in the hearing records.  Understanding the general arguments of these groups 
illuminates the need for conservation-based amendments.154 
Since their unexpected agreement before Congress in 1953, the factional leaders, 
Jackson and Crawford, had redeveloped opposing views.  Jackson maintained his 
argument for more planning and a slower termination process.  He and his supporters, 
Jesse Kirk, Elnathan Davis, and Dibbon Cook, continued to agree that federal purchase 
was the best option for their termination process.  Federal purchase had three benefits.  
First, the federal purchase would secure a “fair, competitive market price” for the 
withdrawing members.  Second, the remaining members would realize their future timber 
economy benefits.  Conservation of the forest under federal purchase would curtail any 
flooding of the timber market that might have occurred if the land were sold to multiple 
private investors and clear cut.  More supply than demand would reduce prices that 
remaining members could acquire by selling their timber resources.155 
However, other tribal members, especially members of the Crawford faction, gave 
alternative testimonies.  Crawford was sure that the tribes would be better off if they 
dismantled the tribal government, sold their land, split their assets, and went their 
separate ways.156  He had been fighting for withdrawal and termination legislation for 
decades.  He and his followers argued that the Klamath Termination Act should not be 
amended.  Crawford stated in the amendment hearing in October of 1957, “I favor 
carrying out Public Law 587.”  The main reason Crawford said he objected to Senator 
Neuberger’s proposal for federal purchase was because he did not know what the assets 
were worth or what the federal government would pay for them.  Crawford told Senator 
Neuberger, “I don’t care who buys [the reservation land].  We are interested in getting the 
most for it, but what I am afraid of in your bill here is…[that] I don’t know what our 
values are.”157  Federal purchase would exclude private purchasers and, therefore, restrict 
the Klamaths from accepting the highest bid for their resources.  Crawford had suggested 
federal purchase numerous times in previous congressional hearings.  When he realized 
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that federal purchase might reduce the price the tribes might receive for their land, he 
opposed it.  Opening the sale of the tribal lands to the public, would have increased 
competitive bids and resulted in larger revenue for the withdrawing members.158   
Not all members joined Crawford or Jackson.  Many tribal members did not know who to 
trust or what termination really meant.  Termination had become a nebulous concept and 
unfathomable to many members of the Klamath Tribes.159 
The BIA was very aware of the factional disagreements among the Klamath Tribal 
members, but still insisted that the termination of the tribes’ supervision should continue.  
Under Secretary O. Hatfield Chilson expressed the Interior Department’s view that the 
factionalism was “one of the difficult problems connected with termination of Federal 
supervision over the Klamath Tribe.”  He explained, “One faction desired, upon 
termination, that their share of the tribal assets should be paid or distributed to them as 
individuals, and the other faction desired to hold the tribal assets in communal 
ownership.”  Under Secretary Chilson argued that the best way to solve the problems 
associated with the Klamaths’ termination act was to amend it in a way that benefited the 
tribal members and the local and regional non-Indian community.160   
The Interior Department fully recognized the economic and ecological impacts the 
Klamath Termination Act posed.  They, too, saw the future of the Klamath Tribes’ 
termination process influenced by conservation measures.  Unlike Senator Neuberger, 
who favored the federal purchase of the entire reservation, the Interior suggested that the 
tribal forest land should first be offered to private investors.  “If private industry will buy 
any of the forest at the same price that the United States would pay, but subject to an 
enforced sustained yield [sic] requirement, the conservation objective will be 
accomplished and a large Federal expenditure will be avoided.”161   
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Plenty of non-Indians at the hearings willingly discussed the conservation issues.  A 
local group of farmers and ranchers who belonged to the Klamath Water Users Protective 
Association [KWUPA] sent a representative to the amendment hearing in October of 
1957.  KWUPA’s resolutions clearly outlined their conservation interests for amending 
the Klamath Termination Act.  The association estimated that in its final stage of 
development the Klamath Basin, south of the reservation, would support about 600,000 
acres of farm and ranch land.  The very source of their irrigation water was the Upper 
Klamath River Watershed, which the Klamath Reservation largely encompassed.  They 
argued that the federal government, either the Forest Service, Bureau of Land 
Management, or another capable agency, should purchase and manage the reservation 
land under sustained-yield management.  This plan would support the interests of the 
downstream agriculturalists whose livelihoods depended on the integrity of the Upper 
Klamath River Watershed.162 
However, not all of KWUPA’s members fully supported the federal purchase of the 
tribal land.  Members of the Tule Lake Irrigation District of the Klamath Project, a 
Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) farming and irrigation development in southern Oregon 
and northern California, testified separately from the other KWUPA representative.  The 
Tule Lake Irrigation District is the most southern point of the reclamation project, which 
lies within northern California.  They depended on the return flow of water for irrigation.  
Return flow is the water that comes originally from the Upper Klamath River Watershed.  
This water is used to irrigate reclamation land farther north in the project, and is, then, 
cycled through to the Tule Lake Irrigation District before it reenters the Klamath River 
system.  These members of KWUPA contended that Congress should allow private 
purchase, “if at all possible.”163  The Tule Lake Irrigation District representative did not 
elaborate on why their district supported private purchase over federal purchase; 
however, they never directly stated that they completely opposed federal purchase, either.  
The Klamath Falls Chamber of Commerce studied the Klamath tribal termination and 
conservation issues.  They maintained that they normally did not support expanding the 
federal control of lands in their county, as their county was largely federally owned.  
                                                 
162 Amendments to the Klamath Termination Act of 1954, Part 1, 72-73. 
163 Ibid, quote, 119; complete statement of Tule Lake Irrigation District of KWUPA, 119-121. 
 71 
They “slowly and painfully” derived, what they believed to be, a careful decision, despite 
that they were defying their fundamental view of promoting private ownership.  “Either 
the Federal Government must take over this timber and operate it on sustained yield or 
this forest must disappear from the face of the earth….”  The Chamber of Commerce 
based their decision on the risk of clear cutting that might occur if termination led to 
private purchase.  Clear cutting would lead to an over supply of timber and saturate the 
local economy.  Furthermore, clear cutting would affect run-off from the forest, creating 
further implications for the local farmers who depended on the forest for its water storage 
and water filtering capabilities.  Moreover, they argued that clear cutting the enormous 
ponderosa pine forest would be a loss to the United States.  Pine from the Klamaths’ 
forest supported the United States in WWI and WWII.  If not clear cut, the forest had the 
capability of supporting the “Nation’s economy” for years to come.  The only solution 
that they believed would protect both the timber and farming industries was federal 
purchase.164   
The Klamath Sportsmen’s Association was another group of citizens interested in 
conservation issues.  The members of this organization believed that the reservation land 
should not pass into private ownership.  Instead, they argued that it should be available to 
the public for hunting, fishing, and other recreational activities.  This association was also 
concerned with the future management of the forest.  The possibility of clear-cutting and 
poor forest management that might result under the Klamath Termination Act could lead 
to heavy erosion and to silted streams.  Moreover, a clear-cut forest, they argued, would 
not provide cover and other necessary elements of habitat for game and wildlife.  They 
believed the federal government should purchase the Klamath Reservation and manage 
the forest under sustained-yield management in order “to afford maximum protection to 
fisheries and wildlife.”165  
The Klamath Falls Citizens Committee (Citizens Committee), an adhoc group of 
locals, presented the Senate Subcommittee on Indian Affairs a petition for the federal 
purchase of the Klamath Reservation.  They studied three future possibilities for the tribal 
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land.  Those possibilities included selling the land in small tracts to private individuals 
and selling all the land to the State of Oregon or to the federal government.  The Citizens 
Committee decided “that the only solution that offers a fair return to the Klamath Indians 
and that will protect the watershed and economy of this area” was federal purchase.  They 
understood that the federal government had experience in managing large forest tracts 
under sustained-yield management.  Furthermore, they expected that private purchasers 
of small forest tracts would easily clear-cut the forest under Oregon laws.  The Citizens 
Committee argued against the State of Oregon purchasing the land because of 
undisclosed economic and political issues.  They had collected about 430 signatures from 
Klamath Falls locals and from citizens in the nearby communities of Medford, Ashland, 
and Bend, Oregon.  The risk the Klamath Termination Act posed for the conservation of 
resources in southern Oregon had grown to a regional issue.166   
Senator Neuberger informed the regional timber businesses and associations of the 
controversy over the Klamath Reservation timber.  He also solicited verbal and written 
testimonies from them.  During the first amendment hearing in October of 1957, Senator 
Neuberger was disappointed at the lack of feedback he had received from the timber 
industry.  He was surprised to find that the Western Pine Association (WPA) submitted a 
terse written testimony in which took no position on the Klamath timber issue as of 
October of 1957.  His frustration is evident in his statement to the participants of the 
October of 1957 hearing, “[W]hen a great organization representing many lumber 
producers such as the Western Pine Association declines to submit their views, it seems 
to me that they have deliberately left a vacuum as to their own wishes and 
recommendations in this matter…”  He further commented on need for the timber 
industry to participate in the amendment process during the hearings.  “I doubt if there 
will be any opportunity other than these hearings at Klamath Falls or Portland for these 
views to be submitted.”  The WPA had another chance to offer their perspective on the 
future management of the 800,000-acre Klamath forest during the February of 1958 
hearing.  Again, the WPA submitted a brief statement.  They still had no definitive 
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response to the amendment discussions.  The one opinion they gave was their support for 
private rather than federal ownership.167  
A small amount of forestry and timber associations and companies submitted their 
suggestions for amendments.  The American Forestry Association (AFA) made a point to 
submit a written statement that included their stance on the Klamath timber issue.  
Conservation of the Klamaths’ natural resources and the economic futures of the regional 
economy were of utmost importance to the AFA.  The AFA argued that the Klamath 
timber must be kept under sustained-yield management.  They explained their point of 
view in a written statement during the October 1957 amendment hearings: “’that the 
disposal of timber lands of the Klamath Indian Reservation should be made under such 
conditions as will assure sustained forest production and maximum permanent 
contribution to the economy of the area including the economy of the Indians 
themselves.’”168  The AFA published a slew of articles about the Klamaths’ termination 
and the related conservation issues between 1954 and 1961 in their journal, American 
Forests.  During these years, they closely tracked the amendment hearings and the 
amending legislation proposed for the Klamath Termination Act.  The AFA maintained 
their argument for the continued sustained-yield requirement of the Klamaths’ forest in 
the amendment hearing held in February of 1958.  The AFA also maintained their 
argument for private purchase over federal purchase of this land.169 
Another organization, the National Lumber Manufacturing Association (NMLA), 
offered their suggestions as well in the October of 1957 amendment hearings.  The 
NMLA supported the public sale of the Klamath Reservation forest.  Public sale to 
private individuals would increase Klamath County’s tax base and allow the Klamath 
Tribes to receive the highest possible bid.  Furthermore, the NMLA argued that federal 
purchase would restrict private individuals, including the Klamath Indians, from 
investing in timber resources in a region that is mostly federal owned.  Unlike the AFA, 
the NMLA ardently opposed any sustained-yield requirement on privately-owned land.  
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The NMLA viewed federal oversight of private land as unnecessary and unjust in the 
sense that it would restrict private property rights.170  
Weyerhaeuser Timber Company, the largest timber company in the region, including 
Klamath, Lake, and Deschutes counties in Oregon gave both a verbal and written 
statement at the October of 1957 hearing.  Weyerhaeuser sternly contended that 
sustained-yield management of the Klamath Reservation forest was vital for the health of 
the regional economy and watershed.  They had implemented this conservation measure 
on their own lands for the last 50 years.  Under this premise, they argued that federal 
purchase was not the only way to ensure the sustained-yield management of forest 
resources.  Furthermore, Weyerhaeuser advocated the mandatory sustained-yield 
management of the forest tracts sold to private investors.  In order to promote competitive 
bidding on tracts under the sustained-yield requirement, they suggested that the federal 
government pay the tribes the difference between selling without sustained-yield 
restrictions versus selling with sustained-yield restrictions.  Last, Weyerhaeuser 
advocated that the federal government be allowed to bid on the Klamaths’ forest land 
after the public sale ended.  During the February of 1958 hearing, Weyerhaeuser 
reaffirmed their arguments.171 
The Western Forest Industries Association (WFIA) based in Portland, Oregon, which 
WFIA represented small- and medium-sized timber companies, provided a verbal 
statement at both amendment hearings.  During the October of 1957 hearing, their 
suggestion for the future management of the Klamaths’ timber was different than any 
other forest or timber group that gave a statement.  They offered a plan for the 
management of both the remaining and withdrawing Klamath tribal members’ resources.  
WFIA’s representative recommended that the Forest Service manage the remaining 
members’ forest resources for them after termination.  They also argued that the Forest 
Service should purchase and oversee the forest land that the Klamaths sell to payoff their 
withdrawing members.  Not until the hearing in February of 1958 did the WFIA discuss 
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the importance of sustained-yield forestry practices.  The WFIA asserted, like others in 
the timber industry, that the large tracts required for sustained-yield management would 
be too large for the smaller timber companies in the region.  Moreover, they argued that 
the government should not oversee the management of private land or sustained-yield 
purposes.  Instead, they maintained that the Forest Service should simply purchase the 
whole reservation so that the agency could manage the whole forest under sustained-yield 
practices.  This way, the private timber companies would be able to benefit from the sale 
of forest tracts in the forest, and the public would benefit from the Forest Service’s 
multiple use management practices.172 
A couple of timber industry members, who had not testified in the October of 1957 
hearing, commented on the Klamath forest and termination issue during the amendment 
hearing in February of 1958.  Both supported the mandatory sustained-yield restriction on 
the Klamath Reservation forest.  The Southern Oregon Conservation & Tree Farm 
Association did not comment whether they preferred federal or private purchase.  
However, the Car-Ad-Co Company, a small timber company in Klamath Falls, advocated 
the federal purchase of the Klamath Reservation forest.  Like the WFIA and 
Weyerhaeuser, the Car-Ad-Co Company argued that the sustained-yield forest units 
would be too large for smaller timber companies to afford.173 
The range of voices at the hearings and the different viewpoints presented show how 
conservation management of the Klamaths’ forestland and marshland became a crucial 
aspect for both economic and ecological reasons.  The next question would become, 
“How will Congress handle this ‘stubborn Klamath dilemma’?” 174 
 
Amending the Klamath Termination Act 
Congress made two conservation-based amendments to the Klamath Termination of 
1954.  The first amendment afforded the management specialists more time for the 
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termination process and gave Congress a chance to study the conservation concerns that 
spawned from the original termination act.  By slowing down the process, this 
amendment also reversed the need for the management specialists to liquidate the tribal 
property so quickly.  The second amendment led to the future sustained-yield 
management of the Klamaths’ forest and the federal purchase of most of that forest. 
Congress reviewed two amendment bills that focused on conserving the tribal 
forestlands.  These bills both suggested means for conserving the forested lands and for 
safeguarding the future of the Klamaths’ marshes.  The main difference between the two 
bills was who would be allowed to purchase the Klamaths’ land during the termination 
process.   
Senator Richard Neuberger presented the first bill, S. 2047.  He remained adamant 
that the federal government should purchase the entire reservation from the Klamath 
Tribes.  He argued that this plan would guarantee the conservation of the forest- and 
marshlands as public goods and at the same time offer the Klamath Tribes a “fair and 
generous price” for the Klamath Tribes. His bill did not offer any of the tribal land for 
sale to the public.  Instead, S. 2047 required the federal purchase of the whole reservation 
at a price based on a professional appraisal and negotiated with the Klamath Tribes.  In 
his article, “Solving the Klamath Dilemma” published in American Forests, Senator 
Neuberger boasted the support his bill had received from the Klamath Tribal Council, 
namely Jackson’s party.175  
The Interior’s bill presented a similar plan for the Klamaths’ land.  Their bill, S. 3051, 
recognized the importance of conserving the forest through sustained-yield cutting.  They 
also supported federal purchase of the tribal land.  However, the Interior maintained that 
the land first should be offered to the public in large enough tracts that would allow for 
mandatory sustained-yield management.  The tribe would sell large tracts of land at their 
realization value.  Realization value refers to the price the tribe would receive if they sold 
their land unrestricted on the open market.  After the public sale period, the federal 
government could buy any remaining sustained-yield tracts.  As for the Klamaths’ marsh, 
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the Interior contended that the federal government should purchase the wetland and 
manage it as a national wildlife refuge.176 
Senator Neuberger did not oppose the Interior’s bill, but he viewed it as the second-
best option for the Klamaths’ forest.  After speaking with many of his fellow senators, he 
came to the conclusion that he would not get enough support from the Senate to pass his 
bill for the federal purchase of the whole reservation.  He learned that the Senate was 
skeptical of the large sum of money needed for the federal acquisition of such a large 
estate.  Therefore, he stated, “I think S. 3051, for all its imperfections, at least points the 
way to a permanent and fair solution of the Klamath problem – fair to the Indians in 
price, and fair to the non-Indian community in permanent protection of the forest, marsh 
and watershed resource.”177  
 
As Senator Neuberger predicted, Congress passed the Interior’s bill, S. 3051 in 1958.  
Because 78% of the Klamaths withdrew from the tribe, the management specialists 
liquidated approximately 78% of the jointly-held assets.  As the Interior had wished, the 
passing of S. 3051 opened the tribal land for sale to private individuals.  The amended 
termination law required that the new owner of the forest land manage their land under 
sustained-yield forestry practices.178   
Despite the open public sale of 11 large, sustained-yield forest tracts on the Klamath 
Reservation, the federal government purchased the greatest amount of Klamath Indian 
land.  A private buyer purchased one sustained-yield tract totaling 91,541 acres.  The 
Forest Service bought the remaining 10 sustained-yield tracts, which totaled 525,680 
acres.  With a majority of the forestland, the Forest Service established the Winema 
National Forest, which they named after a Modoc heroine.  They added some of the most 
eastern portions of the forest to Fremont National Forest.  The management specialists 
sold 84 miscellaneous “fringe units,” equal to a total of 84,006 acres, to private buyers.  
The amended termination act also required the federal government to buy the Klamaths’ 
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marsh and manage it as a national wildlife refuge.  The federal government, then, divided 
the newly liquidated assets and awarded each withdrawing Klamath about $43,500 
dollars in one lump sum.  In August of 1961, the government completed the Klamaths’ 
termination.   
The remaining members retained their portion of the jointly-held tribal land.  
However, they did not reserve their rights to manage their land.  Most of the members 
who remained were deemed incompetent because of disabilities or their statuses as 
minors or senior citizens.  The United States National Bank in Portland, Oregon, 
managed the remaining members’ assets—about 135,000 acres of forested land.179   
 
Conclusion 
Congress and the BIA had deliberated for decades over how to end the Klamaths’ 
federal supervision.  As chapter three argued, the hearings during the Indian New Deal 
era reveal how the Klamaths’ tribal factions, the BIA, and Congress influenced the 
development of the Klamath Termination Act.  Soon after Congress passed the Klamath 
Termination Act of 1954, however, tribal members and local non-Indians bombarded 
Congress, the BIA, and the management specialists with economic and ecological 
concerns about the act.  Because such a large percentage of the tribal members planned to 
withdraw, the Klamaths would have to liquidate complimentary amount of the 
reservation—presumably their forest.  The tribes’ nearly one-million-acre reservation 
included one of the largest stands of ponderosa pine trees in the nation and a marsh that 
was integral to birds that migrated on the Pacific Flyway.  The tribal land, rich with 
natural resources, was as much a public good as it was a tribal resource.  The sustained 
harvest of trees and the stability of the watershed were important to the continued success 
of the regional timber and agricultural economies.   
Instead of continuing with the hasty termination program spelled out in the Klamath 
Termination Act of 1954, Congress spent three years amending the act for conservation 
reasons.  The final conservation-based amendments to the act extended the Klamaths’ 
termination period and led to the federal purchase and conservation of most of the tribes’ 
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former reservation.  The outcomes of the conservation-based amendments, most notably 
the federal purchase and sustained-yield requirement, may not have seemed immediately 
like helpful outcomes for the Klamaths.  However, in the decades following the 
termination era, the Klamaths developed ways to take advantage of the federal ownership 
of their former forest land. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GAINING POLITICAL GROUND 
 
When they signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the US Forest Service 
in 1999, the Klamath Tribes garnered management rights for nearly 600,000 acres of 
their former reservation.180  The MOA is a formal document that outlines the meaning of 
the Klamath Tribes’ government-to-government relationship with the Forest Service.  
Not only does the MOA reconfirm the tribes’ rights to protect their treaty resources as a 
sovereign nation, it reaffirms the mandatory responsibility of the Forest Service to protect 
the Klamaths’ treaty rights within the agency’s jurisdiction.  The MOA explicitly outlines 
the Forest Service’s substantive and procedural duties concerning their mandatory 
government-to-government relationship with the Klamath Tribes.  The Forest Service 
maintained jurisdiction over most of the former tribal land since 1961, after the federal 
government completed the Klamaths’ termination process.  The Klamaths, who lost their 
federal recognition as an Indian tribe and who lost their highly-valuable forest land 
through the termination process in the 1950s, would gain political ground in the decades 
after termination.  By the 1990s, they not only reaffirmed their many treaty rights, 
restored their federal recognition and guardianship, they acquired a management role 
over their former forest land.  During these four decades, the Klamaths have benefited 
from the conservation-based amendments to their termination act.  Understanding how 
they have benefited requires background on the coalescence of environmental policy and 
federal Indian self-determination policy.  
One year after the federal government completed the Klamaths’ termination process, 
natural historian Rachel Carson published Silent Spring (1962).  Carson’s book formed 
the foundation of a new social movement based on national environmental awareness.  
This movement pressured Congress to pass numerous environmental laws in the ensuing 
decades. The Klamaths took advantage of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970 
(NEPA) after the conservation-based amendments encouraged the federal purchase of 
most of their reservation forest.  Congress wrote NEPA to encourage public participation 
                                                 
180 “Memorandum of Agreement: The Klamath Tribes and the U.S. Forest Service,” 19 February 1999, as 
amended 17 February 2005, unsigned copy in my possession. Hereinafter referred to as “1999 MOA.” 
 81 
and disclosure and to require federal agencies to consider how their projects might 
significantly harm the environment.  However, NEPA was not the only environmental 
policy tool that the Klamath Tribes used to earn their management rights as a tribal 
sovereign nation.  The Appeals Reform Act of 1992 provided the administrative process 
for the Klamaths to appeal Forest Service decisions concerning their former reservation 
forest under what is known as the Forest Service administrative appeals process (FS 
appeals process).  Prior to 1992, the Forest Service had voluntarily created a public 
appeals process, which allowed public parties to participate in the agency’s planning 
process.  In 1992, the Forest Service attempted to abolish the rules that provided the 
framework for the public participation process.  However, Congress passed the Appeals 
Reform Act of 1992 in order to require the Forest Service to continue following a similar 
public appeals process.  Since the majority of the Klamaths’ former reservation land 
remained under federal ownership after termination, the Klamaths could take advantage 
of both of NEPA and the FS appeals process.181 
Many Native Americans who look back at the 1960s and 1970s remember the 
coalescence of the Pan-Indian Movement and the related activism associated with 
members of Red Power.  The grassroots initiatives among tribal communities during 
these decades built the foundation for an important shift in federal Indian policy from 
termination to self-determination.  The Indian Self-Determination and Indian Education 
Assistance Act of 1975 became the counterpoint of termination policy.  Self-
determination policy reassured tribes of their sovereignty and their simultaneous ward 
status created by their trust relationship.  Sovereignty meant that tribal governments 
would be able to take responsibility for duties that the BIA had in the past.  Sovereignty 
would ensure tribes’ rights for government-to-government relationships with federal 
agencies.  At the same time, the wardship status of tribes required federal agencies, like 
the Forest Service, to protect tribes’ treaty rights.182   
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Francis Paul Prucha describes how treaties became of utmost importance to tribes in 
the self-determination era:  
The treaties, which reformers at the end of the nineteenth century considered 
an obstacle to the progress of Indians, have turned out, in the late twentieth 
century, to be one of the principal bastions of protection for the lands, the 
political autonomy, and the hunting and fishing rights of present-day 
reservation Indians.183 
 
This held true for the Klamaths.  They bolstered their tribal resurgence with three federal 
court decisions in the 1970s that reaffirmed their treaty-promised water rights and their 
rights to hunting, fishing, gathering, and trapping on their former 860,000-acre 
reservation.  Two decades later, the Klamaths combined those treaty rights with the 
NEPA process and the FS appeals process to garner management rights over their former 
reservation through their MOA with the Forest Service.  The Klamaths’ self-
determination history suggests that a nexus exists, where self-determination policy 
intersects with environmental law, allowing Native Americans to empower themselves as 
no other social group can.184 
Historians and scholars of Native American studies have focused their research on 
both the general trends among American Indian communities and specific instances of 
tribal empowerment during the self-determination era.  Books like Peter Iverson’s We 
Are Still Here: American Indians in the Twentieth Century and Charles Wilkinson’s 
Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations document the collective 
accomplishments of tribes across the nation in the 20th century.  Their research brings 
together the tribal goals of economic self-sufficiency, cultural renewal, and self-
government into the tightly-braided strand of self-determination.  Another such volume, 
Trusteeship in Change: Toward Tribal Autonomy in Resource Management, edited by 
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Richmond Clow and Imre Sutton, explores the need for trusteeship reform and the 
possible environmental and tribal benefits that might result.185 
Other scholars have honed their studies on Native American tribes and their forest 
resources.  Native American studies scholars Lawrence Lesko and Renee Thakali focus 
on the “increased government-to-government relationships” tribes have with the US 
Forest Service.  They use the Hopi Tribe’s experience to argue that through these 
relationships US Forest Service managers are realizing the benefits of traditional tribal 
knowledge and are incorporating this knowledge into contemporary forest management 
practices.186  The Klamath Tribes’ history, although very different from the Hopi Tribe’s 
because of termination, actually parallels that of the Hopi in respect to recent 
developments concerning tribal forest management.   
Patrick Haynal effectively demonstrates in his doctoral dissertation, “From 
Termination through Restoration and Beyond: Modern Klamath Cultural Identity,” how 
the Klamath Tribes have used the dominant culture’s legal system to their benefit by 
lobbying politicians, filing suit, and taking advantage of the mass media.  These actions 
have allowed the Klamaths to reaffirm their subsistence treaty-rights and their federal 
status as an Indian tribe.  Haynal, however, does not include the Klamaths’ participation 
in the NEPA process in his dissertation or in his later published essay titled, “Termination 
and Tribal Survival: The Klamath Tribes of Oregon.”  My focus on the tribes’ use of the 
NEPA and FS appeals processes and litigation strengthens Haynal’s argument.187   
 
Effects of Termination on the Klamaths 
Policymakers predicated termination policy on the idea that Indians would liberate 
themselves by fully assimilating into mainstream society, America’s “cultural melting 
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pot.”  For a policy that was written to liberate the Klamaths, termination did not 
accomplish its desired end.  During the decades after termination, the Klamaths 
experienced increased alcoholism and health problems, and death rates that surpassed the 
national average.  Termination not only ended federal programs for healthcare and 
education, the policy also erased the Klamaths’ legal and political status.188  
Moreover, Haynal contends that termination policy negatively affected some tribal 
members more than others.  He explains that the Klamaths’ termination created three 
social groups among the Klamaths: the “withdrawing members,” the “remaining 
members,” and the “descendants.”  The withdrawing members received their share of the 
tribal assets in cash, about $43,500 each.  They no longer held title to any of the former 
reservation land unless they had retained their allotted land.189   
The remaining members included tribal members who chose to remain members of 
the tribe and not take their shares of the tribal estate in cash.  The majority of this group, 
however, included those members whom the federal government designated incompetent 
to manage their own affairs, such as minors or elderly members.  The federal government 
transferred its trusteeship position to the US National Bank in Portland, Oregon.  Under 
this plan, the remaining members still had no say in the management of their land.190   
By the end of the 1960s, the remaining members had each received about $50,000 
dollars from timber sales on their jointly-held 135,000 acres of forested land.  Frustrated 
with the bank’s inability to protect the tribal members’ land from exploitation by non-
Indian hunters and fishermen, the remaining members elected, by a close vote, to end 
their trust relationship with US National Bank in the early 1970s.  Without consulting the 
remaining Klamaths, US Bank officials decided to liquidate the trust lands and divvy the 
money among the remaining members.  Although some members wanted their share of 
assets as land, the bank rejected this proposition.  In 1974, US National Bank sold the 
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remaining members’ 135,000 acres of forested land to the US Forest Service.  The last of 
any of the Klamaths’ tribally-held land had passed out of Klamath ownership.191 
The descendants, those born after the BIA closed the Klamaths’ roll in 1954, Haynal 
argues, probably suffered the most.  This group of Klamath tribal members did not 
benefit directly from the liquidation of tribal assets.  Not only that, termination restricted 
the descendents from benefiting from federal programs for Native Americans.  They 
grew up during a confusing time, when federal policy put their identities in question and 
the political structure of the tribal government, which would have held their community 
together, was no longer functioning.192 
Haynal argues that termination did not directly restrict tribal governments from 
acting.  However, by removing tribes from their land bases and their jurisdiction over a 
geographic area, termination policy rendered tribal governments seemingly useless.  
Haynal speaks to the importance of every culture maintaining a basic political system that 
manages authority and social norms and that provides the accepted action for violating 
those norms.  The Klamaths’ government had fulfilled the important role of sustaining a 
distinct culture and political identity different from the non-Klamaths living nearby.  
Without their tribal government, the Klamaths struggled to perpetuate their tribal culture 
from 1961 to 1975.193 
In the late-1960s, however, Klamaths established the Organization of the Forgotten 
American (OFA) in Klamath Falls, Oregon, a city 30 miles south of the central Klamath 
tribal community.  Although the OFA did not constitute a governing body for the 
Klamaths, it did offer limited health programs for tribal members and provided an outlet 
for the Klamaths’ voices in a tribally-distributed newsletter titled, Mukluks Hemcunga, or 
“Klamath Talk.”  This newsletter informed the Klamaths of social gatherings, allowed 
tribal members to express their artwork and poems in a public forum. Moreover, the 
newsletter informed the Klamaths about important political happenings.  The OFA acted 
as a political body for the tribes.  According to Haynal the presence of the OFA made it 
hard for the local and state governments to ignore the interests of the Klamath Tribes.  
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Likewise, tribal interests around the nation were more pronounced as the self-
determination movement emerged.194   
 
The Self-Determination Era 
During the decades that followed the Klamaths’ termination, Indian nations gained 
power on many levels.  Native American communities around the United States provided 
the political momentum for the transition from termination to self-determination policy.  
Activism among members of the Red Power movement; conservative measures, such as 
tribes taking advantage of the Office Economic Opportunity grants; and tribal successes 
in federal court spurred the pan-Indian movement.  Law professor and historian Charles 
Wilkinson refers to the empowerment of tribes during this time as “new winds” in Indian 
Country.195  
Despite termination and its negative impact on the Klamath tribal community, the 
Klamaths could also feel the “new winds in Indian country” that Wilkinson describes.  
After the state of Oregon arrested members of the Klamath Tribes in the early-1970s for 
hunting without state licenses on their former reservation, the Klamaths took the State of 
Oregon to federal court.  They believed that termination did not end their treaty-promised 
rights to hunt, fish, and gather foods on the former reservation.  The State of Oregon 
argued that after termination the tribal members were to be regarded as citizens of 
Oregon with no special tribal rights.  The federal court split the case into two decisions.  
First, they needed to determine whether or not Congress intended to end the Klamaths’ 
treaty rights.  They decided, in effect, that Congress intended termination to end the 
federal responsibility, and, therefore, the support the Klamaths received through social 
programs created for Native Americans because of their political status as Indians.  In no 
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way, did Congress declare their intention to abrogate the Klamaths’ treaty rights.  The 
federal court made this decision in 1974 and named it Kimball I.196   
The court then evaluated the geographic extent to which the Klamaths’ treaty rights 
were valid.  The court decided that the Klamaths’ treaty rights to fish, hunt, trap, and 
gather without state licenses applied to the boundaries of the former reservation just prior 
to termination in 1954.  Since the Department of Agriculture managed most of the former 
reservation, the Klamaths would be guaranteed their treaty rights in that jurisdiction.  
Only with permission from the owner could the Klamaths practice their treaty rights on 
privately-owned land within their former reservation.  Furthermore, the courts granted the 
Klamaths the sovereign right to manage their tribal members’ use of the treaty-promised 
resources.  The court finalized its decision in 1979, and referred to it as Kimball II.197 
Furthermore, Kimball II required the Klamaths and the State of Oregon to develop a 
wildlife management scheme that recognized the Klamaths’ sovereignty within the 
former reservation boundaries.  The State of Oregon had assumed the responsibility of 
managing wildlife within the reservation boundaries during those years between the 
tribes’ termination in the 1960s and Kimball II in 1979.  The Klamaths, the Oregon Fish 
and Wildlife Commission, and the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife came to an 
agreement in 1981.  The formal document that outlines this agreement is the 1981 
Consent Decree.  This document established a formal agreement to support the Klamaths 
in their efforts to act as a sovereign nation as far as their treaty resources were concerned.  
The Consent Decree limited the rights of Oregon state agencies to prosecute tribal 
members for exercising their treaty rights to fish, hunt, and trap on the former 
reservation.  Probably the most important aspect of the 1981 Consent Decree was that it 
explicitly recognized the sovereign rights and responsibilities of the Klamath Tribes, 
which would allow them to oversee the management of wildlife on the former 
reservation.  Elwood Miller, Jr., a tribal natural resources technician, later explained the 
purpose of the Consent Decree: “Through the Consent Decree all parties mutually agreed 
to coordinate manage[ment] activities to meet natural resource concerns.  The stated 
purpose of the agreement was: ‘To promote the sound and efficient management and 
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conservation of fish and wildlife resources within the areas comprising the former 
Klamath Indian Reservation to ensure future use of these resources by both the Klamath 
Indians and non-Indians.’”198 
 Since the 1981 Consent Decree, the Klamaths had collaborated with federal and 
Oregon state wildlife management agencies through the Interagency Technical Advisory 
Committee (ITAC).  The Klamaths and government agencies organized ITAC in order to 
fulfill their duties and responsibilities required by the Consent Decree.199  ITAC became a 
working group that developed and implemented methods for studying and managing 
wildlife within the former reservation.  The Forest Service is not listed explicitly in the 
Consent Decree and did not participate in ITAC.  However, as a government agency, the 
Forest Service must fulfill its fiduciary responsibility to protect tribal treaty rights.  
Moreover, the Forest Service recognized the 1981 Consent Decree by publishing it as an 
appendix to their forest plan for Winema National Forest (1990). 
During the same year as Kimball II, the federal courts reaffirmed the Klamaths’ 
senior water rights.  This case, Adair, is currently in the fourth phase.  The water rights 
did not play a direct role in the Klamaths’ later NEPA participation, but they did bolster 
the tribes politically.  During this decade, any political boost for the Klamaths was 
important to their overall morale after termination.200  
 
Restoration of the Tribes’ Federal Status 
Soon after the Klamaths reaffirmed their federal treaty rights for water and 
subsistence needs and their right to act as a sovereign over their members, they 
campaigned for the restoration of their federally-recognized tribal status and the 
reacquisition of their former reservation lands.  They believed the land would be the 
center point of their full restoration and future economic self-sufficiency.  The Klamaths 
                                                 
198 1981 Consent Decree in Land and Resource Management Plan: Winema National Forest, United States 
Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, 1990, Appendix D, 4-7. Hereinafter 
referred to as “1981 Consent Decree.” Quote in Elwood Miller, Jr., to Lee Coonce, chief forester, Winema 
National Forest, 25 November 1987, Chiloquin Ranger District, Chiloquin, Oregon, “Appeals History” 
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199 Portland Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs (unreadable signature) to John Buttruille, regional 
forester, USFS, 8 December 1989, Chiloquin District Office, Chiloquin, Oregon, “Appeals History” 
vertical files. 
200 United States v. Adair, full citation in note 184. 
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soon found, though, that reacquiring their former reservation would not be a simple 
task.201    
With support from Oregon Republican Representative Bob Smith, the Klamath Tribes 
initiated their plan for reinstating their trust relationship with the United States in the 
early 1980s.  Representative Smith suggested that the Klamaths first focus solely on 
reestablishing their federal status as Native American tribe.  In 1986, Congress redeemed 
the Klamaths’ federal trust relationship and recognized them as a sovereign nation.  The 
tribes still believed that restoration was only the beginning of their tribes’ 
reestablishment.  The rebuilding of their sovereignty would not be complete without their 
forest land.202    
The Klamaths’ forest represented monetary wealth, but the forest was also a primary 
source of food and medicine.  Many tribal members still hunted and fished and collected 
plants on the former reservation.  Moreover, many areas within the forest were 
considered sacred by the tribes.  The Klamaths’ ability to protect these foods, medicinal 
plants, and sacred grounds were vital to their cultural renewal.  Prior to termination, the 
BIA managed the Klamaths’ forest.  Since termination and the conservation-based 
amendments to the Klamath Termination Act, the Forest Service owned most of the 
Klamaths’ former forest land.203   
 
NEPA and the Forest Service Administrative Appeals Process 
While the Klamaths and other Native American tribes joined forces in the self-
determination movement in the 1960s and 1970s, many other US citizens focused on 
developing environmental policies.  Environmental degradation had become mainstream 
knowledge, which encouraged the public to pressure federal agencies to identify the 
                                                 
201 Land reacquisition as central feature of restoration, see Pati O’Conner, “Bill Seeks Tribal Restoration,” 
Herald and News (Klamath Falls, Or), 23 August 1985; Todd Kepple, “Klamath Tribes OK Plan to Seek 
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effects of their actions on the environment and to include public participation in the 
federal decision-making process. 
When Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act in 1969, they couched 
the policy in terms of federal agency “good faith” and public disclosure.  Federal agency 
“good faith” refers to an agency’s obligation to use their best judgment in adhering to the 
terms of NEPA.  The public disclosure clause in NEPA illuminates the importance of 
informing the public of federal agency plans and decisions and, then, allowing the public 
to comment on those federal actions.  These two fundamental aspects of NEPA became 
important to the Klamath Tribes, whose former reservation forest was managed mostly 
by the Forest Service.  The Klamaths maintained subsistence rights to their former land, 
even that land that was under private ownership.  However, they were guaranteed access 
to the federally-managed portion of their former reservation forest.204 
NEPA requires federal agencies to study all “major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the human environment.”205  A major federal action might be a proposed timber 
sale, and the human environment affected could be a region in which the Klamath Tribes 
gather medicinal and dietary plants.  According to NEPA, the Forest Service would have 
to issue an in-depth analysis, or an environmental impact statement (EIS), which would 
disclose the agency’s analysis of the proposed timber sale.  This report must explain the 
environmental impacts of the timber sale, including those that cannot be avoided.  
Furthermore, the report must include alternatives plans for the proposed timber sale and 
must compare the projects’ short-term and long-term effects on the tribes’ use of that 
timber sale region.  Last, the Forest Service would be required under NEPA to report the 
timber sale’s irreversible effects on resources.206   
However, the Forest Service can circumvent their need for a full analytical report of 
the proposed timber sale.  NEPA only requires the Forest Service to complete an EIS if 
the timber sale will significantly impact the human environment, for instance, 
substantially reducing a native wildlife population.  Another qualifier of significance is if 
the proposed action may violate a federal law, such as a treaty right, which the Klamaths 
                                                 
204 Federal agency “good faith” and public disclosure, see Zygmunt J. B. Plater et al., Environmental Law 
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claimed in their appeals.  When an agency is unsure if its project will significantly harm 
the environment, federal agencies can first complete an environmental assessment (EA).  
An EA is a succinct public document that should include evidentiary support for the 
agency’s conclusion about the significance of impacts.  In an EA, an agency will choose 
to either proceed with an EIS, or a finding of no significant impact (FONSI). Therefore, a 
FONSI requires no EIS.  The Forest Service that managed the Klamaths’ former 
reservation routinely completed EAs and released FONSIs for timber sales and other 
decisions concerning forested land that was formerly within the Klamath Reservation 
boundary.  They denied that their projects would compromise the tribes’ treaty rights.207   
As Lesko and Thakali explain, NEPA opened the door for tribes nationwide to engage 
in the forest management process with several federal agencies.  By submitting 
substantive comments during the NEPA comment period for environmental assessments 
(EA), the Klamaths established their standing for appeals during the FS appeals process, 
the agency’s established administrative dispute resolution process.  Both NEPA and the 
FS appeals processes became integral to the Klamaths’ later political victory that afforded 
them a right to participate in the Forest Services’ forest management process at a higher 
level than the non-Indian public.208  
The Forest Service’s duty as a federal agency was to protect the Klamaths’ 
subsistence treaty rights on former Klamath lands in the national forests.  At the same 
time, self-determination was supposed to have modified the federal trust relationship in a 
way that would encourage tribal involvement as a sovereign nation in the management of 
their resources, especially those protected by their treaties.  After participating in the 
timber sale planning process with the Forest Service under the auspices of tribal 
sovereignty and self-determination, the Klamaths were dissatisfied with the effort of the 
Forest Service to include them in the planning process.  Within a year after restoring their 
                                                                                                                                                 
206 Determination of significance, see 40 CFR 1508.27. EIS, 40 CFR 1502. 
207 EA at agency discretion, 40 CFR 1501.3(a) and 1508.27(10).  Valerie M. Fogleman explores the 
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 92 
status as a federally-recognized tribe in 1986, the Klamaths began planning new 
tactics.209   
The NEPA and the FS appeals processes offered the Klamaths another route.  The 
1981 Consent Decree did not outline procedures for how the Forest Service would 
include the tribes in the planning process.  Furthermore, the Klamaths did not have any 
other established framework for their government-to-government consultation process 
with the Forest Service.  The Klamaths believed that the Forest Service should include 
the tribes in the planning process prior to the NEPA and appeals processes so as to 
acknowledge the Klamaths’ sovereignty.  The Forest Service resisted the tribes’ requests 
for such inclusion in the Forest Service’s planning process.  As the record below 
indicates, the Forest Service willingly met with the Klamaths and discussed the meaning 
of a government-to-government relationship many times over the course of a decade.  But 
until the federal court mandated that the two parties formalize an agreement concerning 
the meaning of that relationship in 1996, the Forest Service continued to allow the 
Klamaths to participate in their planning process as any other public party could.  In order 
to maintain influence in the Forest Service’s decisions regarding the tribes’ former forest, 
the Klamaths began commenting during the NEPA process and filing appeals in the FS 
appeals process.  In this way, the Klamaths were able to formally cite their continued 
interest in the management of their former forest.   
Any citizen can participate in the NEPA and FS appeals processes through a public 
comment period, but the agency only has to respond to comments made by parties with 
substantive claims.  The Klamaths’ basis for establishing standing, their right to appeal 
under the regulations of the FS appeals process, was dependent on two factors.  First, the 
Klamaths cited their treaty rights guaranteed by their 1864 treaty.  Second, the tribes had 
qualified themselves for the appeal process by participating in the NEPA process 
comment period for the sale under scrutiny.210     
                                                 
209 David Getches et al provide a summary of changes in the federal-tribal relationship through legislation 
and case law in their volume, see multiple chapters. Despite that the Klamaths did not have federal 
recognition until 1986, they retained their treaty rights after termination and their sovereign right to manage 
their tribal members’ taking of treaty resources, as the federal court decided in Kimball I and Kimball II.  
210 Parties with substantive claims, 40 CFR 1503.1 and 1506.6. Rebecca Craven, tribal attorney, to James 
Torrence, regional forester, Pacific Northwest Region, USFS, 1 July 1988, Chiloquin District Office, 
“Appeals History” vertical files. Craven refers to the forest appeals in 1987 as the first the Klamaths had 
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The Klamaths’ appeals and their correspondence with the Forest Service unearth a 
discordant relationship between the Forest Service and the Klamath Tribes.  Woven 
throughout this inharmonious relationship are the meanings of the federal trust 
responsibility, tribal sovereignty, and treaty rights.  The Klamaths had a different 
understanding of a government-to-government consultation process than did the Forest 
Service officials.  The Klamaths continual efforts to assert their treaty rights and 
sovereignty through the NEPA and FS appeals processes resulted in a negotiated 
government-to-government agreement in the form of an MOA between the two parties.   
Two interconnected arguments the Klamaths made consistently from 1987 to 1999 
demonstrate how the NEPA, FS appeals process, and self-determination nexus became a 
tool for tribal empowerment.  The Klamaths’ two main arguments against the Forest 
Service were that the agency failed to protect the tribes’ treaty rights and that the agency 
was not providing the Klamaths with a meaningful government-to-government 
consultation process.  These two interconnected arguments wrapped tightly around a 
common thread that links many of the tribes’ NEPA comments and appeals.  This 
common thread was the Klamaths’ continual claim that the Forest Service failed to 
analyze, or to analyze correctly, the effects of multiple Forest Service actions on mule 
deer populations and habitat.  The Klamath Tribes raised many other concerns such as the 
inadequacy of the Forest Service’s EAs and EISs to address the impacts of their proposed 
actions on tribal sacred and cultural sites, fishing rights, and old growth stands.  The 
consistency with which the tribes showed their concern for mule deer analysis in their 
appeals and the connection of mule deer to both tribal treaty rights and sovereignty makes 
the mule deer concern a prime example for explaining this history.  More than that, the 
Forest Service recognized the mule deer as a management indicator species (MIS) in the 
Winema Forest Plan (1990).  The Forest Service uses management indicator species to 
gauge forest health.  Thus, the mule deer should have been a common focus of interest 
and planning of land management activities within the forest.211 
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The mule deer is an integral subsistence food for the Klamaths and protected under 
their treaty provisions.  Not only that, the hunting of mule deer is an important part of the 
tribes’ culture and spirituality, as are other subsistence needs that the Klamaths fulfill by 
practicing their treaty rights.  The Klamaths described the connection of their treaty rights 
to spirituality in an appeal they filed with the Forest Service in 1988: “[E]xercise of treaty 
right includes a significant religious and spiritual component.  Not only is the hunting and 
fishing right exercised for subsistence purposes, but it is also part and parcel of tribal 
members’ spiritual existence which cannot be separated from the exercise of the hunting 
and fishing right itself.”212  Klamath tribal member Don Gentry, the natural resources 
specialist for the tribes, argued for the importance of Klamaths to practice their treaty 
right to hunt in his affidavit included with another tribal appeal in 1991.  Gentry 
maintained, “I hunt, fish, and gather primarily for my immediate family and father-in-
law, and occasionally for other elders that are unable to perform these activities 
themselves.”  Gentry further explained, “I…have learned, through these activities, about 
the Klamath Tribes’ cultural practices and the issues of great significance to our 
culture.”213  The Klamaths argued that possible significant effects to mule deer habitat 
could reduce mule deer populations and limit the ability of the Klamaths to depend on 
mule deer as a subsistence food and to pass on certain aspects of their culture.   
During their extensive participation in both the NEPA and appeals processes, the 
Klamaths believed that the Forest Service was not taking into account the tribes’ 
comments and concerns for their treaty resources, including mule deer.  Klamath Natural 
Resource Technician Elwood Miller, Jr., clarified the tribal position in a letter to the 
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Regional Forester in November, 1987, concerning the proposed Dice Crane and Heron 
timber sales:   
Information collected by the Tribe is not being used to help develop 
alternatives to be used as a token gesture by the District and Supervisors [sic] 
office.  The concerns in these sales are very real, important, and legitimate for 
the protection of the treaty.  Cultural, spiritual and subsistence rights of the 
Klamath Tribe are a Treaty right [sic], however, the support of these rights by 
the United States Forest Service is questionable.214 
 
From the tribes’ perspective, the Forest Service was listening to the Klamaths’ 
concerns, but they were not implementing measures in their decisions that adequately 
addressed the needs of the tribes.  However, as a federal agency, the Forest Service was 
charged with the responsibility to protect the tribes’ treaty rights.  Moreover, self-
determination had promised tribal sovereignty.  Sovereignty secured the Klamaths’ rights 
to interact with federal agencies in a government-to-government manner. 
Throughout the period of Klamath appeals over numerous Forest Service projects, the 
mule deer populations were declining in the region of the former reservation.  The 
Klamaths were working in partnership with the Oregon Department of Fish and Game 
through the Interagency Technical Advisory Committee (ITAC).  ITAC was an outcome 
of the 1981 Consent Decree.  At times the Forest Service also participated in this 
technical group.  However, on multiple occasions, they chose not to incorporate ITAC’s 
scientific data or the group’s models into their environmental assessments.  In the latter 
part of the Klamaths’ appeals history the Forest Service made an effort to work with 
ITAC.  This effort, however, did not hold credibility when Klamaths saw that the Forest 
Service either improperly applied the model in an EA or chose not to apply any model to 
analyze a project’s impacts on mule deer in their EA.  At least one letter written by a state 
agency member of ITAC suggests that others shared in the Klamaths’ early frustrations 
concerning the Forest Service’s decision not to apply ITAC’s mule deer model.215    
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Prior to the Klamaths’ appeal of the Dice Crain and Heron timber sales, the tribes and 
at least one non-tribal member of ITAC, requested that the Forest Service apply ITAC’s 
mule deer model in their EAs for the Winema and Fremont national forests.  Ralph Opp, 
representing the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, found the Forest Service’s 
decision not to use the ITAC mule deer model discouraging.  ITAC developed the model 
specifically for the Winema and Fremont national forests in an attempt to put “wildlife 
(mule deer primarily) into timber’s language.”216  By not implementing the ITAC model 
in their analyses, Opp explained in his 12 October 1987 letter that the Forest Service was 
“going a long way to undermine the working relationship here in the [Klamath] 
Basin…”217    
After the tribes appealed the Forest Service’s decision to implement the Dice Crane 
and Heron timber sales on 10 November 1988, they received a positive response from the 
Forest Service’s reviewing officer.  He found that “the timber sale EA’s [sic] do not 
adequately analyze and describe cumulative effects on the mule deer herd” because the 
Forest Service did not analyze a large enough area to properly analyze this.218  Similarly, 
the reviewing officer of the tribes’ 4 October 1991 appeal of the Blue Ford EA found that 
“the Fremont National Forest did not sufficiently disclose information about the effects of 
this project to the mule deer population.”219  The Klamaths Tribes had effectively shown 
that the Forest Service had failed to analyze the impacts of their decisions on mule deer.  
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However, the reviewing officer of the Dice Crain and Heron timber sales argued that the 
Forest Service had the discretion to implement whichever mule deer model it wished.  
This comment supported the agencies earlier efforts to disregard the ITAC mule deer 
model and was inconsistent with the meaning of the 1981 Consent Decree and the 
Klamaths’ rights to consult the Forest Service in a government-to-government 
relationship.220 
 Another problem with the Forest Service focusing primarily on NEPA issues 
associated with the environment, and not the tribal treaty rights or sovereignty, was that 
any public party could have made a substantial claim for the mule deer.  What should 
have made the Klamaths’ NEPA comments and appeals different from another public 
party was their status as a federally-recognized tribe with sovereignty and treaty rights.  
Any federal action that may threaten to violate a federal law, such as a treaty right, is 
considered by NEPA as significant to require an EIS rather than simply an EA.  The 
Klamaths made this argument for numerous federal actions throughout their NEPA and 
FS appeals history.  Yet, the Forest Service marginalized this claim in their internal 
policy review process as the decisions of the two reviewing officers exemplified. 
Furthermore, tribal sovereignty constitutes the Klamaths’ right for government-to-
government relationships with all federal agencies, including the Forest Service.  The 
Forest Service had a Desk Guide to Tribal Government Relations: Tribal Relations 
Advisory Group, September 1991.   This document provided Forest Service staff with a 
brief history behind the required government-to-government relationship the Forest 
Service must hold with tribal nations.  Despite containing a section on government-to-
government relations subtitled “Process and Procedures,” it provided no framework for 
tribal participation in a Forest Service planning process.  This section did suggest that 
Forest Service staff interact with tribal governments in writing rather than by phone.  
This section additionally described the rights of tribal governments over those of the 
general public in the planning process.  The document stated, “…Tribal Governments are 
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not treated as part of the ‘public’ review and comment process and the associated 
procedures with time clocks also do not apply for treaty rights issues.” 221  However, the 
Forest Service lacked both a definition for the term “government-to-government 
relationship” and a framework for such relationships.  This becomes more apparent as the 
Klamaths’ appeals history unfolds.         
In the early-1990s, the Klamath Tribes and the Forest Service began discussing the 
meaning of a government-to-government relationship.  The Klamath Tribes requested a 
formal meeting with the Forest Service to begin formulating a shared definition and plan 
for their government-to-government relationship.  Representatives of the Klamath Tribes 
and the Forest Service met on 20 July 1992 in Klamath Falls, Oregon.  This meeting 
provides evidence that the meaning of government-to-government relations was an issue 
plaguing the highest offices of the Forest Service.  Bob Tippeconnic, representing the 
Forest Service chief, explained that a major factor influencing this disagreement between 
the Klamaths and the Forest Service was the Forest Service’s lack of defined policies for 
working with tribes as sovereign nations.  Nancy Greybeal, Deputy Regional Forester, 
Region Six, concurred with Tippeconnic’s explanation.  Greybeal further explained the 
difficulty associated with the agency’s efforts at recognizing tribes in a government-to-
government relationship, rather than a ‘special interest group.’  The recorded summary of 
her comments states, “The shift from the notion of the Tribes as ‘special interest group’ is 
difficult for the agency and shouldn’t be expected to be smooth.  The commitment to 
change exists, now we need to understand what the government-to-government 
relationship really means.”222  Clarity of this term for the Forest Service and Klamath 
Tribes would take another seven years and include many more discussions, 
disagreements, and litigation.    
Because the Forest Service did not have a formal policy that outlined the government-
to-government relationship for working with the Klamaths, the tribes remained dependent 
on the NEPA and FS appeals processes.  However, the Forest Service was in the process 
of changing their appeals process about the time the tribes met with the Forest Service to 
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discuss government-to-government relations.  In 1992, the Forest Service passed a rule 
that would eliminate the public appeals process from Forest Service projects for which 
the agency had completed an EA and released a FONSI.  This rule eliminated the public 
review process NEPA intended.  The rule received a negative reaction from the public 
and from policymakers.  In response to public outcry concerning the undemocratic spirit 
of the rule, Congress passed the Forest Service Decisionmaking and Appeals Reform Act 
of 1992 (ARA) the same year.  This act reinforced the duties of the Forest Service 
required by NEPA, essentially the right for public disclosure, public comment, and public 
appeal of Forest Service actions.223 
The importance of the ARA is made clear in the case of the Klamath Tribes.  Prior to 
1992, the Klamaths had used the FS appeals process to comment on EAs and to appeal 
EAs and FONSIs.  By December of 1991, the Klamaths had appealed seven Forest 
Service EAs concerning projects within their former reservation.  If Congress had upheld 
the Forest Service’s rule to do away with public commenting on EAs for which the Forest 
Service released a FONSI, the Klamaths would not have been able to appeal many Forest 
Service actions, which they believed put their treaty rights in jeopardy.  Furthermore, the 
ARA stabilized the nexus among environmental policy, the FS appeals process, and self-
determination.  The Klamaths could continue using the two administrative processes to 
assert their treaty rights and their sovereignty.224   
While the Forest Service attempted to remove the ability of public parties to appeal 
their FONSIs in the early-1990s, the Winema National Forest staff were writing a new 
forest plan.  The Klamath Tribes commented on and appealed the Winema Forest Plan at 
all possible stages in the EIS and FS appeals process.  The Klamaths raised many 
arguments concerning the draft EIS (DEIS), the final EIS (FEIS), the record of decision, 
and the Winema Forest Plan, itself.  They contended that the Forest Service did not 
identify, analyze, and disclose the impacts of the management plan in an adequate 
manner.  By doing that, the tribes argued that the Forest Service failed to analyze the 
impact of the forest plan on the tribes’ treaty rights.  The tribes wrote in their appeal, 
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“The Klamath Tribe appreciates the Forest Plan’s recognition of the unique relationship 
between the Tribe and the Forest [Service].  However, the Tribe believes the Plan does 
not adequately protect the resources necessary for the exercise of these treaty rights.”225   
The Forest Service’s response to the Klamaths’ concerns for their treaty rights 
indicates that they still recognized the Klamaths’ role in the planning process as parallel 
to any other interested public party.  The Forest Service stated in its decision notice that 
the FEIS adequately analyzed the impacts of the forest plan on the Klamath Tribes.  The 
Forest Service decided that the agency should further analyze impacts of Forest Service 
management on Klamath tribal treaty rights during the NEPA process on a project-by-
project basis.  “The Forest Plan and the ROD [record of decision] establish an appropriate 
framework for addressing tribal concerns during project-level decisionmaking….”226  In 
its “Native American Rights and Claims” section the Winema Forest Plan directs the 
local districts to recognize treaty rights and the agency’s obligation to protect those rights 
during the NEPA process.  “The Forest [Service], through the NEPA process, will 
analyze, disclose and consider potential effects on the tribe,” the plan states.  This section 
directs the district staff to “inform and invite participation from the Klamath Tribe in 
planning of resource management activities,” including an annual coordination 
meeting.227  These directives in the Winema Forest Plan did not provide the Klamaths 
with a sovereign role on a government-to-government level.  Instead, they reaffirmed the 
need for the Klamath Tribes to continue using the NEPA and FS appeals processes—
something they believed they could avoid through a relationship with the Forest Service 
that allowed them in on the planning process earlier than those for public interests.    
The Klamaths and the Forest Service continued their discussions about government-
to-government processes into the mid-1990s.  These discussions, however, did not curb 
the Klamaths’ NEPA comments on and appeals of Forest Service projects.  Rather than 
                                                                                                                                                 
on 7 March 2008. The Forest Service began managing the Fremont and Winema national forests as one 
forest in 2001. 
225 Klamath Tribes’ appeal of the Forest Service’s record of decision approving the Winema National 
Forest  Land and Natural Resource Management Plan and final environmental impact statement, 3 January 
1991, Chiloquin Ranger District, Chiloquin, Oregon, “Appeals History” vertical files. 
226 David G. Unger, Reviewing Officer for the Chief, USFS, to Tom J. Ball, Chairman, Klamath Tribe, 
Notice of Decision for the Klamath Tribes’ Appeal of the Winema National Forest Plan, 13 October 1993, 
Chiloquin Ranger Station, “Appeals History” vertical files.   
227 Land and Resource Management Plan: Winema National Forest, United States Department of 
Agriculture, Forest Service, Pacific Northwest Region, 1990, 4-58. 
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realize improvement in their working relationship with the Forest Service, the Klamath 
Tribes’ frustration with the Forest Service continued.  The Klamaths met with Forest 
Service officials, again, on 18 April 1995 in a continued effort to agree on a policy 
directive for the Forest Service’s government-to-government relationship with the 
Klamath Tribes.  Modesto Jimenez, vice chairman of the Klamath Tribes, described what 
the Klamath Tribes sought in their government-to-government relationship with the 
Forest Service in a letter after the meeting.  “Our basic concept of the government-to-
government relationship is that the agency and the Tribes meet prior to any activities 
being planned, and look at the former reservation (and surrounding ecosystem) as a 
whole, and work out—cooperatively—policies and activities appropriate to that area…,” 
wrote Jimenez. 228  
In 1996, fifteen years had passed since the 1981 Consent Decree and almost 10 had 
passed since the Klamaths had begun their intense dedication to NEPA commenting and 
the FS appeals process.  Over the last decade, the Forest Service had either withdrawn or 
remanded only six of the Klamaths’ 14 appeals by January of 1996.  In not one of these 
instances had the reason for rethinking the project included recognition of the need for 
government-to-government consultation with the Klamath.  In other words, the tribes’ 
participation in the NEPA and FS appeals processes was changing the Forest Service’s 
approach to meeting its duty to protect the tribes’ treaty rights and acknowledge the 
Klamaths’ sovereignty.  In their 14th appeal, filed in January of 1996 for the Ford timber 
sale, the Klamaths described the reasoning behind their continued participation in the 
NEPA commenting and FS appeals processes.229 
As has often been the case with timber sales authorized on the Winema National 
Forest, the Forest staff’s failure to consult with the Tribes has forced the Tribes to 
appeal the timber sale in order to have any meaningful input into the decision….It 
appears that Forest staff take the position that it is simply easier to keep the Tribes 
out of the process until the last possible moment.  As should be obvious by now, 
this only forces the Tribes into the unfortunate position of being an adversary in 
                                                 
228 Jimenez Medesto, Klamath Tribes Vice Chairman, to John Lowe, Regional Forester, Portland, OR, RE: 
Meeting with Klamath Tribes and Request for Policy Directive, 18 April 1995. This letter does not include 
meeting minutes. The letter documents the Klamaths Tribes’ response to the discussions during the 
meeting. 
229 The Forest Service remands or withdraws a decision when they determine through their administrative 
procedures that they need to rethink the decision.  
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the appeals process, rather than in the co-management position envisioned by the 
Consent Decree.230 
 
In practice and despite the Forest Service’s own Desk Guide to Government Relations, 
the Forest Service was still allowing the Klamaths to participate in the planning process 
only as the agency allowed any other public citizen or group.  The Klamaths argued that 
if the Forest Service allowed the tribes to work collaboratively with the agency prior to 
the NEPA process, as the Consent Decree suggested, together they could reduce the need 
for the tribes to appeal Forest Service decisions. 
A closer look at the Klamaths’ Ford timber sale appeal explains why the Klamaths 
still believed that the Forest Service was not including them in the agency’s planning 
process.  The Forest Service created the Ford timber sale by splitting it from an earlier 
sale known as the Dorf timber sale.  As the tribes explained in their appeal of the Ford 
timber sale, the Forest Service had created a “hybrid sale” by combining units included in 
previously proposed timber sales.  Rather than complete a new EA for the newly-
designated Ford timber sale, the Forest Service proceeded to send the Klamath Tribes a 
decision notice for the sale.  By not completing a new EA for the “hybrid sale,” the 
Klamaths argued that the Forest Service had breached the requirements of NEPA.  The 
Klamath Tribes had commented on and appealed the Dorf timber sale.  A new sale 
required a new EA or EIS.  Aside from violating NEPA, the Klamaths contended that the 
Forest Service failed to consult the tribes before issuing their decision notice.  By not 
consulting the Klamaths prior to signing their decision notice for this new sale, the tribes 
further argued that the Forest Service violated the tribes’ rights for government-to-
government consultation and the NEPA requirement for public disclosure and 
commenting.231 
The mule deer thread surfaces in the Ford timber sale much as it did in many of the 
tribes’ earliest appeals in the late-1980s.  In their Ford appeal, the Klamaths contended 
that the Forest Service was not addressing their treaty rights adequately because the 
Forest Service failed to analyze the impacts of the sale on mule deer populations.  The 
                                                 
230 “Notice of Appeal and Statement of Reasons Filed by the Klamath Tribes against the Environmental 
Assessment, Decision Notice, and Finding of No Significant Impact Authorizing the Ford Timber Sale,” 23 
January 1996, Chiloquin District Office, Chiloquin, Oregon, “Appeals History” vertical files. 
231 Ibid. 
 103 
tribes explained in bold-face type that the EA for the Dorf timber sale, which the Forest 
Service was using as their EA for the Ford timber sale, “explicitly states that no analysis 
of the impacts of this harvest on mule populations was conducted.”  The tribes had raised 
their concerns for mule deer populations in appeals and discussions with the Forest 
Service for almost 10 years.  According to the tribes’ appeal, the Forest Service 
contended that the timber sale would benefit mule deer in their decision notice for the 
Ford timber sale.  The Klamaths argued, however, that if the Forest Service did not 
analyze the sale’s impacts (both positive and negative), they did not have evidence that 
the sale would be beneficial for mule deer.232 
The NEPA and FS appeals processes were time consuming and expensive for the 
Klamaths, but they were the only way the tribes believed they could get the Forest 
Service to acknowledge, even partially, their concerns for their treaty rights and 
sovereignty.  The Klamaths faced additional disagreement with other Forest Service 
decisions in 1995 and 1996 as well. 
After Congress passed the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional 
Disaster Assistance, for Anti-terrorism Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from 
the Tragedy That Occurred at Oklahoma City, and Recissions Act of 1995 (Recissions 
Act), the Klamaths found their treaty rights at stake, again.  The Recissions Act allowed 
the Forest Service to speed the process of awarding timber contracts.  One provision in 
the act “requires the release and harvesting, ‘not withstanding any other provision of 
law,’ of ‘all timber sale contracts offered or awarded before [the Act’s enactment] in any 
unit of the National Forest system….’”  This provision raised the question of whether or 
not the Recissions Act abrogated the Klamaths’ treaty rights.  The Forest Service 
contracted eight timber sales under the Recissions Act.   
The Klamaths believed the Forest Service violated the tribes’ sovereign rights to 
protect their treaty rights by not meaningfully consulting with the tribes before allowing 
the timber sales.  The Klamath Tribes had used the NEPA and FS appeals processes for 
almost 10 years by 1996.  Their efforts in these processes were not resulting in effective 
                                                 
232 Ibid. The Forest Service’s appeals history record indicates that the Forest Service both implemented the 
sale and remanded the Ford sale on the same day, 23 January 1996. Whether they remanded the entire sale 
or just part of it is not clear from the records I have to review. See, “Appeals History Environmental 
Assessment, 1987-2004, Chiloquin Ranger District, Updated 30, 2004.”  
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changes in their interactions with the Forest Service.  The Klamaths’ NEPA and appeal 
record would come in handy, though.  The FS appeals process offered another 
advantageous factor for the Klamaths—litigation.  The ARA states that after a public 
party has exhausted all of its resources, the party can file suit against a federal agency for 
not complying with NEPA, or some other federal policy under the Administrative 
Procedures Act.  After almost a decade spent commenting on and appealing timber sales 
and forest plans within their former reservation boundaries, the Klamaths packed their 
briefcases and took the Forest Service to federal court.  The tribes brought with them 
their extensive NEPA and appeals record they had created over the last decade.233 
 
Tribes v. U.S. and the 1999 Memorandum of Agreement 
In 1996 the Klamath Tribes argued in federal court that the Recissions Act did not 
negate their treaty rights.  They alleged that the Forest Service “breached its trust 
responsibility to ensure that the former reservation lands are managed so as to protect the 
tribes’ treaty rights,” when the Forest Service failed to participate in meaningful 
consultation with the tribes prior to awarding eight timber sales under the Recissions 
Act.234  Two corporate defendants, timber contract holders of the sales under discussion, 
argued that the Recissions Act invalidated the Klamaths’ treaty rights because of the 
section that nullified “any other provision of law.”   The Forest Service disagreed with 
the corporate defendants.  They not only argued that the Recissions Act did not abrogate 
the tribes’ treaty rights, they also contended that they “consistently and regularly 
consulted with the Klamath Tribes regarding the timber sales.”  In doing so, the Forest 
Service argued that the agency had carried out its trust duties.235   
                                                 
233 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Additional Disaster Assistance, for Anti-terrorism 
Initiatives, for Assistance in the Recovery from the Tragedy That Occurred at Oklahoma City, and 
Recissions Act,U.S. Statutes at Large 109 (1995):194. Tribes v. U.S., 2 October 1996, Not reported in F. 
Supp., See West Law, WL 924509 (D. Or.). Quotes are taken from the West Law case summary not the 
testimonies. 40 CFR 1500.3. This section explains that “Parts 1500 through 1508 of this title provide 
regulations applicable to and binding on all Federal agencies for implementing the procedural provisions of 
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.” Mary H. O’Brien argues that the threat of litigation is the 
main factor that encourages agencies to comply with NEPA. See O’brien, “NEPA as It Was Meant to Be: 
NCAP v. Block, Herbicides, and Region 6 Forest Service,” Environmental Law 20 (1990), 736-745. Party’s 
right to pursue litigation after exhaustion resources through administrative procedures, U.S. Code, vol. 5, 
sec. 704. 
234 Ibid. 
235 Ibid. 
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The main argument was really between the tribes and Forest Service over what 
constitutes “meaningful consultation.”236  The tribes did not deny that they met with 
Forest Service officials for meetings, fieldtrips, and other such consultation procedures.  
However, the tribes found that even after meeting with Forest Service officials the Forest 
Service planned projects that ultimately did not acknowledge the tribal interests in 
protecting their treaty rights.  Furthermore, the tribes argued this was evidence that the 
Forest Service was not working with them in a government-to-government relationship. 
The court sifted through the evidence and relied on previous decisions related to tribal 
treaty rights and sovereignty.  The court agreed that the tribes are sovereign nations.  But 
at the same time they are “domestic dependent nations,” that the United States owes a 
fiduciary responsibility—the protection of treaty rights.  The court further held that as a 
federal agency, the Forest Service must follow through with this fiduciary responsibility 
and recognize the Klamaths as sovereign.  The court also cited the Forest Service’s own 
policy written into the Winema National Forest Plan Appeal Decision, dated 13 October 
1993.  In this document the Forest Service acknowledged the tribes’ sovereignty by 
stating that a “determination of what constitutes compliance with treaty obligations 
should not be made unilaterally; rather, the Tribe’s view of the hunting, fishing, 
gathering, and trapping activities protected by the treaty must be solicited, discussed, and 
considered.”  The Forest Service directly referred to its responsibility to protect tribal 
treaty resources by managing “habitat to support populations necessary to sustain Tribal 
use and non-Indian harvest.”237   
In consideration of this legal history, the court decided in favor of the tribes’ request 
for a preliminary injunction for seven of the eight timber sales.  The Forest Service could 
not proceed with the logging that would “effect [sic] wildlife resources within the Tribes’ 
former reservation, without ensuring, in consultation with the Klamath Tribes on a 
government-to-government basis, that the resources on which the Tribes’ treaty rights 
                                                 
236 Ibid. 
237 Ibid.  Quotes, David G. Unger, Reviewing Officer for the Chief, USFS, to Tom J. Ball, Chairman, 
Klamath Tribe, Notice of Decision for the Klamath Tribes’ Appeal of the Winema National Forest Plan, 13 
October 1993, Chiloquin Ranger Station, Chiloquin, Oregon, “Appeals History” vertical files. See Getches 
et al., multiple chapters. 
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depend [would] be protected.”238  The court left development of an acceptable 
relationship concerning the management of the former reservation forest to the Klamaths 
and the Forest Service.239 
Three years after their litigation, the Forest Service and the tribes completed a formal 
agreement that provides a framework for their federally-mandated government-to-
government consultation process.  The resulting 1999 MOA provides not only an 
explanation of the tribes’ and the Forest Service’s rights and duties, it clearly outlines the 
Forest Service’s trust obligation to ensure that they protect the Klamaths’ treaty 
resources.   
The MOA describes the “procedural” and “substantive” responsibilities of the Forest 
Service to protect the Klamaths’ treaty rights.  The MOA contains language very similar 
to that in the Winema National Forest Plan Appeal Decision.  The Forest Service is 
required to seek out, discuss, and take into account the Klamaths’ concerns regarding 
Forest Service decisions that affect the tribes’ treaty-promised resources.  This section 
recognizes the Forest Service’s procedural duties.  The Forest Service’s substantive trust 
obligation is “to protect to the fullest extent possible the Tribes’ Treaty [sic] rights and 
the resources on which those rights depend.”  Moreover, the MOA acknowledges the 
long-standing federal court decisions that have upheld this meaning of the federal trust 
relationship and treaty rights.240  
Without the extensive record of their NEPA comments and their appeals, the 
Klamaths may not have been able to develop a strong argument for the court.  The 
Klamaths realized that by commenting in the NEPA process and applying NEPA 
regulations in their appeals, they could protect their treaty rights.241  
Furthermore, in the MOA the Forest Service promises to consult with the tribes in the 
planning procedures prior to implementing the NEPA process.  Under Section II(f) of the 
MOA, the parties acknowledge the sovereign status of the Klamath Tribes and what that 
                                                 
238 Ibid. Quotes, Tribes v. U.S., 2 October 1996, Not reported in F. Supp., See West Law, WL 924509 (D. 
Or.). 
239 The Klamaths did not stop appealing Forest Service projects during the three years it took the Klamaths 
and Forest Service to negotiate the 1999 MOA. They appealed eight more of the agency’s projects. See 
Appeal History, 1987-2004.  
240 1999 MOA. 
241 1999 MOA. During informal conversations, two Forest Service officials explained that the 2005 MOA 
has only minor amendments. For this reason I have chosen to quote from the more recent document. 
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means in terms of the their government-to-government relationship with the Forest 
Service.  In the past, the tribes had to wait until the NEPA comment period to participate 
in the Forest Service planning process like any other interested public party.   
The parties recognize that as a sovereign government, the Tribes are more 
than simply another interested public.  The Tribes and the Forest Service, as 
an agency of the federal government, work as cooperative governments in 
policy and management decisions that impact the sovereignty and other rights 
of the Klamath Tribes.242   
 
By repeatedly taking part in the NEPA and FS appeals processes, the Klamaths 
developed a record of their involvement in the Forest Service’s management process.  
This record exemplified the tribes’ vested interest in the management of their former 
reservation land, and their intent to act as a sovereign nation and to protect their treaty 
rights.  Moreover, the record showed that they exhausted all of their resources before 
filing suit.   
 
Conclusion 
The 1999 MOA on which the two parties agreed constitutes more than an 
acknowledgement of the importance of the cooperative agreement among the Oregon 
State wildlife agencies, the federal government, and the Klamath Tribes in the 1981 
Consent Decree.  The Consent Decree recognized the Klamaths’ sovereign rights and 
established TAC, but it did not outline each party’s duties in Klamaths’ and Forest 
Service’s government-to-government consultation process.  The tribes’ MOA with the 
Forest Service outlines a framework for tribal participation earlier in the planning process 
than non-Indian public parties.   
For the first time in the history of their trust relationship with the federal government, 
the Klamath Tribes have established a position of authority over a large part of the land 
they accepted in their 1864 treaty.  The Klamaths use of NEPA and the FS appeals 
processes suggests that there exists a connection between self-determination and 
environmental policy that empowers tribes in a way that other social groups can not 
realize.  The conservation-based amendments offered the Klamaths a new path after 
termination.  With tools like NEPA and the FS appeal process, the Klamaths guided 
                                                 
242 Ibid. 
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themselves down that new path during the self-determination era.  The Klamath Tribes 
have not reacquired their land at this point, but they have gained political ground. 
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CONCLUSION  
 
The Klamaths’ termination history is laden with negative meaning, and for good 
reasons.  As Stern suggests, the termination program did not provide the necessary 
preparation for Klamaths to complete their assimilation into American society.  
According to Stern, “The Klamath situation was a consequence of a reservation become a 
holding operation, with a program that had ground to a halt.”  Through termination, the 
Klamaths lost their land base, a place to call home and a substantial part of their identity.  
Termination removed federal recognition of their tribe and probably further exacerbated 
the tribal members’ “cultural confusion,” a term Stern used to describe the effect of 
assimilation and reservation on the Klamaths cultural experience.  After termination, 
many local non-Indians did not accept the Klamaths, nor did other tribes who viewed the 
Klamaths as “sell-outs.”  However, buried deep beneath the roots of personal pain and 
social and political unrest in which termination resulted are aspects of their history that 
later afforded the Klamaths hope for rebuilding their tribal nation.243   
The self-determination movement and the parallel shift in federal Indian policy in the 
1960s and 1970s fostered, among the Klamaths, a renewal of determination for rebuilding 
their community, even if it was only one political building block at a time.  Haynal 
argues, the Klamaths successfully employed “transcultural techniques,” the use of media, 
and the American political and legal system to re-establish their tribal culture.  The 
reaffirmation of the Klamaths’ treaty rights in federal court and the restoration of their 
federal trust relationship, as Haynal correctly explains, strengthened the Klamaths’ 
culture and their political clout.244        
The Klamaths could practice their treaty rights on their former reservation because 
most of it was under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service.  Their federal trust relationship 
promised them the ability to practice their treaty rights on federal lands.  During the 
termination process, the Forest Service purchased more than one-half million acres of the 
Klamaths’ forested land.  What would have been the meaning of their treaty rights if 
termination had transferred of all of their reservation lands into private ownership, as the 
                                                 
243 Stern, 1965, 266; “cultural confusion,” 227. 
244 Haynal, 1994, iv-vi. 
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original Klamath Termination Act required?  For the Klamaths to access private land and 
practice their treaty rights requires permission from private owners.  This is probably not 
easily attained.  Furthermore, the Klamaths again relied on federal jurisdiction over their 
lands in the 1980s and 1990s.  The federal purchase of most of the reservation forest 
during termination, then, became an important factor in the Klamaths’ termination and 
self-determination history.  Just how did this history unfold? 
During the termination period, the Klamaths’ termination transitioned from a 
discussion of citizenship and economic freedom for Klamath tribal members to a 
desperate congressional scramble to amend the Klamath Termination Act in light of 
conservation concerns in the region.  The original Klamath Termination Act would have 
required the Klamaths to sell most of their nearly one-million-acre reservation forest on 
the open market without any conservation restrictions.  Selling that many acres of prime 
ponderosa timber land probably would have resulted in a degraded watershed and a 
collapsed regional timber industry.  In order to avoid this, Congress passed conservation-
based amendments.  The conservation-based amendments, as I have referred to them, 
mandated the sustained-yield management of any privately- or federally- purchased forest 
land.  Moreover, they required the Klamaths to sell their forest tracts large enough to 
practice the required sustained-yield management in a practical manner.  Congress further 
amended the Klamaths’ termination act by allowing the Forest Service to purchase any of 
the large sustained-yield tracts that private investors did not buy.  The outcome of 
Congress’s conservation-based amendments was the private purchase of only one forest 
tract and the federal purchase of the remaining 10 tracts of the reservation forest.   
Soon after the restoration of their federal status, the Klamaths began asserting their 
rights for a government-to-government relationship with the Forest Service, which 
managed the majority of their former reservation.  The Klamaths participated in the 
NEPA and Forest Service administrative appeals processes from 1987 to 1996.  In this 
way, the Klamaths developed a record that demonstrated their repeated attempts to work 
with the Forest Service in a government-to-government relationship.  In 1996, the 
Klamaths sued the Forest Service.  The Forest Services’ internal review process had 
failed to acknowledge the imperative need for a government-to-government framework 
that both protected treaty rights and afforded the Klamaths a sovereign, or government-
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level, position in the Forest Service’s planning process.  When the Klamaths participated 
in NEPA and the FS appeals process, they were taking advantage of rights that any 
citizen in the USA has.  Their treaty rights and sovereignty, however, should have lent 
them a position above the rights of the average US citizen.  The federal courts agreed 
with the tribes in 1996.  The federal court enjoined seven of the eight timber sales until 
the Forest Service and the Klamaths came to a formalized agreement for their 
government-to-government relationship.  Their 1999 MOA with the Forest Service marks 
a shift in the Klamaths’ history.  The MOA provided the Klamaths with a management 
position over their former reservation forest for the first time since the pre-reservation 
years.  They could now assert their right as a sovereign and protect their treaty resources 
on which their culture and subsistence depend.           
The nearly 90 years that this history spans demonstrate not only the struggle of a 
people, but it exemplifies the strong will of a people to resist federal policy that was 
meant to put an end to their tribes.  Like their forest, the Klamaths experienced 
fragmentation, as witnessed in their factionalism and the three distinct groups created 
through termination, withdrawees, remainees, and descendants.  Despite the fracturing 
and loss of federal recognition in the 1950s the Klamaths have remained a tribe.  They 
still seek reacquisition of their former reservation forest.  They want ownership and full 
management rights of their former land base.  Until they can attain that goal, they have 
reached a victory that has redefined their political power and that has brought them that 
much closer to regaining the land they lost during termination. 
 
When Grandma Chips, Grandma Dowie’s mother, met me, my brother, and my mom 
for the first time in the early-1980s, she barely spoke a word.  Just before we left Grandpa 
Jackie and Grandma Dowie’s house, Grandma Chips gently grasped my mom’s arm.  My 
mom turned around and saw a paper grocery bag laying cut open on the floor.  Grandma 
Chips pointed at the bag and then to my mom’s foot.  Grandma Dowie explained to my 
mom that she should take off her shoes and allow Grandma Chips to trace her foot.  Then 
my mom was to allow Grandma Chips to trace both my brother’s foot and mine.  She had 
traced my dad’s foot twenty years earlier. 
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Grandma Chips sewed a pair of beaded moccasins for all four members of my family.  
Mine are tiny leather slippers that fit in the palm of my hand now.  The soft deer hide of 
the tiny moccasin exudes a natural fragrance, sweet and raw, like no other material.  I rub 
my thumb on the base of the little shoe, slick to the touch from wear.   And my fingers 
pass over the ridges of the beads Grandma Chips fastened to them about 26 years ago.   
To me, the deer hide represents the intense meaning of a cultural resource.  Over the 
last few decades, the Klamaths spent enormous amounts of energy protecting their treaty 
rights to hunt mule deer and to protect the mule deer species.  The twist in their 
termination history provided them a path to do so.  Without the conservation-based 
amendments, the original termination act may have led to the extreme fragmentation of 
the Klamaths’ reservation forest, the degradation of the forest and watershed, and the 
inability of tribal members to practice their treaty rights.  Moreover, if the forest had been 
under private ownership in the 1980s and 1990s, the Klamaths would not have been able 
to use the NEPA or FS appeals processes to assert their management rights for the forest 
resources.    
By viewing the Klamaths’ termination history in light of the conservation-based 
amendments to the Klamath Termination Act, we are not disregarding the hardship the 
Klamaths have experienced because of termination.  Instead, we are illuminating the new 
path the conservation-based amendments created for the Klamaths in the decades 
following termination.  This new path, the federal ownership of most of their former 
reservation, and the leverage provided by self-determination policy and environmental 
and administrative law afforded the Klamaths a land base on which they could continue 
to practice their treaty rights and to assert their sovereignty.     
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